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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
U. S. Army Forces in the Pacific

STAFF STUDY OPERATIONS

OLYMPIC

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EDITION

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES
IN THE PACIFIC

STAFF STUDY

"OLYMPIC"

OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN KYUSHU

1st Edition
28 May 1945.

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STAFF STUDY

"OLYMPIC"

Operations in Southern KYUSHU

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~~GENERAL HEADQUARTERS~~
~~UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES~~
IN THE PACIFIC

28 May 1945.

STAFF STUDY

"OLYMPIC"

OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN KYUSHU

1. The attached Staff Study for Operation "OLYMPIC" is derived from Strategic Plan "DOWNFALL". It constitutes the basis for directives for joint operations in Southern KYUSHU to establish air and naval forces for support of Operation "CORONET".
2. Pending the issue of directives based thereon, the Staff Study is circulated to senior Commanders and Staff Sections of United States Army Forces in the Pacific and to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, as a general guide covering the larger phases of allocation of means and of coordination, in order to facilitate planning and implementation, both operational and logistic. It is not designed to restrict executing agencies in detailed development of their final plans of operation.
3. The Study is being forwarded to the Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force, for his information and guidance.
4. Directives covering the operations to be conducted will be issued by these Headquarters at the appropriate time.

For the Commander-in-Chief.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE PACIFIC

STAFF STUDY

OPERATION

"OLYMPIC"

APO 500
28 May 1945

1. DIRECTIVE (See Chart, Annex 1, The Operation Directed).

a. This Staff Study is derived from "DOWNFALL", Strategic Plan for Operations in the Japanese Archipelago, General Headquarters, United States Army Forces in the Pacific, 28 May 1945. It covers the operations of United States Army and Navy Forces in the Pacific to occupy Southern KYUSHU with target date ("X" Day) of 1 November 1945.

b. The following basic command relationships are established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for operations of United States Army and Navy Forces against JAPAN:

- (1) Command of all United States Army resources in the Pacific (less the Twentieth Air Force, Alaskan Department and South-east Pacific) is vested in the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific.
- (2) Command of all United States Naval resources in the Pacific (less Southeast Pacific) is vested in the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
- (3) The Twentieth Air Force, for the present, continues operations under the direct control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to support the accomplishment of the over-all objective.
- (4) The Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific is charged with making plans and preparations for the campaign in JAPAN. He cooperates with the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet in the plans and preparations for the naval and amphibious phases of the invasion of JAPAN.
- (5) The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet is charged

with making plans and preparations for the naval and amphibious phases of the invasion of JAPAN. He cooperates with the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific on the plans and preparations for the campaign in JAPAN.

- (6) The Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force cooperates with the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific and with the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet in the preparation of plans connected with the invasion of JAPAN.

c. The following Directive for operation OLYMPIC has been issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

- "(1) The Joint Chiefs of Staff direct the invasion of KYUSHU (Operation OLYMPIC), Target Date, 1 November 1945; in order to:
 - (a) Intensify the blockade and aerial bombardment of JAPAN.
 - (b) Contain and destroy major enemy forces.
 - (c) Support further advances for the purpose of establishing the conditions favorable to the decisive invasion of the industrial heart of JAPAN.
- (2) CINCAFPAC-CONCSWPA.
 - (a) Is charged with the primary responsibility for the conduct of the operation OLYMPIC including control, in case of exigencies, of the actual amphibious assault through the appropriate naval commander.
 - (b) Will make plans and preparations for the continuance of the campaign in JAPAN and cooperate with CINCPAC in the plans and preparations for the naval and amphibious phases thereof.
- (3) CINCPAC-CINCPHA.
 - (a) Is charged with the responsibility for the conduct of the naval and amphibious (subject to paragraph c, (2) (a) above) phases of the OLYMPIC operations, and will correlate his plans with CINCAFPAC-CINCSWPA.
 - (b) Will cooperate with and assist CINCAFPAC in his plans and preparations for, and the conduct of, the campaign in JAPAN.

- (4) The land campaign and requirements therefor are primary in the OLYMPIC operation. Account of this will be taken in the preparation, coordination and execution of plans.
- (5) CG, Twentieth Air Force, will cooperate in the plans, preparations, and execution of operation OLYMPIC and in the continuance of the campaign in JAPAN. At appropriate times, to be determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Twentieth Air Force will come under the direction of the appropriate commander for the support of operations directed above."

d. Task

In order to accomplish the purposes laid down by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the following task for operation OLYMPIC is assigned:

"By joint overseas expeditionary operations, seize and occupy Southern KYUSHU as far north as the general line TSUNO - SENDAI and establish air and naval forces for support of Operations CORONET."

Tokyo
Plan

2. ASSUMPTIONS

- a. HOSTILE (See Annex 2a, G-2 Estimate of Enemy Situation, Southern KYUSHU, 25 April 1945).

- (1) That the Japanese will continue the war to the utmost extent of their capabilities and will prepare to defend the main islands of JAPAN utilizing all available means. That the operation will be opposed not only by the available organized military forces of the Empire, but also by a fanatically hostile population.
- (2) That the initial assault on southern KYUSHU will be opposed at the time of landing by three combat divisions plus local air, naval and service personnel.
- (3) That prompt reinforcement of the southern KYUSHU defense garrison will be attempted by troops located in northern KYUSHU, estimated to consist by target date of at least three (3) Infantry Divisions, 1 - 2 Tank Regiments, 2 Depot

Divisions and Naval ground troops. That, without interference, this reinforcement could arrive in southern KYUSHU at the rate of the equivalent of one Division every two days, commencing with opening phase of the operation.

- (4) That reinforcement of the southern KYUSHU garrison will also be attempted from HONSHU via northern KYUSHU up to a total of four additional combat Divisions, to bring the defensive force to a total of the equivalent of ten combat divisions.
- (5) That the enemy may withdraw his land-based air force to the Asiatic Mainland for protection from our neutralizing attacks. That under such circumstances he can possibly mass from 2,000 to 2,500 planes in that area by exercise of rigid economy, and that this force can operate against KYUSHU landings by staging through homeland fields.
- (6) That the attrition caused by continued land-based and carrier-based air preparation and support and by our destruction of aircraft manufacturing and maintenance facilities will reduce the hostile capability for air action against our landings to suicide attacks of uncertain proportion at an early phase of the operation.
- (7) That hostile fleet elements will be destroyed or forced to withdraw to the YELLOW SEA or Western SEA OF JAPAN. That the enemy will maintain the capability of suicide attack against a KYUSHU landing with the approximate strength of a typical carrier task group. That his remaining submarines and large number of small suicide craft will oppose our landings and that mines will be used in large numbers.
- (8) That, during the continuation of Russian neutrality, the productive capacity of hostile industries and raw material sources in MANCHURIA, North CHINA and KOREA will remain relatively unimpaired.

- (9) That the hostile logistic position will permit of a determined defense of southern KYUSHU by the forces described above.

b. OWN FORCES

- (1) That there will be no effective redeployment of major combat elements from EUROPE in time for commitment in the operation.
- (2) That the entry of RUSSIA into the war against JAPAN at some stage of the operation is not unlikely, but that in case this should occur, resources allocated to the operation will not be diverted or withdrawn.
- (3) That prior to initiation of the operation, United States forces will be established on the line BONINS-Northern RYUKYUS.
- (4) That prior to initiation of the operation, United States Air Forces will have effectively crippled the Japanese aircraft and electronics industries, and seriously reduced enemy rail movement capabilities.
- (5) That offensive air superiority over southern KYUSHU will have been attained prior to the assault.
- (6) That the United States Pacific Fleet will dominate the waters east of the main Japanese islands and the EAST CHINA SEA as far north as southern KYUSHU.
- (7) That sufficient amphibious lift will be available to mount twelve (12) reinforced Divisions for the initial assault and for at least one (1) follow-up echelon of similar size.
- (8) That mounting facilities and base establishments will be available in the PHILIPPINES, HAWAII, RYUKYUS and MARIANAS to mount the total force required to meet the target date.

3. OPERATIONS

a. CONCEPT

This Staff Study visualizes a joint overseas expeditionary operation culminating in the landing of powerful forces in and the rapid seizure of an

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area in Southern KYUSHU sufficient for establishment of overpowering land-based air forces, to cover a final decisive thrust into the industrial heart of JAPAN.

The plan is initiated by, and the operation is executed under cover of, the heaviest practicable neutralization of hostile ground, naval and air forces. The Twentieth Air Force, operating from bases in the MARIANAS and the RYUKYUS, immediately initiates and continues the destruction of the industrial power of the Japanese Islands and the Asiatic Mainland in order to paralyze the hostile effort necessary for the production, maintenance and movement of modern military forces. Carrier forces, starting at the earliest practicable date, make repeated attacks into critical areas of the Japanese Home Islands with the objectives of destroying hostile naval and air forces, interrupting land and sea communications, and attacking strategic targets on shore in cooperation with the Twentieth Air Force. Maximum practicable land-based air power is installed in the RYUKYUS and institutes and continues action to neutralize hostile air forces in the Japanese Home Islands and the Asiatic Mainland, interrupt and destroy shipping from the Asiatic Mainland, shatter communications, isolate Southern KYUSHU, and reduce defensive installations in the objective area. All air attacks are intensified as the date of landing approaches, culminating in an all-out effort from X-10 to X Day, to destroy hostile air forces in KYUSHU and closely supporting areas, isolate the objective area, reduce defenses, and cover preliminary operations and minesweeping.

An Advanced Attack Force is launched from the PHILIPPINES toward KYUSHU under cover of strong air neutralization, to arrive about X - 4. It conducts preliminary operations, as required, to seize areas for advanced emergency anchorages and to clear naval routes of approach to landing areas. Minesweeping operations are conducted concurrently with these preliminary operations, and bombardment of landing areas is instituted.

The Main Attack Force is launched from HAWAII, the MARIANAS, the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and the RYUKYUS. Proceeding to the objective area under cover of the Pacific Fleet and carrier and land-based aviation, it effects, on X Day, a three-pronged landing of one Corps each in the MIYAZAKI, AIRAKE-WAN, and KUSHIKINO areas.

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The landing forces, supported by air and naval elements, isolate the Southern KYUSHU area, seize KAGOSHIMA-WAN by rapid overland advances, destroy hostile forces, and occupy the objective area to the general line SENDAI-TSUMO.

A floating reserve of two divisions, a part of the Main Attack Force, under cover of fleet protection, appears off Eastern SHIKOKU as a diversionary threat about X-2 to X Day, thence proceeds to the RYUKYUS awaiting call for a contingent landing by a part or all of the force on the southern end of the peninsula westward of KAGOSHIMA-WAN or to reinforce any of the previous landings, as dictated by developments.

Reserves and service troops are promptly brought forward, land-based aviation is installed progressively and at the earliest practicable date, logistic facilities are developed and the area consolidated. Military Government is instituted.

The China Theater conducts neutralizing attacks against hostile air forces on the Asiatic Mainland and executes diversionary attacks by ground forces. The Southeast Asia Command conducts neutralizing attacks against hostile air forces on the MALAY PENINSULA and executes diversionary attacks with ground forces. The efforts of these two Theaters are directed towards holding Japanese air and ground forces in position. Air and naval elements based in the ALEUTIANS provide general support as practicable.

EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES

(1) Organization

- (a) For organization of United States Army Force in the Pacific, including major corresponding elements of the United States Pacific Fleet as prescribed by CINCPAC, see Chart, Annex 3 b (1) (a).

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*Relates to Authority from CINCPAC 12 Dec 45
CAG 5592*

(2) Forces

- (a) UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE PACIFIC - Command of United States Army resources in the Pacific, except Alaskan Department, Twentieth Air Force and Southeast Pacific. Inter-theater coordination. Theater command, SWPA. Coordination of ground and land-based air operations.
- SIXTH ARMY - Landing forces. Operations of ground forces. Preparation and mounting of Sixth Army elements from Western Pacific. Conduct of civil affairs. Preparation for and mounting of U. S. Army elements from KYUSHU for CORONET.
- FAR EAST AIR FORCES - Preparation of air forces for OLYMPIC. General air support. Preliminary air bombardment. Air convoy cover, as requested by United States Pacific Fleet. Air support of ground operations, in conjunction with United States Pacific Fleet.
- SEVENTH FLEET (for CINCPAC) - Preparation and mounting of Naval and Marine units from SWPA.
- UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC - Logistic support of Army forces in Western Pacific and in objective area.
- UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES MIDDLE PACIFIC - Preparation and mounting of Army elements from Middle Pacific. (for CINCPAC) Logistic support for Army elements in Middle Pacific.
- (b) UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET - Naval and amphibious operations, including strategic and general support. Inter-theater coordination. Theater command POA. Preparation and mounting of Naval and Marine Units from POA. Establishment of Naval facilities in objective area.
- (c) TWENTIETH AIR FORCE - VHB strategic and general air support.

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(3) Forces Required ✓

(a) Major ground combat elements allocated for the operation are as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>MOUNTED FROM</u>
<u>SIXTH ARMY</u>	LUZON (Manila)
40th Inf Div	PANAY (Iloilo)
11th A/B Div	LUZON (Batangas)
158th RCT	LUZON (Legaspi)
<u>V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS (Marine)</u>	HAWAII
3d Marine Div	MARIANAS (Guam)
2ND MARINE DIV	SAIPAN
4th Marine Div	HAWAII
5th Marine Div	HAWAII
<u>IX CORPS</u>	LEYTE
77th Inf Div	LEYTE (Dulag)
81st Inf Div	LEYTE (Dulag)
98th Inf Div	HAWAII
<u>XI CORPS</u>	LUZON (Manila)
1st Cav Div, reinf	LUZON (Batangas)
Americal Div	CEBU (Cebu)
43rd Inf Div	LUZON (Lingayen)
<u>I CORPS</u>	LUZON (San Fernando, La U.
25th Inf Div	LUZON (Lingayen)
33d Inf Div	LUZON (San Fernando, La U.
41st Inf Div	MINDANAO (Zamboanga)
<u>AFPAC RESERVE</u>	
Inf Div (to be designated)	PHILIPPINES
Inf Div (to be designated)	PHILIPPINES
Inf Div (to be designated)	PHILIPPINES

(b) Commitment

Total commitment, United States Army Forces in the Pacific, with attachments, is estimated as follows: (see Annex 3 b (3)(b), Tentative Troop List).

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1. Shipping Estimates

<u>Assault Echelon</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Vehicles</u>	<u>D.W.T.</u>
SIXTH ARMY			
Combat	311,474	43,589	386,963
Military Govt	2,415	568	2,282
Service	35,335	7,773	45,001
FAR EAST AIR FORCES (Including Marine)			
Combat	7,262	1,985	8,970
Service	22,438	5,023	36,799
ARMY SERVICE COMD "O"	<u>54,512</u>	<u>12,919</u>	<u>160,296</u>
TOTAL (Assault Echelon)	436,486	71,857	640,311

Follow-up Echelons

SIXTH ARMY			
Combat	68,463	12,727	100,185
Military Govt	16,555	1,675	12,444
Service	14,047	3,133	20,795
FAR EAST AIR FORCES (Including Marine)			
Combat	28,595	8,589	55,418
Service	55,840	14,045	97,350
ARMY SERVICE COMD "O"	130,243	23,373	211,558
NAVAL SHORE ESTAB'S	<u>43,159</u>	<u>5,100</u>	<u>236,368</u>
TOTAL (Follow-up Ech's)	356,902	68,642	734,118
TOTAL SHIPPING ESTIMATE	793,388	140,499	1,375,223
2. <u>Air Echelon (FEAF)</u>	<u>22,160</u>	<u>---</u>	<u>---</u>
GRAND TOTAL	815,548	140,499	1,375,223

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(c) Naval Assault Lift

CINCPAC has estimated the following naval assault lift as available for the operation:

	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Vehicles</u>	<u>DW Tons</u>
210 APA	273,000	10,500	105,000
4 APH	3,200	40	2,000
17 AP	34,000	850	11,900
95 AKA	23,750	11,400	95,000
16 LSD	3,840	800	11,200
6 LSV	4,800	300	1,500
555 LST	166,500	33,300	277,500
400 LSM	20,000	4,000	60,000
68 APD	10,200		
Total Assault Commitment	539,290	61,190	564,100

(d) Air Deployment

For deployment of air units see Charts, Annex 3b(3)(d)I and Annex 3b(3)(d)II.

(4) Operations Required (See Chart, Annex 3b(4), The Operation Required).

(a) United States Army Forces in the Pacific are assigned tasks, as follows:

1. Sixth Army

- a. Constitute the "Landing Force" for the operation.
- b. Conduct the operations of ground forces
- c. Prepare and mount United States Army Forces in the Western Pacific.

d. Utilizing *etc* elements of the 40th Inf Div (Reinf), be prepared to execute preliminary ground operations to seize, as arranged with Commander, Amphibious Forces Pacific Fleet, any or all of the following areas, concurrently with naval mine-sweeping activities (estimated to commence X - 4):

NAKAKOSHIKI URA in KOSHIKI RETTO as an advanced emergency naval anchorage and temporary sea-plane base.

The northern tip of TANEGA-SHIMA, MAGE-SHIMA, TAKE-SHIMA and IO SHIMA, to clear OSUMI STRAIT.

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Areas on KOSHIKI RETTO and/or the NOMA-MISAKI Peninsula, required to clear the sea route into the west coast landing area (KUSHIKINO).

- e. Prepare the IX Corps (less follow-up elements), initially in Sixth Army reserve afloat and consisting of the 81st Inf Div and 98th Inf Div, for diversionary appearances off the eastern coast of SHIKOKU Island during the period about "X" - 2 to "X" Day.

4a1

- f. On "X" Day, effect simultaneous amphibious assault landings as follows:

V Marine Amphibious Corps (3rd, 4th & 5th Marine Divs).

Land in the vicinity of KUSHIKINO, destroy hostile garrisons, and advance eastward to secure the western shore of KAGOSHIMA WAN.

Block movement of hostile reinforcements from the north.

XI Corps (1st Cav, Americal and 43rd Inf Divs).

Land in ARIAKE WAN, destroy hostile garrisons, and advance inland to secure the KANOYA Area and the eastern shores of KAGOSHIMA WAN.

Advance on MIYAKONOJO and assist in clearing the northern shore of KAGOSHIMA WAN.

I Corps (25th, 33rd, 41st Inf Divs).

Land in the vicinity of MIYAZAKI, destroy hostile garrisons, and advance southwest to secure MIYAKONOJO and promptly clear northern shore of KAGOSHIMA WAN. Block movement of hostile reinforcements from the north.

- g. Execute with reserve elements afloat, if required, a contingent amphibious assault landing in the vicinity of WAKI (South Coast), commencing the assault as soon as adequate naval support can be provided.

- h. Commit follow-up reserve elements (77th Inf Div and 11th A/B Div) as dictated by developments.
- i. Destroy all hostile elements south of the general line SENDAI-TSUNO.
- j. Initiate construction of air, naval and logistic facilities at the earliest practicable date, to accommodate the required garrisons.
- k. Occupy and defend radar and aircraft warning installations as arranged with Commanding General, Far East Air Forces.
- l. Institute Military Government in occupied areas. (see Annex 5 b).
- m. Prepare to support Operation "CORONET" as follows:
 - Stage and mount four (4) follow-up Divisions.
 - Stage and mount as additional follow-up elements AFPAC reserve units committed in "OLYMPIC".
- n. Prepare to conduct such overland and amphibious operations in KYUSHU and the INLAND SEA subsequent to the assault phase of Operation "CORONET", as may be directed.

4a2

- 2. FAR EAST AIR FORCES (See Annex 3 b (4)(a)2, Land-Based Air Support).
 - a. Provide aerial photography and reconnaissance as required.
 - b. In conjunction with other air forces, destroy or neutralize hostile air, sea and ground elements capable of interfering with or limiting the success of the operation.
 - c. In coordination with Naval air forces, execute preliminary air bombardment missions within the objective area, reaching maximum intensity of this bombardment during the period "X" - 10 Day to "X" Day.

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- d. By air attack against critical points along hostile routes of communication between northern and southern KYUSHU, limit to the greatest extent practicable the enemy capabilities for movement of reinforcements into the objective area from the north.
- e. Provide land-based air protection for naval forces as arranged with the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
- f. Be prepared to execute emergency air resupply missions as requested by Commanding General, Sixth Army.
- g. Promptly install the required air garrisons in the objective area.

3. SEVENTH FLEET (for CINCPAC)

- a. Prepare and mount Naval and Marine units from Southwest Pacific Area that are committed to the operation.

4. UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE MIDDLE PACIFIC

- a. Prepare and mount United States Army elements from the Middle Pacific for CINCPAC.
- b. Provide logistic support for United States Army forces in the Middle Pacific.

5. UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC

- a. Logistic support of Army forces in the Western Pacific.
- b. Establishment of ARMY SERVICE COMMAND "O" in the objective area at a time designated by CINCPAC.

(b) UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

See Annex 3b(4)(b), Summaries of pertinent portions of the preliminary Staff Study for "OLYMPIC", CINCPAC, 13 May 1945.

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(c) TWENTIETH AIR FORCE

The Twentieth Air Force will provide VHB strategic and general support for the operation.

(5) Coordination

Operations of United States Army Forces in the Pacific, the United States Pacific Fleet and the Twentieth Air Force are coordinated as follows:

(a) Establishment of Army Air Forces in the RYUKYUS

1. CINCPAC provides facilities for, and assists with all available means at his disposal, in the establishment in the RYUKYUS of elements of the Far East Air Forces as designated by CINCPAC, in order to augment air action to the maximum prior to the operation. The operation of these Army Air Forces is conducted under control of CINCPAC.
2. When the major portion of the Seventh Air Force is deployed in the RYUKYUS, the command of these forces will pass to CINCPAC. In case Seventh Air Force units are required by CINCPAC for support of local operations, arrangements are made with CINCPAC by dispatch.
3. CINCPAC continues to press development of port and airdrome facilities, and assists in establishing Army Air Forces in the RYUKYUS. CINCPAC furnishes, within the limit of his capabilities, United States Army resources to assist in the deployment of additional Army Air Forces. Representatives of CINCPAC are to inspect the present base and airfield development projects of CINCPAC and advise, through CINCPAC, of changes or additions desired to support the additional Army Air Force elements to be installed.

(b) Control of Air Forces

1. Land based air forces of the Army and of the Naval service operate under the control of CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC respectively, except:
 - a. The Twentieth Air Force operates as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
 - b. Marine air units assigned to operate with major ground elements of the Fleet Marine Force under Army control pass to the control of the Commanding General, Far East Air Forces.
 - c. When the Army is responsible for the air defense of an area or position, Marine units engaged in such air defense pass to the operational control of the appropriate Army Air Task Force Commander.
2. a. During the amphibious phase of an operation while control is exercised by CINCPAC, land-based air elements operating in the objective area are controlled by CINCPAC, through a commander designated by him. The instructions of this commander, wherever practicable, are transmitted to the appropriate land-based air echelon through an Army Air Controller who accompanies the Naval Air Commander designated.
- b. Similarly, after land-based air forces are established in the objective area and responsibility for air operations passes to CINCAFPAC, control of carrier-based air elements operating in the objective area is exercised by the Army Air Task Force Commander, KYUSHU, wherever practicable through a Navy Air Controller at the objective area.

3. For initial delimitation of the objective area for the operation see Annex 3b(5)(b)3. The amount of land-based and carrier-based air to be available in the objective area, and the duration of their respective operations, is set forth in the coordinated detailed plans of the Commander Fifth Fleet, Commanding General, Sixth United States Army, and Commanding General, Far East Air Force.
4. For general coordination of air forces and preliminary air action see Annex 3b(5)(b)4. Concentrations of air at various periods of preparation and operation are coordinated by pre-arrangement between CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC and the Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force.
5. Other details of coordination of air forces are announced as the hostile situation is more fully developed.

(c) Control of Landing Forces Ashore

1. The Commander, Fifth Fleet, controls the amphibious movement and landing through Commander, Amphibious Forces Pacific Fleet, who in turn controls the Attack Force or Group Commanders who are responsible for the amphibious operations at their respective objectives.
2. Control of forces ashore passes to the Commander of each Assault Division or each separate Landing Force, after his arrival and establishment ashore, and upon his notification to the Commander of the corresponding Naval Attack Group that he is ready to assume control of his forces ashore. The Commander of each Assault Division and separate Landing Force and the Commander of each Naval Attack Group promptly reports to his next senior Ground or Naval Commander the time he assumes or relinquishes control of forces ashore.

3. Control of forces ashore passes to each Corps Commander within his respective area of operation after his arrival and establishment ashore and upon notification to the Commander of the corresponding Naval Attack Force that he is ready to assume control of his forces ashore. Each Corps Commander and the corresponding Naval Attack Force Commander promptly reports to the Commanding General, Sixth United States Army and the Commander, Amphibious Forces Pacific Fleet; respectively:
 - a. The time each Division and separate Landing Force and its corresponding Naval Attack Group Commander assumes or relinquishes control of the forces ashore.
 - b. The time he himself assumes or relinquishes control of forces ashore.
4. Division, separate Landing Force, and Corps Commanders who have assumed control of their forces ashore continue under control of the next senior Naval Attack Force or Group Commander until their next senior Army Commander assumes control of forces ashore.
5. Control of forces ashore passes to the Commanding General, Sixth United States Army, upon his announcement to the Commander, Amphibious Forces Pacific Fleet, that he is ready to assume control of the forces ashore. The Commanding General, Sixth United States Army and the Commander, Amphibious Forces Pacific Fleet, promptly report to CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC and the Commander, Fifth Fleet, the time of assumption of control of forces ashore by the Commanding General, Sixth United States Army.

6. Nothing in this type procedure limits the two Commanders in Chief from exercising under their general responsibilities such controls as extraordinary or unforeseen circumstances may necessitate.

(d) Control of United States Marine Corps Ground Forces.

1. Control of United States Marine Ground units forming parts of landing forces is exercised by the Commanding General, Sixth United States Army.

(e) Coordination of Air Search.

1. Responsibility for development of the coordinated air search plan over water areas north and east of the line: China coast at 26 degrees 30 minutes N to 26 degrees 30 minutes N - 123 degrees E to 23 degrees N - 123 degrees E to 20 degrees N - 130 degrees E to 0 degrees - 130 degrees E, is vested in the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. The Commander-in-Chief, Army Forces in the Pacific, coordinates the Southwest Pacific Area air search plan, south and west of this line with the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

(f) Air and Naval Operating Zones.

1. The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, designated the air and naval operating zones north and east of the line: China coast at 26 degrees 30 minutes N to 26 degrees 30 minutes N - 123 degrees E to 23 degrees N - 123 degrees E to 20 degrees N - 130 degrees E to 0 degrees - 130 degrees E. The Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific coordinates Southwest Pacific Area air and naval operating zones south and west of this line with the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

(g) Topographical Intelligence

1. Primary responsibility for provision of mapping photography for the operation, and preparation of maps for the use of ground forces in the objective area, is vested in the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific.
2. Primary responsibility for provision of necessary hydrographic surveys and mapping of beaches for use of amphibious forces, for the operation, is vested in the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
3. CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC continue to prepare such maps as are required for their respective Air Forces.

4. LOGISTICS

a. Responsibility for Logistic Support

- (1) Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific, is responsible for the logistic support of all Army forces engaged in these operations (except the Twentieth Air Force). He is also responsible for logistic support of Marine Corps units operating under his control. Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet is responsible for the logistic support of all Naval forces, and for providing the organizational equipment and mounting out supplies for Marine Corps units passing to Army control. Necessary coordination is effected between Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific, and Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, where units of one force are serving with or under the other, or concerning supplies and equipment common to both services.
- (2) The Commanding General, Sixth Army, is charged initially with responsibility for logistic support of all forces ashore. At a date to be determined by Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific (Approximately X / 15) this

responsibility is passed to the Commanding General, Army Forces in Western Pacific for Army Forces, and to Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet for Navy forces.

b. Re-supply

Re-supply and the supply of the bulk of construction materials are direct from the UNITED STATES, augmented as necessary from bases under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific, and the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

c. Bases

- (1) Forces are staged, equipped and mounted out with prescribed equipment and supplies from the PHILIPPINES, RYUKYUS, MARIANAS, and HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.
- (2) Following the assault phase, the KAGOSHIMA and SHIBUSHI port areas are developed to support this operation and land-based air forces to be established to support subsequent operations.
- (3) Army and Naval shore establishments operate under the control of Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific, and Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, respectively. Port and shore installations common to the support of both Army and Navy forces operate under the control of Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific. Lighterage and other harbor equipment are furnished by each service to the extent of available resources.

d. Construction

- (1) The Commanding General, Sixth Army, initiates the construction and development of port and base facilities, supply points, and air bases, and allocates areas for all shore establishments. At a date designed by Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific, responsibility for the completion of Army projects passes to Commanding General, Army Forces in Western Pacific. Responsibility for the completion of Navy projects passes to the designated agency of Commander-in-Chief,

United States Pacific Fleet, at the earliest practicable date as arranged between Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific, and the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

- (2) Construction in the objective area is limited to the provision of minimum essential operative facilities.
- (3) Construction forces available for the operation which are in excess of the requirements of the owning service are made available on projects of the other services.

e. Transportation.

Naval assault shipping is used for transportation of assault and reinforcing elements forward from mounting areas and for movement of other troop organizations with heavy equipment and stores.

f. Evacuation and Hospitalization

- (1) Evacuation of personnel of both services from objective areas, initially, is by Naval assault shipping, followed at the earliest practicable date by the employment of hospital ships and aircraft. Evacuation is to ports and bases where bed credits have been established. At the earliest practicable date, evacuation from the objective area direct to the United States is initiated.
- (2) During the early phases of the operation and prior to the establishment of fixed hospitals in the objective area, minor casualties are hospitalized in mobile type hospitals assigned to the assault forces. Casualties requiring prolonged treatment during the early phases of the operations are hospitalized in fixed hospitals at bases in the PACIFIC and in the objective area when hospitals are established therein.

g. Local Resources.

Maximum use is made of available local resources, including existing installations and civilian labor. Allocation of these resources is made initially by the Commanding General, Sixth Army. At a date to be determined,

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by Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific (approximately X / 15), this responsibility passes to the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in Western Pacific.

h. Military Government

Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific, exercises, through the Military Government agencies, control of the civil population in JAPAN to the extent and in the manner necessary to prevent interference with the progress of the military operation in the objective area, to obtain the maximum exploitation of local means, and to carry out the policy of the Government of the UNITED STATES with respect to the Japanese people.

5. MISCELLANEOUS

- a. Communications Plan (See Annex 5a)
- b. Military Government (See Annex 5b)
- c. Meteorological Study (See Annex 5c)
- d. Terrain Study (See Annex 5d)

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
- 1 The Operations Directed.
- 2a G-2 Estimate of Enemy Situation.
- 3b(1) (a) Organization of Forces.
- 3b(3) (b) Tentative Troop List.
- 3b(3) (d)I Air Garrison (X / 15).
- 3b(3) (d)II Air Garrison (X / 90).
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- 3b(5) (b)3 Initial Delimitation of the Objective Area.
- 3b(5) (b)4 General Coordination of Air Forces.
- 4 Basic Logistic Plan.
- 5a Communications Plan.
- 5b Military Government. (missing)
- 5c Meteorological Study.
- 5d Terrain Study.

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ANNEX 2 
STAFF STUDY
"OLYMPIC"

G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION
WITH RESPECT TO AN OPERATION AGAINST
SOUTHERN KYUSHU IN NOVEMBER 1945

25 APRIL 1945

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
U. S. Army Forces in the Pacific
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION
With Respect to an Operation Against
SOUTHERN KYUSHU in November 1945

25 April 1945

1. ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION.

Bibliography: See "G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation (Abbreviated) With Respect to an operation Against Kyushu-Honshu, 24 March 1945"; "Monthly Summary of Enemy Dispositions No. 29, 31 March 1945, and subsequent issues current Daily Intelligence Summaries, this Headquarters; A.G.S. Terrain Studies Nos. 130, 131 (to follow); A.G.S. Terrain Handbooks on Kyushu (to follow).

a. Significant Trends:

(1) General:

In practice, if not publicly announced, the Japanese have abandoned all pretensions to the offensive. Current trends in troop movements and dispositions clearly emphasize preparation for all-out defense of the home islands; it is apparent that they now consider invasion certain if not imminent.

Within the Empire proper, the organization and training of new combat formations is being expedited. Reinforcement of distant areas has ceased. Troops guarding the close approaches to Japan are dying in place in desperate delaying actions, but ground reinforcement is strictly withheld. The Japanese dare not strip Manchuria in the face of potential entry into the war of the U.S.S.R.; however even that source is now being heavily tapped in order to provide strength for final defense of the Empire.

(2) With Particular Respect to Kyushu:

Although the Japanese obviously regard the Tokyo Plain as the ultimate decisive battleground, it is apparent that Kyushu is considered a critical sector on their planned Empire Battle Position. It is believed that plans will visualize assignment of about 6 combat divisions (plus 2 depot divisions) to garrison Kyushu initially, and that they are prepared to expend

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up to 10 divisions, all they can tactically employ in the area, to insure its retention. Depot facilities to maintain such a force have been established in Northern Kyushu.

With our entry into the Ryukyus, they have accepted the probability of an early assault on Kyushu. Reinforcement has already begun and is expected to continue as rapidly as practicable until the planned initial garrison of 6 combat divisions is built up. It is expected that 3 of these divisions will be deployed in Southern Kyushu and 3 north of the central mountain mass. The fact that the first reinforcing division for Kyushu was withdrawn from the mainland is an index to the importance of the Kyushu sector in the Jap defense plans, and also to the urgency they attach to rapid completion of their initial deployment.

b. Command Structure:

Defense of Kyushu is the responsibility of the Sixteenth Area Army; Headquarters at Fukuoka.

Currently, immediate tactical control of southern Kyushu is believed vested in the Commander of the 86th Division; Headquarters at Miyakonojo; however, with the expected arrival of 2 more combat divisions in Southern Kyushu it is probable that an Army (Corps) of 3 divisions will be formed, and charged with the defense of the area south of the central mountain mass. (See Maps, Encls. 1, 2 and 3.)

c. Forward Areas:

(1) Ground Forces:

(a) Current Strength and Dispositions:

Overall enemy strength in Southern Kyushu is currently estimated at 80,000 to 85,000 troops of all classes. Mobile combat units, their estimated strength and the proportion of troops in each classification, i.e. mobile combat, air-ground, base and service, are listed in the following table:

TABLE I

Estimated Ground Troop Strength, Southern Kyushu

Classifications:	Estimated Strength	Date	Estimated Present Location
<u>MOBILE COMBAT:</u>			
86 Division	16,000	4/45	Probably SE Kyushu, Hq Miyakonojo
23 Inf Repl Reg't	3,100	4/45	Kagoshima (?)
45 Inf Repl Reg't	3,100	4/45	Kagoshima (?)
1st Raiding (Prcht) Brig	3,500	4/45	Probably Miyazaki Plain
Total, Mobile Combat	25,700		
<u>NAVAL GROUND UNITS:</u>			
SNLFs, Defense Forces, Guard Forces, A/A Unit, etc.	5,000	4/45	Bulk probably in Kagoshima Area
<u>AIR GROUND PERSONNEL:</u>			
Army	9,000	4/45	
Navy	36,500	4/45	
Total Air Ground Personnel	45,500**		
<u>BASE AND SERVICE: *</u>	8,000	4/45	
<u>AGGREGATE:</u>	84,200**		

Recapitulation:

Mobile Combat	25,700
Naval Ground Troops	5,000
Air Ground Personnel	45,500**
Base and Service	8,000*

Aggregate	84,200**
-----------	----------

- * Estimate possibly low; however it is believed large number of civilian service personnel are employed by the Japs on Kyushu.
- ** Does not include Flying Personnel of Aviation Units.

Estimated dispositions of the forces listed above are shown on Map Encl. 2.

(b) Estimated Strength by Target Date:

It is estimated that by target date, Southern Kyushu will have been reinforced by two (2) combat divisions along with corresponding numbers of base and service troops. It is probable that as our bombing range is extended northward, a considerable proportion of the current large naval air strength will be withdrawn to Honshu bases.

It is therefore estimated that by D-Day overall enemy strength in Southern Kyushu will be approximately as set forth in the following table:

[REDACTED]
TABLE II

Classification	Probable Strength	Included Units
Mobile Combat	60,000 to 65,000	86th Div, 2 u/i divs; 23rd and 45th Repl. Regts; possibly 1st Raiding Brig; possibly an u/i Tank Reg't; Naval Ground Units.
Air Ground Personnel	20,000 to 30,000	Both Army and Naval Units; Airfield Construction Units; Airdrome Bns; Ground Crews, etc.
Base and Service	15,000 to 20,000	A/A, Engr, Port, Med, MP, etc.
Aggregate	95,000 to 115,000	

(c) Probable D-Day Dispositions:

It is expected that Mobile Combat Units will be disposed approximately as follows:

Miyazaki area-Miyakonojo Basin
 Ariake Plain 1 division
 Head of Kagoshima-Wan (vicinity
 of Kokubu) 1 division
 Kushikino Plain-Makurazaki Plain 1 division
 Total 3 divisions

The 1st Raiding Brigade, if still present, will probably remain in the Central Miyazaki Plain. The two replacement regiments will probably remain in present locations at Miyakonojo and Kagoshima.

The shores of Kagoshima-Wan will probably be protected by fixed defenses and garrison troops; these may include a high proportion of naval ground units, which normally possess high combat value, particularly in defense.

Although unconfirmed reports have vaguely referred to some fixed defenses along the coast of Ariake-Wan details are unknown and pending confirmation, this information is treated with reserve. It is considered probable, however, that defended beaches will be organized with pill-boxes, entrenchments and obstacles prior to D-Day. (See Map, Encl. No. 3.)

(2) Air Forces:

(a) Trends:

With the establishment of our land-based aircraft through the Nansei Shoto, all of Kyushu, Shikoku, that portion of Honshu west of Kobe-Osaka, Southern Korea and the China coastal area north to Shanghai will

[REDACTED]

lie within the forward air combat zone.

The enemy has apparently reversed his policy of conserving his air strength at least for the time being. In conducting previous operations in defense of the close approaches to the Empire he has either withheld all air support or strictly avoided losses, apparently unwilling to accept any reduction in his reserve below the strength considered necessary for final defense of the home islands. Since our assault on Okinawa he has gone to the opposite extreme and has committed himself to a bitter, all-out, sustained air counter-offensive; he is expanding air strength recklessly in recurrent massed air attacks regardless of cost. To include 18 April he had already accepted losses amounting to 2,569 aircraft. Approximately 20% of the aircraft committed employed suicidal plane-crashing tactics. All evidence points to a liberal employment of all available classes of aircraft including obsolescent types, trainers and carrier-based planes operating shore-based. Withdrawal of aircraft from all other sectors to Kyushu and Formosa in order to participate in the action has been noted.

Every effort is still being made to increase aircraft production and to improve materiel. The aircraft industry is receiving highest priorities; however, as a result of our heavy attacks against concentrated aircraft production facilities, aircraft production is declining.

The development of new and improved conventional aircraft types has also possibly been arrested by the increasing weight of strategic counter air force bombing. Employment of the suicide-piloted rocket plane (BAKA) was initiated during Okinawa operations and is increasing. Ground-launched V-type weapons, similar to the German jet-propelled V-1, have not appeared to date; however, it is known that the Japanese have made efforts to obtain German assistance in developing them and they may be introduced prior to target date.

Air crew training programs have been disrupted and curtailed, due to both training aircraft and trainees being now committed directly into combat. Increasing difficulty is being experienced by the

enemy in replacing, maintaining and servicing his aircraft, with all air facilities in Japan now subject to an increasing degree of neutralization. (See Chart, Encl. 12.)

(b) Command Structure:

Overall strategic control of current offensive air operations is being exercised by the C-in-C of the Combined Fleet. Tactical control is currently exercised by the Commander of the First Mobile Base Air Force, Headquarters at Kanoya; forces at his disposal include all Navy Air Forces in the Empire and currently, of some Army Air elements. Tactical control of remaining Army Air is vested in the General Air Command, Headquarters at Tokyo. The Japanese habitually place air units of one service under command of the other; although the current offensive operations are principally directed by the Naval Air Command, it is probable that as the Japanese again shift to the air defensive a more important role in the conduct of operations may pass to the Army. (See Map, Encl. 8.)

(c) Current Strength and Dispositions:

Overall air strength based in forward areas is currently estimated at approximately 1,000 combat aircraft of all types. Estimated distribution by type is shown in the following table:

TABLE III

Areas	Bombers	Fighters	Recce	Totals
Kyushu, Shikoku and Honshu (west of 133° east), Saishu Island:	258	357	152	767
Formosa *	83	98	32	213
Pacific Area (south of 30° north and east of 133° east)	0	6	11	17
Aggregate	341	461	195	997

* Current basing will probably be withdrawn prior to Target Date. (See Map, Encl. 8.)

B-29 and carrier strikes have already reduced the Japanese aircraft production rate to approximately 1200 per month; with the increase in our bombing capabilities from Nansei-Shoto airfields, it will suffer further decreases.

However, upon completion of our conquest of Okinawa, the enemy will probably again assume the air defensive. It is expected that he

[REDACTED]

will then bend every effort toward reconstituting his Empire reserve; he will probably revert to his policy of conservation of air strength, and all aircraft that can be spared from other areas will be withdrawn.

Considering the long period available to him, it is probable that by vigorous application of these measures and by careful limitation of losses in attempted interception of our strikes he will be able to gradually restore a considerable portion of his current heavy losses. It is therefore estimated that by target date he will have 2,000 to 2,500 aircraft immediately available to defend the Empire. Of these, probably 1,500 to 2,000 will be first line aircraft, the remainder will be training planes and obsolete or obsolescent models.

(d) Airfields:

The number, types and distribution of forward area enemy airfields are entirely adequate for the maximum numbers of aircraft now available or likely to be in the future. Some 200 airfields and landing grounds are now known to exist within the forward areas. Principal air centers and the numbers of currently known airfields contained therein are listed in the following table:

TABLE IV

Air Centers	Number of Fields
Southern Kyushu	13
Northeast Kyushu	4
Northwest Kyushu	11
Southern Korea	4
Shikoku	7
Western Honshu (west of Kobe-Osaka)	6
China coast (north of Shanghai)	30
Aggregate	75

See Map, Encl. 9. For details of Kyushu fields, see Map Encl. 10.

(3) Naval Forces:

(a) Current Trends:

Since the abortive attempt by the 1st Diversion Attack Force Suicide Unit (1 BB, 1 CL, 8 DD), there has been no evidence that further operations by the remaining Empire-based fleet units are planned or impending. This force, which sortied on 6 April met disaster when Allied

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carrier-based planes sank 1 battleship, 1 light cruiser, 3 destroyers and seriously damaged 2 destroyers. Recent photographs show that the major portion of the Jap fleet remains in the Inland Sea; however, in view of the fact that Allied land-based aircraft operating from Nansei Shoto fields will soon be added to carrier-based planes operating over that area, and because of intensified Allied mining operations in Shimonoseki Straits, it is very probable that the Jap High Command will soon attempt to extricate the majority of naval units from the death trap which the Inland Sea is rapidly becoming. Whether employment of the fleet will then take the form of a final desperate attack against the Allied forces in the Nansei Shoto area or of further withdrawal to less vulnerable waters of the Yellow Sea-Sea of Japan is matter for conjecture. In view of the reduced strength of the fleet, whatever course they may choose will have little effect on future Allied operations.

(b) Jap Naval Strength in the Empire:

Present enemy naval strength in Empire waters is estimated as follows:

Battleships	- 3
Converted Battleships (XCV-BB)	- 2
Aircraft Carriers (CV)	- 4
Aircraft Carriers (CVL)	- 2
Aircraft Carriers (CVE)	- 3
Heavy cruisers (CA)	- 4
Light Cruisers	- 2
Destroyers	- 30
Submarines	- 60

The present operational status of the Empire-based fleet is estimated as follows: 3 BB, 1 XCV-BB, 4 CV, 2 CVL, 3 CVE, 3 CA, 2 CL and approximately 20 DD. In addition, many small suicide craft and midget submarines are estimated to be located throughout the Empire.

(c) Construction:

Recent aerial reconnaissance of Japanese ship building yards reveals considerable aircraft carrier construction and indicates that the enemy is concentrating on the production of this type of vessel. Analysis of photographs, plus information from PWs and captured documents indicate the Jap carrier situation to be as follows: (i) 1 new Unryu class carrier (CV) (estimated 22,000 grt) is either operational or in a training

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status; 3 other CV's of this class are under construction. (ii) 2 new escort carriers (Kobe class CVE's) are probably operational, though both may have been damaged during recent Allied air attacks; 1 CVE is fitting out at the Habu Shipyards, Inno Shima; 1 CVE has been launched and work started on the flight deck in Kobe area; 1 or 2 CVE's are in process of conversion at Yokohama, 2 tanker hulls on the ways at Kawasaki yards (Kobe area) and 1 tanker hull in a berth in Yokohama may be destined for conversion to carriers. In recapitulation, current Jap carrier strength is estimated to be as follows:

	<u>CV</u>	<u>CVL</u>	<u>CVE</u>
Operational	4	2	3
Under Construction	3	0	3-7

It has previously been indicated that four (4) Atago class heavy cruisers were under construction. However, it is possible that these ships are being converted to carriers and are the Unryu class carriers discussed above; in that case, cruiser construction is estimated to be limited to two (2) heavy cruisers of the Tone class. Numerous destroyers and other small escort vessels are also believed to be under construction.

In view of the fact that Japanese shipyards will continue to be subjected to heavy air attacks, it is extremely doubtful that all of the above mentioned ships now under construction ~~will ever be~~ launched. However, assuming that new construction is completed and damaged vessels are repaired, Japans over-all naval shipbuilding capabilities are still insufficient to enable her to alter the naval situation, and her strength will still be totally inadequate for the defense of Kyushu. (See Map Encl. 13.)

(d) Merchant Shipping Position:

Japan was estimated, as of 1 February, to have 2,416,556 tons of powered and auxiliary-powered merchant vessels of 100 gross tons and upwards; with a reduction of 20 percent for lay-ups and repairs, the total serviceable shipping amounts to 1,935,000 tons.

During the first six months of 1942, when the Japanese had at their disposal some seven or eight million tons of merchant shipping, they were conducting military operations over vast distances and supplying

forces on scores of islands within a great area extending from the Aleutians through Wake, the Marshall Islands, the Solomons, New Guinea, the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya and Burma. Now many of the outlying garrisons are eliminated; others have been cut off and are supplied only by submarine, if at all. With out conquest of the strategic areas of the Philippine Islands and the Ryukyus, we will soon be in a position to deny Japanese shipping passage through the waters between the Philippines and the China coast; the N.E.I., Malaya and Burma will be cut off from sea communications with Japan, except for such blockade-running as the enemy cares to risk. Thus in the very near future Japan's merchant shipping requirements will have been reduced to the maintenance of essential traffic between the Home Islands, Korea, Manchuria, China and the Kuriles. These are relatively modest requirements, but it is not possible to state with any precision whether Japan's present total merchant shipping is adequate to meet them. With the enemy forced into a wholly defensive posture, even in his own home waters, it becomes increasingly difficult to determine what traffic he will be willing to sacrifice and which cargoes he will consider essential. The entire question of Japanese shipping requirements may soon be academic, however, if losses continue at anything like the present rate. That this possibility has occurred to the Japanese is indicated by a Tokyo broadcast on 17 February, in which the Japanese forces in China and other overseas garrisons were warned that they might have to operate without help from the homeland.

Detailed analysis of the Japanese shipping position, as of 1 February 1945, is presented in the following table:

TABLE V

	Freighters & Transports		Tankers		Total	
	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons
Totals as of 7 Dec 1941, plus captures and construction to 1 Feb 1945	6,426	8,063,912	300	1,314,644	6,726	9,378,556
War Losses estimated to 1 Feb 1945 (1000 GT upwards)	1,385	5,680,273	122	856,727	1,507	6,537,000
War Losses estimated to 1 Feb 1945 (100-1000 GT)	1,466	399,338	34	25,662	1,500	425,000
Total Losses	2,851	6,079,611	156	882,389	3,007	6,962,000
Total Available	3,575	1,984,301	144	432,255	3,719	2,416,556
Total Serviceable	2,860	1,590,000	115	345,000	2,975	1,935,000

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The smallest ships, those below 100 gross tons (which are not included in the foregoing table), are chiefly engaged in fishing, picketing and general cargo traffic. An approximate break-down of vessels in this category follows:

20-99 Gross Tons:		
Full-powered :	About 2,500 ships	125,000 gross tons
Auxiliaries :	About 7,000 ships	350,000 gross tons
Total	About 9,500 ships	475,000 gross tons
Sailing vessels without engines are estimated as follows:		
Over 1000 GT :	750 ships	100,000 gross tons
20-99 gross tons :	6,000 ships	300,000 gross tons
5-19 gross tons :	5,000 ships	60,000 gross tons
Total	11,750 ships	460,000 gross tons

In addition, the Japanese, using native laborers, have built numbers of small wooden vessels in all the conquered southern territories. These, engaged chiefly in coastal and inter-island trade in those areas, are not included in the foregoing estimates.

d. Rear Areas:

(1) Ground Forces:

(a) Current Strength and Dispositions:

Overall enemy strength in Northern Kyushu is currently estimated at 140,000 to 145,000 troops of all classes. Mobile combat units and their estimated strength, and the proportion of troops in each classification i.e. mobile combat, air-ground, base and service are listed in the following table:

TABLE VI

Estimated Ground Troop Strength, Northern Kyushu

Classification	Estimated Strength	Date	Estimated Present Location
MOBILE COMBAT:			
Active Units:			
57 Div	16,000	4/45	N Kyushu
18 Tank Reg't	650	10/44	Prob Kurume
5 Med Arty Repl Reg't	1,500	8/43	Kokura-Moji
6 Med Arty Repl Reg't	1,500	3/44	Kokura-Moji
Sasebo Hvy Arty Repl Reg't	1,400	5/45	Sasebo
Hoyo Fortress	3,000		Kitsuki
Iki Fortress	3,200		Iki Id
Nagasaki Fortress	3,000		Nagasaki
Depot Divs:			
6 Depot Div (- 2 Reg'ts)	13,800	4/45	Kumamoto
56 Depot Div	20,000		Kurume
Total Mobile Combat	64,050		
NAVAL GROUND UNITS:			
SNLFs, Guard Forces, Defense Forces, Barrack Unit, A/A Defense Forces, etc.	20,000	4/45	
AIR GROUND PERSONNEL:			
Army	9,000		
Navy	36,500		
Total Air-Ground Personnel	45,500**		
BASE AND SERVICE:	15,000		
Aggregate	144,550 **		

Recapitulation:

Mobile Combat	64,050
Naval Ground Troops	20,000
Total Air Ground Personnel	45,000**
Base and Service	15,000

Aggregate	144,550**
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* Estimate possibly low, however it is believed large number civilian service personnel are employed by the Japs in Kyushu.

** Does not include flying personnel of Aviation Units.
See Maps Encls. 1 and 2.

(b) Estimated Strength and Dispositions by Target Date:

It is estimated that by target date, the number of combat divisions in Northern Kyushu will have been increased to 3. It is possible that an additional Tank Regiment may also be brought in. A corresponding increase in base and service personnel is anticipated:

It is estimated that by D-Day, overall enemy strength in

Northern Kyushu will be approximately as follows:

TABLE VII

Classification	Estimated Strength	Included Units
Mobile Combat	95,000 to 100,000	3 Combat Divs; 2 Depot Divs; 1 to 2 Tank Regts; Arty Reg'ts; Naval Ground Units; Fortress Troops
Air Ground Personnel	40,000 to 45,000	Both Army and Navy Airdrome Bns, Air Construction, Ground Crews, Air Maintenance Person- nel.
Base and Service	30,000 to 40,000	A/A, Engr, Port Units, Med, MP, etc.
Aggregate	165,000 to 185,000	

See Map Encl. 3.

(2) Air Forces:

(a) Current Strength and Dispositions:

For purposes of this paper, air rear areas are considered to include: That portion of Honshu northeast of Kobe-Osaka; Hokkaido; the Kuriles and Karafuto; that part of Korea north of the Keijo area; Manchuria; and that part of China north of the Yangtze. Aircraft based in these areas on target date could be staged into forward areas in time to participate in the action, prior to the time the enemy reaches the limit of expenditure he is willing to except.

Overall air strength based in rear areas is currently estimated at approximately 1,560 combat aircraft of all types. Deployment through rear areas, by type is set forth in the following table: (See Map Encl. 8.)

TABLE VIII

Areas	Bombers	Fighters	Recce	Total
Central Honshu and Shikoku (W of 138° E and E of 133° E):	50	205	49	304
Eastern Honshu (S of 40° N and E of 138° E):	222	338	61	621
Northern Honshu, Hokkaido, Kuriles, Karafuto:	18	36	35	89
Korea, Manchuria:	0	81	61	142
China:	76	157	172	405
Aggregate	366	817	378	1561

(b). Airfields:

The rear area airfield network is of interest principally for its capabilities for concentration and staging reinforcements for forward areas, for which purposes it is more than adequate. (See Map Encl. 9.)

(3) Naval Forces:

(a) Naval Strength Southwestern Area:

As of 23 April 1945 the only major fleet units operating outside of Empire waters were located in the Singapore-NEI area where they are engaged in upkeep and overhaul and in urgent troop transportation runs between Singapore and Batavia, Java. This Southwestern Area Force is currently estimated to be composed of the following:

Heavy Cruisers	—	3 (2 damaged)
Light Cruisers	—	1
Destroyers	—	4-6
Submarines	—	8

It is possible that before the proposed operations the enemy will attempt to return these now more or less isolated fleet units to the Empire to bolster his strength in home waters in preparation for a final last ditch battle to deny the Allied forces a beachhead on Kyushu or Honshu. (See Map Encl. 13.)

e. Terrain and Weather:

(1) Terrain, Southern Kyushu:

(a) General:

Southern Kyushu includes that portion of the island south of the line; Sendai-Nobeoka; i.e. the area lying south and southwest of the central mountain mass.

The area includes three more or less distinct large lowland areas facing the sea. Areas between lowlands and the interior are jumbles of low, rugged mountains, and upland plateaus varying in elevation from 1,500 to 2,500 feet (except for a few peaks which rise to 3,500-5,500 feet) interspersed with small basins.

A series of fairly level but winding valleys, 3 to 10 miles wide and 20 to 50 miles long, cut through the upland masses to form corridors connecting the 3 main lowlands.

(b) Miyazaki-Nobeoka (eastern) Coastal Plains:

i) Topography:

These triangular plains form a broken coastal shelf along the Eastern Kyushu coast, from Nobeoka 52 miles south to Miyazaki.

The (northern) Nobeoka triangle is 3 miles deep and 7 miles wide; it is formed by the deltas of the Gokase and Kita rivers and is composed of flat, wedge-shaped areas $\frac{1}{2}$ to 1 mile wide covered with wet rice fields. Small areas on the delta and the surrounding hills are covered by dense woods. The Nobeoka triangle is separated from the (southern) Miyazaki triangle by a 12 mile long belt of low hills. Soils are chiefly clay, and sticky when wet.

The largersouthern plain is 33 miles long and varies from $\frac{1}{2}$ to 1 mile wide in the north to 5 to 6 miles wide in the south. The area consists principally of a series of flat terraces, cut into 1 to 2 mile blocks by streams flowing out of the highlands. Most terraces and wider stream valleys are covered with rice paddies. Edges of terraces and projecting spurs are covered with grass and woodland. Inland from the plain, the foothills rise to 1000-2500 feet and are covered with dense forest. Soils are clay and loam on the flats; sandy and rocky in the surrounding low hill and spurs.

ii) Features of Military Significance:

Both triangles and the intervening hilly area lie behind good landing beaches. The east coast main rail line and the National highway traverse the entire length. At Miyazaki both road and railroad turn west through the corridor which connects the plain with the southeastern lowlands and the Kagoshima area.

The cross-island secondary road to Kumamoto leaves the plain at Nobeoka; it is a steeply graded tortuous route and except for the initial 15 miles cannot be depended on to carry wheeled vehicles. A similar road leaves the southern plain at Sadowara, 12 miles north of Miyazaki, bound for the west coast via Hitoyoshi. A third road of doubtful vehicular usefulness cuts off through the mountains from Miyazaki to Yoshimatsu.

The northern plain includes 1 operational airfield at

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Nobeoka, and the southern plain 3 fields; 2 in its central portion and 1 at Miyazaki.

iii) Susceptibility to Cross Country Movement:

Flooded rice fields and heavy rains which occur approximately 1 day out of 2 would render cross country movements difficult from May through August. The most favorable period of the year for operations is December-January; during these months rains are infrequent, freezing, or near-freezing weather prevails, and rice fields are drained. November and early February are less favorable, though practicable.

(c) Miyazaki-Miyakonojo Corridor:

A NE-SW corridor 3 to 7 miles wide and 12 miles long connects the southern end of the Miyazaki Plain to the Miyakonojo Basin at its northeastern extremity. The floor of this corridor is rugged, being largely composed of low but moderately steep hills, which rise 600 to 700 feet above intervening valleys. The surface is volcanic ash and heavily forested. Cross country movement is difficult. The east coast railroad, the National Highway, and a secondary road, traverse the corridor from Miyazaki to Miyakonojo; however, these routes avoid the deeper valleys and cross the hill divides by means of tunnels and deep cuts.

(d) Ariake-Miyakonojo (southeast) Lowlands:

i) Topography:

This area really includes 2 terrain compartments: the Ariake Plain, 10 x 10 miles extending west from the head of Ariake-wan (Bay); and the Miyakonojo Basin, extending 10 miles southward from Miyakonojo and 6 miles wide.

The floors of both compartments are a series of flat terraces, divided into 1 and 2 mile blocks by stream valleys 20 to 100 feet deep. Terraces in the Miyakonojo Basin are planted in wet field rice; in the Ariake Plain in dry crops. Patches of woodland are scattered through the lowlands; the surrounding foothills are densely forested. The surface is a deep layer of loose medium-textured volcanic ash except for a few spots of clay-sand soil.

ii) Features of Military Importance:

An excellent landing beach 9 miles long at the head of

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Ariake-wan (Bay) provides direct access to the Ariake Plain, and there are several smaller beaches farther east in the vicinity of Shibushi, a secondary port with two quays. The west end of the Ariake Plain abuts against a narrow belt of low hills 1 to 4 miles wide; however, the east shore of Kagoshima-wan can be reached via narrow valleys through these hills. A railroad runs eastward from Furue across the low hills and through the Ariake Plain to Shibushi, thence across more low hills to Odotsu on the Pacific. From Shibushi an axial railroad runs northward through the basin to a junction with the east coast railroad at Miyakonojo; then enters an upland valley leading north to Kobayashi and Yoshimatsu. The main east coast railroad and the National Highway emerge from the corridor joining the basin, the Miyazaki Plain, cross the northern end of the basin, and continue westward through a corridor which leads from the northwest corner of the Basin to the head of Kagoshima-wan.

The area includes 4 operational airfields; 2 on the shore of the Ariake Plain, 1 farther south in the Plain and one at Shibushi.

iii) Susceptibility to Cross Country Movement:

During the period May-September, rice fields are flooded and rains occur 1 day out of 2. This renders cross country movement, particularly vehicular movement, in the Miyakonojo Basin difficult. Dry crops in the Ariake Plain make the going a little easier but rainfall conditions are relatively the same. Movement through the hills west of the latter lowland is restricted to the narrow valleys; although the hills are only 200 to 500 feet high they are covered with loose volcanic ash.

(e) Corridor from Miyakonojo to Head of Kagoshima-wan:

This 12 mile passage way crosses a flat-topped ash-covered ridge which admits of easy movement except the central four miles which is a series of narrow winding valleys through rugged hills of 500 to 1000 feet elevation. Through this area, movement is moderately difficult and some portions of the valleys are within machine gun range from adjacent hills.

(f) Makurazaki-Kagoshima (southwest) Lowlands:

i) Topography:

This area consists of 2 small coastal plains. The (southern) Makurazaki Plain extends eastward 11 miles from along the south

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coast of the Satsumo Peninsula. It is 2 to 6 miles wide and its surface is gently rolling. The (western) Kushikino Plain extends southward from Kushikino Village 24 miles along the west coast. It is very narrow and has scattered sand dunes along the coast; in its northern section hill spurs approach to within a few hundred yards of the sea.

These two compartments are connected by two narrow valleys each approximately 6 miles long. To the east and north separating these lowland areas from Kagoshima-wan is a belt of rugged hills 300 to 800 feet high but penetrated by winding valleys.

The Makurazaki Plain is covered with dry crops; the Kushikino Plain with wet rice fields.

Surface on the lowlands is chiefly volcanic ash and clay loam. Patches of woodland are scattered through the lowlands, principally among the sand dunes and between the cultivated fields.

ii) Features of Military Importance:

The southern plain has a good sandlanding beach 5 miles long near its eastern extremity and a shorter, less easily accessible beach near Makurazaki town. No main or secondary roads or railroads traverse the area; however, a railroad spur runs north from Makurazaki through the connecting valleys partway through the northern plain to join the main west coast line at Ijuin.

The northern plain lies behind excellent beaches. The main west coast rail line and the National Highway enter it at Kushikino; at Ijuin 12 miles farther south they turn eastward through an E-W valley to Kagoshima.

The area contains only 1 operational airfield, near the southern extremity of the Kushikino Plain.

From the eastern extremity of the Makurazaki Plain it is only 8 miles across low hills to a railroad and a parallel secondary road leading north along the west shore of Kagoshima-wan to Kagoshima.

iii) Susceptibility to Cross Country Movement:

Cross country movement is relatively easy across the low areas except across the rice fields of the Kushikino Plain during the

period May-September when they are flooded. The sand dunes along the west coast and the hill behind the lowlands are difficult going due to steep slopes and loose volcanic ash surface; and in the case of the hills, to dense forest coverage. (See Map Encl. 4.)

(2) Railroad Net:

(a) General:

Only 2 through railroads connect Northern and Southern Kyushu. Both run south from Moji at the northernmost tip of Kyushu, one following the west coast, the other the east, to join again at Kagoshima.

(b) West Coast (Kagoshima) Route:

(i) Description:

Distance Moji-Kagoshima: 248 miles. The line is double-tracked 67 miles to Tosu; remainder single track. Track guage: 3 feet 6 inches. Power: Steam.

From Tosu the route traverses gently rolling country to Yatsushiro; South of Yatsushiro it follows the coast, often almost at the waters edge, for 90 miles to Ijuin. From Ijuin it turns inland traversing a level corridor across the peninsula to Kagoshima.

(ii) Connections:

Numerous secondary lines from the interior and coastal cities of Northern Kyushu converge on the Kagoshima line at Kokura, Orio, and Fukuoka.

At Tosu, lines from the important west coast port of Nagasaki and from the Sasebo Naval Base join.

From Kurume and Kumamoto cross lines follow river valleys to Oita on the east coast.

From Yatsushiro, an alternative route to Kagoshima runs inland via Hitoyoshi and Yoshimatsu.

(iii) Critical Areas Traversed: (See Map Encl. 5.)

(c) East Coast (Nippo) Route:

(i) Description:

Distance Moji-Kagoshima: 288 miles. Entire line is single track. Track guage: 3 feet 6 inches. Power: Steam.

Branching southeastward off the Kagoshima line at Kokura, the route parallels the northeast coast (except for one 10 mile inland stretch) to Oita, then turns south along the east coast to Miyazaki; then inland across the peninsula and around the head of Kagoshima-wan to Kagoshima.

(ii) Connections:

At Oita the line is joined by the 2 transverse routes across Northern Kyushu from Kurume and Kumamoto. From Miyakonojo, 10 miles east of the head of Kagoshima-wan, it forks to join the alternate inland route from Yatsushiro to Kagoshima at both Yoshimatsu and Kokubu. A feeder line from the southeastern ports of Shibushi and Odotsu and from Furue on the east shore of Kagoshima-wan also joins at Miyakonojo.

(iii) Critical Areas Traversed: (See Map Encl. 5.)

(3) Road Net:

(a) Main Highways:

Only 2 main highways connect Northern and Southern Kyushu. From Moji both of these branches run southeast and southwest closely paralleling the east and west coast railroads to Kagoshima, where they unite to form a "round-the-island" loop.

(i) West Coast Route:

West of Moji this route turns southwest to Kurume; thence inland to Kumamoto. From Kumamoto it parallels the west coast railroad to Kagoshima. An alternate loop from west of Kokura runs through Fukuoka and rejoins at Tosu. A branch from the port of Nagasaki and the Sasebo Naval Base joins north of Kurume and a spur thereof north of Kumamoto.

Minimum width: 24 feet. Ruling grade: 1 in 30 (3.3%). Surface: 5 to 8 inch concrete or other hard surfacing. Minimum bridge load, 12 ton vehicles. This road, while motorable, would probably not be considered a first class highway by U. S. standards.

(ii) East Coast Route:

This route parallels the east coast railroad route to Kagoshima throughout.

Minimum width: 24 feet. Ruling grade: 1 in 30 (3.3%). Minimum bridge load, 12 ton vehicles. This road, while motorable, would probably not be considered a first class highway by U. S. standards.

(iii) Lateral and Connecting Roads:

These are all secondary roads:

Width - approximately 18 feet. Ruling grades - vary from 1 in 25 in relatively flat areas to 1 in 10 in mountainous areas. Minimum bridge capacity - 6 ton vehicles. The surface and state of maintenance of these roads is doubtful - at best they would be rated as poor by U. S. standards, and in many areas would not carry motor traffic above jeeps.

North of the mountain mass of Central Kyushu, 3 transverse routes connect the 2 main coastal highways, viz; Oita-Kurume; Oita-Kumamoto; and Nobeoka-Kumamoto. These are connected by several north and south routes through the inland area.

No north-south roads in this classification cross the central mountain mass.

South of the central mountains 2 lateral roads cross the island; the northernmost from Sashiki, 25 miles south of Yatsushiro joins the east coast highway at Sedawara 12 miles north of Miyazaki; the southernmost roughly parallels it 10 to 20 miles farther south and joins the highway 12 miles west of Miyazaki. Several north-south secondary roads join the latter lateral to the main highway as it traverses Southern Kyushu.

Secondary roads border the east and west coasts of Kagoshima-wan from the southernmost tips of Kyushu, and another similar road connects the southeastern port of Shibushi with the main highway at Miyakonojo.

There are other local roads ranging in classification from trails to tracks, but no dependence can be placed on either maintenance or trafficability; it is doubtful that most of them would carry more than foot traffic.

(4) Tactical Significance of Defiles:

The large number of bridges, tunnels, cuts and fills traversed by the railroads render them particularly susceptible to prolonged interdiction by concentrated aerial bombing.

In order to completely stop rail traffic via the west coast route it would be necessary to interdict both the main line along the coast south of Yatsushiro and the alternate inland branch from Yatsushiro to Kokubu. Probably the most effective method would be destruction of the long bridge over the Kuma-gawa (river) south of Yatsushiro; destruction of all or a portion of the tunnels north of Sendai would be equally effective, but would permit rail movement considerably farther south. South of Yatsushiro this route is subject to interdiction by naval gun fire.

The inland route to Kokubu could be effectively blocked almost anywhere south of Yatsushiro by destruction of bridges and/or tunnels which are spaced at short intervals throughout its length.

The east coast route, is equally vulnerable to stoppage by destruction of tunnels, particularly in the area between Oita and Nobeoka. South of Nobeoka the line runs close to the shore across the Miyazaki Plain and is particularly susceptible to naval gun fire interdiction, and probably to complete destruction by gun fire or small night raids.

Coastal roads, although largely devoid of tunnels cross numerous bridges and high fills and pass through many deep cuts; although obstructions created by aerial bombing are unlikely to put them permanently out of use, vehicular traffic can at least be effectively interrupted for long periods and even the flow of foot traffic seriously retarded. Foot and vehicular movement south of Nobeoka and Yatsushiro can be effectively interdicted by naval gun fire as well, particularly during daylight hours.

These factors lead to the conclusion that the blocking of a limited number of defiles, i.e. destruction of critical bridges, tunnels, cuts and fills by concentrated aerial bombing and vigorous maintenance of interdiction by both air and naval bombardment will render it exceedingly difficult for the Japanese either to reinforce Southern Kyushu with elements of the Northern Kyushu garrison, or to supply and maintain their forces which are in Southern Kyushu prior to the blocking of their only two lines of overland communication.

(5) Landing Beaches: (See Map and Chart Encl. 6.)

(6) Weather, Southern Kyushu:

(a) General:

The most favorable period for operations in Southern Kyushu is from November to April inclusive. During this period, although surf is heavy, rice fields are drained, cool to freezing weather prevails and typhoon risk is at a minimum. During the remainder of the year rice fields are flooded, heavy rains are frequent, and at least 1 typhoon and possibly as many as 3 are to be expected.

(b) November:

(i) Temperatures and Humidity:

Average temperatures vary from 66 to 46 with extreme high of 82 and extreme low of 27. Humidity averages 80.

(ii) Rainfall:

Average is 3.6 inches with rain falling on approximately 9 days out of the month.

(iii) Snow:

Normally no snow falls during November.

(iv) Winds:

Direction is NW at 2 mph velocity. Normally, no high

winds are experienced during November. Typhoons may occur during any month but are unlikely after October.

(v) Cloud Cover:

Normal expectation is 8 clear days, 13 partly cloudy days, and 9 cloudy days.

(c) December:

(i) Temperatures and Humidity:

Average temperatures vary from 58 to 37 with extreme high of 77 and extreme low of 19. Humidity averages 74.

(ii) Rainfall:

Average is 3.5 inches falling on approximately 9 days out of the month.

(iii) Snow:

Normally no snow falls during December, but freezing weather begins about 10th December.

(iv) Winds:

Direction is NW at 2 mph velocity. 1 wind of over 20 mph may be expected during the month.

(v) Cloud Cover:

Normal expectation is 11 clear days, 13 partly cloudy days and 7 cloudy days.

(d) Period Following December:

(i) Temperatures and Humidity:

Through January and February temperatures are only slightly lower; average from 55 to 35, extreme high 76 and extreme low 18.

Beginning with March they rise gradually until August when average reaches 73 to 87, extreme high 100 and extreme low 62.

Humidity follows a similar pattern, dropping to a low of 71 in February, then rising gradually to 85 by July.

(ii) Rainfall:

Rainfall is at the year's low in January of 2.1 inches with rains occurring about 7 days out of the month. Beginning with February, rains increase gradually; 4.1 inches falling on 9 days in February; 6.4 inches falling on 12 days in March and 8.5 inches falling on 14 days in April. Thereafter rains occur about half the days of each month but with increasing violence until September, when the frequency and violence begin to decrease.

(iii) Snow:

Snow may be expected one day a month in January and February. Freezing weather continues until 10 March.

(iv) Winds:

Wind direction changes to W in January and back to NW in April. Velocity increases slightly in January to 3 mph which continues into summer. Winds over 20 mph occur 1 to 2 days per month.

(v) Cloud Cover:

The average number of clear days per month decreases from 10 in January to 2 in May; partly cloudy days vary from 12 to 15 per month until May with the average number of all-cloudy days increasing gradually increasing to 21 in June.

2. CONCLUSIONS.

a. Enemy Capabilities:

- (1) Reinforcement of Kyushu prior to D-Day.
- (2) Ground Defense and Reinforcement.
- (3) Air Interception and Attack.
- (4) Naval Capabilities.

(1) Reinforcement of Kyushu Prior to D-Day:

There is no reason to believe the Japanese will not be able to increase the Kyushu garrison to at least 6 active divisions and 2 depot

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divisions prior to D-Day. In addition to two (2) active divisions, (the 86th and 57th now known to be in Kyushu), two (2) divisional depots on the island the 56th and the 6th are expected to activate two additional trained and equipped combat divisions during 1945. It is likely that the 6th Depot Division has already activated one new combat division since 1 January 1945; if so it would be capable of turning out another late in the year and the increasing threat of invasion will probably cause the activation of new combat units to be expedited. This same consideration implies that immediately upon activation of 2 divisions now training the depots will promptly initiate the formation and training of 2 more; however, in view of this brief period of training by D-Day their combat efficiency is unlikely to be very far developed.

The 1 to 2 additional combat divisions necessary to complete the planned initial garrison may be drawn from one of the following sources:

Eight to 12 active divisions currently on Honshu.

Five to 6 active divisions on Hokkaido, in the Kuriles, or in Karafuto.

Ten to 13 active divisions in Manchuria-Korea.

Twelve to 15 new divisions expected to be activated by the 12 depot divisions in the home islands (other than Kyushu) during 1945.

Of the above sources, the first named is considered the most likely.

Continuing the intensified B-29 and carrier strikes, the initiation of bombing raids from the Ryukyus, and possibly surface and submarine action are certain to cause considerable interruption in overland troop movement in Kyushu and in Southwest Honshu, and in overwater movement through Western Empire waters. (It is possible that eventually complete interdiction may be achieved in limited areas for limited periods. Nevertheless, the long intervening time, the numerous available means of transportation, and the wide dispersion of sources insure that the Japanese will retain sufficient freedom of action long enough to complete the movement of this small number of troops from extra-Kyushu sources. /

Troops from Honshu may now pass under Shimonoseki Strait via the Shimonoseki - Moji tunnel by rail, motor, or marching. This route can be interdicted by sufficient concentrated aerial bombardment to seal one or

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both of the entrances; however, it would be difficult to keep them continuously closed throughout the long intervening period. Even if this were accomplished, the troops can still be moved overwater via barges and/or other types of small craft from Honshu or Shikoku in 1 night; from Korea in 1 to 2 nights. The Empire abounds in small craft and the Japanese are inherently good boatmen.

Neither is it likely that the Japanese will encounter any insurmountable difficulty in completing their planned dispositions of their initial Kyushu garrison. Of the three combat divisions which they are expected to deploy in Southern Kyushu, 1 is already in the area. Although the only two available land routes connecting Northern to Southern Kyushu lend themselves readily to interdiction by either concentrated aerial bombing, or by naval gun fire it is unlikely that any effort we can mount could keep them continuously closed long enough to prevent either the movement of 2 additional divisions to the southern plains prior to D-Day or their maintenance after arrival at least until D-Day. Even if both land routes go out and remain out, abundant time and the ample stock of barges, luggers and other small craft render night coastal movement, either around obstructions or over the complete distance, easily feasible.

The above considerations lead to the conclusion that by D-Day, the Japanese will have increased their mobile combat forces in Southern Kyushu to at least 3 divisions plus appropriate air, base and service units; that their forces in Northern Kyushu will include at least 3 active divisions, 2 depot divisions, and 1 to 2 tank regiments. (See Map Encls. 1, 2 and 3.)

(2) Ground Defense and Reinforcements.

(a) Initial Reaction:

Landings on any of the 3 coastal plains of Southern Kyushu will probably be opposed initially by small but numerous beach defense groups disposed through the areas immediately behind the landing beaches. These will be sacrifice troops; they will be well dug in and will rely principally on automatic weapons and mortar fire.

Surrounding hills provide excellent observation over practically all landing beaches in Southern Kyushu; the enemy will have an excellent opportunity to oppose our assault echelons with observed artillery

[REDACTED]

fire from well concealed battery positions until our assault echelons advance to the foothills.

The Japanese have recently initiated extensive employment of land mines, particularly in sustained defense; their generous use on the beaches as well as along inland routes of advance must be anticipated.

The effectiveness of this echelon of defense in impeding our progress will be dependent on the intensity and thoroughness of the preparatory bombardment, both air and naval.

During the 24 to 48 hours subsequent to landing local reserves of front-line battalions and regiments will probably be encountered. These troops may be employed in local counter-attacks and/or to occupy prepared positions behind the beach areas and covering the approaches to critical inland areas; these would include the airfields, the entrance to the Miyakonojo Basin, the valleys leading from the Kushikino Plain to Kagoshima, the west coast of Kagoshima-wan, and the corridor leading from the Miyazaki Plain to Miyakonojo.

(b) Subsequent Reactions:

(i) Ariake Plain:

Division reserves in the eastern sector will probably be disposed principally in the vicinity of Miyakonojo. Lacking effective interdiction and under favorable conditions of road maintenance and of readiness of troops and transport these troops, moving south through the Miyakonojo Basin, could begin arriving near the head of Ariake-wan in 24 to 48 hours. Elements of the Division in Corps Reserved in the vicinity of Kokubu could approach by either or both of 2 routes; via Miyakonojo and thence down the basin or southward along the east shore of Kagoshima-wan and enter the Ariake Plain via the narrow connecting valleys. It is estimated that 3 to 5 nights would be required for either movement. Both are restricted to a single road through narrow corridors, therefore reinforcing units would arrive progressively.

It is therefore estimated that during the 24 to 48 hours subsequent to landing the Japanese can oppose our forces in the Ariake Plain with up to 1 Division plus 8,000 to 12,000 air, base and service troops; building up to 2 divisions during the period D + 3 to D + 5. It

[REDACTED]

must be remembered that these are optimum figures; intensive air interdiction of the restricted routes of approach should considerably retard the development of this strength.

(ii) Kushikino Plain:

Division reserves in this area will probably be disposed in the vicinity of Kagoshima. Again assuming optimum conditions of road maintenance and readiness of troops and transports, and discounting Allied interference, these troops could begin to enter action in the Kushikino Plain within 24 to 48 hours subsequent to landing. Corps reserves from Kokubu could begin arriving within 3 to 5 nights. As in the Ariake Plain, restricted routes would require progressive building up of strength by successive arrival of small units. It is therefore estimated that during the 24 to 48 hours subsequent to landing the Japanese could oppose our forces in the Kushikino Plain with up to 1 division plus 4,000 to 7,000 air, base and service troops; building up to 2 divisions by about D + 3 to D + 5.

(iii) Makurazaki Plain:

This area is likely to be defended by a mixture of small elements of divisional troops and, particularly in its eastern half, by naval and guard forces. Initially, strength would probably not exceed the equivalent of a Regimental Combat Team; however, reinforcements from the vicinity of Kagoshima could arrive within 24 to 48 hours. Night barge movement might replace overland marching in the event the shore route is interdicted.

(c) Reinforcement from Northern Kyushu:

The rapidity and volume of reinforcement from Northern Kyushu will be totally dependent on the extent to which enemy use of the east and west coastal road and railroad routes is permitted to continue. Both routes and the part-way alternate route from Yatsushiro to Kokubu admit of effective interdiction, and in some areas of complete destruction, by concentrated aerial bombing and/or naval gun fire.

If both these routes are permitted to remain fully operational, reinforcements from the Northern Kyushu garrison of 3 combat divisions and 1 to 2 tank regiments could begin arriving in the Miyakonojo, Kokubu, or Kushikino areas by about D + 2 and could be built up to division strength in

[REDACTED]

each area by about D / 4 or D / 5. Interdiction of one route while the other still remains open would not stop reinforcement of either area since both Miyakonojo or Kokubu can be reached via either; however, it would reduce the rate of arrival by approximately half. The fairly wide-spread road net and transverse railroads of Northern Kyushu would permit the Japanese to feed troops into either channel.

Effective interdiction of both coastal routes and the alternate route from Yatsushiro to Kokubu through concentrated aerial bombing and/or naval gunfire would reduce overland reinforcement from Northern Kyushu to a mere trickle as long as maintained. Laborious passage of blocked defiles and long overland marches would be required; arrival of appreciable reinforcements in either objective area would be retarded by several days, and the building up of incoming units to divisional strength would probably become a matter of weeks.

It is probable that the Japanese may resort to night barge movement. An ample supply of small coastal craft is available, and their tactics have long stressed the use of this means of troop transport. It is practically certain that they will attempt to by-pass road and rail-road blocks by this means. Effective air and sea control should limit if not prevent the use of this method to such small proportions as not to seriously increase the possible reinforcement rate.

(d) Reinforcement from Henshu:

Troops from this source could probably be moved into Northern Kyushu via the Shimonoseki tunnel or by night overwater movement; however, their subsequent movement to Southern Kyushu would be subject to the same restrictions that apply to the Northern Kyushu garrison. Overwater movement across Bungo Channel direct to Nobeoka or points south thereof should be easily prevented by air and/or naval action.

(e) Miyazaki Plain:

The strength opposing our landing will be dependent on 3 contingencies; first, how much of the initial garrison of the southeastern sector remains uncommitted; second, whether or not the 1st Raiding Brigade and the large air garrison have been wholly or partially withdrawn; third, the degree of success the Japanese have enjoyed in trickling reinforcements

[REDACTED]

into the Miyazaki Plain from the north. These factors and the effect of 2 weeks of operations in nearby areas are subject to so many variations that no reasonable estimate of the strength and composition of enemy forces to be employed in this area is practicable; however, assuming effective interdiction of routes from Northern Kyushu, it is considered doubtful that they will exceed the equivalent of 1 division. Under optimum conditions reinforcement from Miyakonojo could arrive in 1 to 4 days dependent on whether the movement be accomplished by motor transport or overland marching.

(3) Air Interception and Attack:

Air reaction during the period of approach will probably consist largely of suicide crash attacks; these can be expected to increase in intensity as our convoys near the coasts of Kyushu.

Intense and violent air reactions may occur prior to landing; in any event they may be expected to begin at any time from D-Day on. These will probably include both massed air attacks, and frequent small sorties. Suicide crashes will continue, probably with increased frequency.

The longevity of this major effort will be governed by the proportion of his then available air strength the enemy feels must be retained at all costs for the protection of the vital Tokyo area. This has previously been tentatively estimated at 2,000 to 2,500 aircraft; however, in view of his reduced overall strength this limitation will probably have to be considerably reduced by target date. Even if this be so, in view of his reduced strength he will be forced either to sharply limit his losses in defense of Kyushu or accept the risk of leaving the Tokyo area undefended or inadequately defended by air. It is believed that he will be extremely reluctant to accept this risk; therefore although his initial reaction will be as intense and violent as he can make it, it is probable that as soon as he realizes that success is unlikely he will promptly abandon mass attacks and reduce his scale of effort to intermittent small sorties with strong emphasis on suicide crashes. In view of the strong air support he will be able to afford our assaulting forces, it is expected that this decision will be arrived at early; it is therefore believed unlikely that more than 500 to 800 aircraft will be sacrificed in attempts to prevent our landing and consolidation.

[REDACTED]

During the period of strong reaction, attacks will be launched principally from fields in Northern Kyushu, Southwestern Honshu, Shikoku, and Southern Korea. Although our extended bombing range will have driven most of his aircraft beyond these areas for basing purposes, the fields are expected to remain in use at least as staging bases, and planes from more distant bases will be staged in and launch their attacks from these fields.

Following the establishment of our land-based air strength on Southern Kyushu and the beginning of short-range air attacks against critical industrial areas, a shift to purely defensive air action can be expected. Offensive air action against Southern Kyushu will probably deteriorate into the familiar pattern of sporadic raiding, principally during the hours of darkness.

(4) Naval Capabilities:

Allied occupation of Iwo Jima and various islands of the Nansei Shotos and the establishment of extensive air base facilities in these sectors will have resulted in complete Allied dominance of the air over Southern Kyushu and at least partial control of the air over the remainder of the Empire. The Allied fleet, which has ranged throughout the waters south of Japan during the past three months, will be even more powerful at the time of the proposed operation, and will have absolute control of the areas south of Kyushu. The Japanese Naval High Command is already faced with the problem of how best to deploy their few remaining fleet units so as to offer maximum resistance against the establishment of an Allied beachhead in an area where the power of the vastly superior Allied fleet will be augmented by powerful land-based air cover.

It is very probable that all operational units now in the Inland Sea will be withdrawn in the near future in order to escape further attacks by Allied aircraft and to avoid being trapped in the confined Inland Sea waters as a result of Allied mining operations. It is possible that following the withdrawal of the fleet from the Inland Sea, Surface Suicide Attack Unit, which met with disaster on 7 April, will attempt to make contact with the Allied forces in the Okinawa area. If such a course of action is followed these forces will most likely meet with the same fate as did the late 1st

[REDACTED]

Diversion Attack Force Suicide Unit and the enemy fleet will thereby be reduced to such an extent that its future employment will be of little significance.

If the enemy fleet is not used in further attempts to engage the Allied units in the Nansei Shotos, it is probable that it will be withdrawn to the less vulnerable waters of the Yellow Sea or Sea of Japan to await the approach of an Allied invasion force toward Kyushu, at which time a final desperate fleet suicide attack will probably be launched.

The enemy submarine force will remain a serious threat to Allied operations against Japan. Although to date the Japanese have achieved little success with their submarines, it is probable that offensive submarine activity will reach a high level when an Invasion Force approaches Japan proper. The enemy has approximately 60 subs concentrated in Empire) Nansei Shoto-Formosa waters at the present time and this number may be increased as the result of the recall to the Empire of those subs now on patrol in distant waters for the defense of the Empire. A new unit called "Kaiten" has been recently noted in connection with submarine activity. The "Kaiten" is not as yet positively identified but it is estimated to be a type of one man suicide 24 inch torpedo with a 37 inch outer diameter housing for the operator between the air flask and war head. This weapon is known to have been used in the Iwo Jima area in March, again in the Nansei Shotos (results unknown), and midget submarine activity is also to be expected.

Regarded as a highly important "secret weapon" by the Jap Army is the so-called "Suicide Boat", better named an Assault Demolition Boat. These craft have been used against the Allied surface vessels in the Philippines and in the Nansei Shotos and can be expected to play an important part in the Japanese strategy to repel Allied landings on Japan proper.

Examination of the northern sea approaches to Southern Kyushu indicates that many of the passages could quite easily be mined. Indications have been received that Tachibana Bay (SE of Nagasaki), Kagoshima Bay and Ariake Bay are to be mined in the near future. The exact limits of the proposed fields are unknown.

[REDACTED]

b. Relative Probabilities:

(1) Reinforcement of Kyushu prior to D-Day:

The Japanese will probably reinforce Kyushu to a total strength of 6 combat divisions, 2 depot divisions, 1 to 2 tank regiments and appropriate numbers of base and service troops prior to target date. Of the major combat units, it is expected that 3 combat divisions will be disposed in Southern Kyushu and the remainder north of the central mountain mass. Reinforcement to the extent of 3 to 4 additional divisions from Honshu may be attempted after operations begin.

(2) Ground Defense and Reinforcement from Northern Kyushu:

Assaulting forces will probably be opposed initially by beach defense groups; within 24 to 48 hours battalion and regimental reserves of front line regiments will be encountered.

Lacking interdiction enemy forces in the Ariake Plain may be reinforced to a strength of 27,000 to 31,000 including 1 combat division plus 1 Infantry Regiment within 24 to 48 hours subsequent to landing and by an additional division by D + 3 to D + 5; in the Kushikino Plain they may be reinforced to 20,000 to 23,000 including 1 combat division within 24 to 48 hours and by an additional division by D + 3 to D + 5.

Forces landing in the Makurazaki Plain will probably be opposed initially by the equivalent of a Regimental Combat Team; reinforcement could begin within 24 to 48 hours.

Initial opposition in the Miyazaki Plain will depend upon the course of previous operations; however, it is doubtful that it will exceed the equivalent of 1 division. The Japanese will probably make strenuous efforts to reinforce Southern Kyushu from the Northern Kyushu garrison and/or Honshu. Success will be dependent on the effectiveness of our interdiction, by concentrated aerial bombing and naval gun fire, of the two coastal land routes and of coastwise barge traffic; if intensive and thorough interdiction is established and maintained, reinforcement from Northern Kyushu and/or Honshu will probably be reduced to intermittent small increments.


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
(3) Air Interceptions and Initial Mass Attack:


During the approach, air interception will probably consist largely of suicide crash attempts increasing in intensity as our forces near Kyushu. Mass air attacks mixed with frequent small sorties will probably begin as soon as landing is imminent and continue with great violence until the enemy is convinced his efforts to prevent our landing and consolidation are unlikely to succeed; thereafter air reactions will probably be limited to intermittent small sorties and sporadic harassing raids, principally at night.

(4) Naval Sorties; Suicide Tactics by Small Units:

If the enemy fleet has not been destroyed in interim operations it will probably launch a final desperate suicide attack during the approach or soon after our landing. Intense submarine activity by both large and midget subs and 1 man suicide torpedoes may be expected during approach and throughout the operations. Increased use of assault demolition boats ("suicide boats") is probable. The waters of Kagoshima-wan and Ariake-wan will probably be mined.








TOP SECRET

CHARACTERISTICS OF PRINCIPAL LANDING BEACHES, SOUTHERN KYNIAU

Beach Area No.	Length	Description	Approaches	Surf and Swell	Tidal Range	Terrain Behind Beach	Remarks
1.	5 miles	?	?	Heavy most of year	5 feet	Coastal Plain formed by river deltas	Rice fields may impede inland movement. Possibly suitable for large scale landings.
2.	3 1/2 miles	Sand, cut by 2 rivers and several small streams	Clear. Deep water inshore. Depths of 50 feet 2 miles offshore.	Heavy all year. Heaviest with E winds, common July and August.	6 to 7 feet	Coastal plain 2 to 7 miles wide, road and RR close to shore.	Excellent for large scale landings.
3.	9 miles	Sand, firm. Cut by 4 small streams no major interruptions.	Clear except for small island 3 miles off north end. 18 foot line 300 to 600 yards offshore.	Heavy all year. Heaviest with SE winds, common July and August.	7 feet	Ariake Plain. Railroad to interior from north end of beach.	Good beach for large scale landings.
4.	20 miles	Sand and cobble stones. Series of intermittent beaches 1 to 9 miles long.	Clear.	Light to none.	8 to 9 feet	Narrow coastal shelf backed by mountains cut by narrow valleys to Ariake Plain. Road along shelf.	Numerous sections considered excellent for large scale landings.
5.	25 miles	Sand and pebbles. Series of intermittent beaches 1 to 9 miles long.	Clear, 5 fathom line generally within 1 mile.	Light to none.	8 to 9 feet	Narrow coastal shelf backed by hills. Road and RR traverse shelf. Kagoshima at north end.	Numerous sections well suited for large landings.
6.	2 1/2 miles	Sand.	Clear except 2 small rocks near center. 18 foot line 80 to 350 yards offshore.	Heavy all year. Heaviest with SE winds, common June through August.	8 to 9 feet	Gently rolling terrain for 2 miles inland.	
7.	5 miles	Sand. Cut by 3 small streams.	Steep offshore slope. Clear except 1 small rock off center. Depths of 18 feet, 350 to 700 yards offshore.	Heavy all year. Heaviest with SE winds, common June through August.	8 to 9 feet	Generally hills 200 to 500 feet high. Narrow Plain 1 mile wide near center.	Excellent for landing large forces.
8.	16 miles	Sand, cut by 1 river and several small streams.	Clear except for 1 small island and 2 rocks 6 miles off south half. 18 foot line 350 to 1000 yards offshore.	Heavy all year. Heaviest with W winds, common from May through August.	8 to 11 feet	3 mile wide coastal plain behind south section. Sand dunes in south section. Road and RR near beach. Entrance of corridor to Kagoshima near north end. Hills 300/600 feet behind north section.	Some sections excellent for amphibious landings.
9.	3 miles	Sand. Interrupted by river mouth and lagoon.	Rocks off north section. Otherwise clear. 18 foot line 350 to 1000 yards offshore.	Heavy all year. Heaviest with SW winds, common June through August.	8 to 11 feet.	Backed by plain 1 mile wide, then hills 300/600 feet. Entrance to Kagoshima corridor (Huin) to SE small swamp at north end.	"
10.	1 1/2 miles	Sand. Cut by small stream.	Clear except for scattered rocks off south half.	Heavy all year. Heaviest with SW winds, common June through August.	8 to 11 feet	Plain extending inland 3 miles, then hills 6/700 feet on either side of plain.	"

See Map Encl. 6.



GLOSSARY


Japanese	English
-gata	lagoon, inlet
-jima	island
-kaido	strait
-ko	lake
-misaki	point, cape
-nada	sea, open bay
-retō	island chain
-saki	point, cape
-sen	mountain
-shima	island
-suidō	channel, strait
-wan	bay
-zaki	point, cape


KYUSHU

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA
Military Intelligence Section
General Staff

LANDING BEACHES
SOUTHERN KYUSHU

Scale 1:1,000,000 at Latitude 33°





[REDACTED]

ENEMY AIRFIELDS, LANDING GROUNDS
AND SEAPLANE STATIONS, KYUSHU

25 April 1945

Enemy airfields, landing grounds and seaplane stations in Kyushu are listed below in alphabetical order. Map Index Nos. permit ready reference to corresponding clock-wise numbering on accompanying map. As specific data is not available on many of these facilities, the general type is indicated by use of standard symbols, defined at the end of this tabulation.

Map Index No.	Name	Location	Runways No. and Length of Longest (ft)	Type
*26	Aburatsu	SE Kyushu	---	FLG
*67	Ainoura	WNW Sasebo	unknown	SS(?)
*68	Ainoura	SW Coast	---	FLG
*47	Akune	SW Coast	unknown	ASS
85	Ashiya	N Coast	2 - 6200	MAD
* 5	Beppu Bay	WNW Oita	unknown	ASS
*14	Bochu	ENE Kumamoto	---	FLG
42	Byu	SSW Kagoshima	2 - 6600	HLG
43	Chiran	SSW Kagoshima	3 - 6400	HAD(?)
84	Fukuma	NNE Fukuoka	2 - 4000	FAD
69	Fukushima	SE Kurume	1 - 5000	MLG
81	Gannosu	N Fukuoka	4 - 3450	FAD
*82	Gannosu	N Fukuoka	ample	ASS
*83	Gono Bay	SW Ikishima	unknown	ASS
50	Goryo	NE Shimojime	ample	SS
76	Hakata	NW Fukuoka	ample	SS
* 4	Handa	NW Oita	---	ELG
*56	Hirose	NW Kumamoto	1 - 5100	MLG
49	Hitoyoshi	S Cent Kyushu	2 - 5500	MLG(?)
*16	Hoso Bay	S Nobeoka	limited	ASS
31	Ibusuki	S Kyushu	ample	SS
78	Imajiku	W Fukuoka	3 - 5500	MAD
*74	Imazu	W Fukuoka	1 - 2800	ELG
59	Isahaya	NE Nagasaki	1 - 6000	HLG(?)
75	Itazuke	ESE Fukuoka	3 - 5140	MAD
27	Iwakawa	S Miyakonojo	3 - 5000	MLG
48	Izumi	SW Kyushu	2 - 5200	MAD
52	Kagami	S Kumamoto	1 - 5000	MAD
38	Kagoshima	S Kagoshima	1 - 5500	MAD
39	Kagoshima	SSE Kagoshima	ample	SS
32	Kanoya	SW Kanoya	2 - 5440	MAD
31	Kanoya East	ESE Kanoya	1 - 5700	MAD
18	Karasehara	NE Miyazaki	1 - 5900	HAD
57	Kikuchi	W Kumamoto	1 - 5800	MLG(?)
55	Kikutomi	NE Kumamoto	1 - 3800	FLG
*34	Kirishima	NW Miyakonojo	---	ELG
*36	Kitahara	NE Kagoshima	1 - 4870	MAD
37	Kokubu	NE Kagoshima	1 - 3780	FLG(?)
23	Korimoto	NE Miyakonojo	1 - 6000	HAD
54	Kumamoto	NNE Kumamoto	1 - 6000	HLG(?)
71	Kurume	NW Kyushu	---	FLG
*70	Kurume East	NW Kyushu	1 - 3000(?)	ELG
*45	Kushikino	WNW Kagoshima	---	ELG
33	Kushira	NE Kanoya	3 - 4650	MAD
*53	Misumi	SW Kumamoto	---	ELG
24	Miyakonojo	NW Miyakonojo	1 - 5600	MLG(?)

Map Index No.	Name	Location	Runways No. and Length of Longest (ft)	Type
*25	Miyakonojo East	ESE Miyakonojo(?)	---	ELG
22	Miyakonojo North	N Miyakonojo	2 - 5940	MAD
*46	Miyanojo	NW Kagoshima	---	ELG
21	Miyazaki	SE Miyazaki	3 - 5050	MAD
77	Najima	NNE Fukuoka	ample	SS
19	Nittagahara	N Miyazaki	1 - 3970	FAD
*15	Nobeoka	E Kyushu	---	FAD(?)
6	Oita	NE Oita	1 - 4640	MAD
7	Oita	ENE Oita	ample	SS
* 8	Oita South	SE Oita	---	ELG
62a	Omura	N Omura	1 - 5300	MAD
62b	Omura	NW Omura	ample	SS
*61	Omura South	N Omura	1 - 1500	ELG
*60	Onomura	E Omura	2 - 4600	MLG
35	Ronchi	NE Kagoshima	1 - 5100	MAD
20	Sadohara	N Miyazaki	1 - 6750	HAD
13	Saeki	NE Kyushu	2 - 2840(?)	MAD
12	Saeki	NE Kyushu	ample	SS
80	Saitozaki	NW Fukuoka	2 - 3750	FLG
*29	Sakita	S Kyushu	unknown	ASS
*64	Sasebo	SSE Sasebo	unlimited	SS
65	Sasebo	SSE Sasebo	1 - 2650	FLG
63	Sasebo East	SE Sasebo	ample	ASS
66	Sasebo-Hui	SE Sasebo	ample	SS
28	Shibushi	S Kyushu	2 - 4950	MAD
79	Shigashima	NW Fukuoka	ample	SS
73	Shisojima	SE Fukuoka	3 - 7300	HLG
1	Sone	E Yawata	1 - 4150	FAD
72	Tachiarai	SE Fukuoka	1 - 6700	HAD
*41	Tara	W Kagoshima-wan	---	ELG
44	Tojimbara	SW Kagoshima	1 - 5500	MAD
51	Tomie	Fukae Id	1 - 3000	FLG
17	Tomitaka	NE Karasehara	1 - 4200	FAD
2	Tsuiki	SE Yawata	1 - 3700	MAD(?)
*10	Tsukumi	SE Oita	unknown	ASS
*11	Tsukumi	SE Oita	---	ELG
*30	Uchinoura	SE Kanoya	unknown	ASS
3	Usa	NNW Oita	2 - 4700	MAD
* 9	Usuki	SE Oita	---	ELG
58	Waifu	NE Kumamoto	1 - 5800	MAD

AIRFIELDS

"AIRFIELD" signifies the existence of an all weather runway or complete facilities, or both.

HAD-HEAVY BOMBER AIRFIELD: An airfield which will permit operational use by Heavy Bombers; or an airfield with a run of at least 6000 ft at sea level, suitable for Heavy Bombers.

MAD-MEDIUM BOMBER AIRFIELD: An airfield which will permit operational use by Medium Bombers; or an airfield with a run of at least 4500 ft at sea level, suitable for Medium Bombers.

FAD-FIGHTER AIRFIELD: An airfield which will permit operational use by Fighters; or an airfield with a run of at least 3000 ft at sea level, suitable for fighters.

[REDACTED]

LANDING GROUNDS

"LANDING GROUND" signifies a suitable landing area without all weather runway and with incomplete facilities.

HLC-HEAVY BOMBER LANDING GROUND: a landing ground which will permit operational use by Heavy Bombers; or a landing ground with a runway of at least 6000 feet at sea level, suitable for Heavy Bombers.

MLG-MEDIUM BOMBER LANDING GROUND: a landing ground which will permit operational use by Medium Bombers; or a landing ground with a runway of at least 4500 feet at sea level, suitable for Medium Bombers.

FLG-FIGHTER LANDING GROUND: a landing ground which will permit operational use by Fighters; or a landing ground with a runway of at least 3000 feet at sea level, suitable for Fighters.

ELG-EMERGENCY LANDING GROUND


SEAPLANE BASES

SS - A fully equipped SEAPLANE STATION.

ASS - Auxiliary seaplane station: incomplete facilities.

* Indicates existence of facility confirmed by photos etc.

(?) Further confirmation required.




ANNEX 3 b (1) (8)

STAFF STUDY

"OLYMPIC"

ORGANIZATION OF FORCES



ANNEX 3 b (3) (b)

STAFF STUDY

"OLYMPIC"

TENTATIVE
TROOP LIST

"OLYMPIC"

TENTATIVE
TROOP LIST

TENTATIVE TROOP LIST

STAFF STUDY

"OLYMPIC"

I N D E X

RECAPITULATION	1
SIXTH ARMY	(2 - 14)
Combat	2 - 6
Military Government	7
Service	8 - 14
FAR EAST AIR FORCES	(15 - 21)
(Including Marine)	
Combat	15
Service	15 - 21
ARMY SERVICE COMMAND "O"	22 - 33
NAVAL SHORE ESTABLISHMENTS	34

RECAPITULATION	TOTALS			ASSAULT SHIPPING			FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS		
	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT
SIXTH ARMY	(451,289)	(69,465)	(568,464)	(352,224)	(51,930)	(434,246)	(99,065)	(17,535)	(133,424)
Combat	382,937	56,316	487,148	314,474	43,589	386,963	68,463	12,727	100,185
Military Government	18,970	2,243	14,726	2,415	568	2,282	16,555	1,675	12,444
Service	49,382	10,906	66,590	35,335	7,773	45,001	14,047	3,133	20,795
TAR EAST AIR FORCES (Incl Marine)	(136,345)*	(30,642)	(198,537)	(29,750)	(7,008)	(45,769)	(84,435)	(22,634)	(152,766)
Combat	35,857	10,574	64,388	7,282	1,985	8,970	28,595	8,589	55,418
Service	78,328	19,068	134,149	22,468	5,023	36,799	55,840	14,045	97,350
ARMY SERVICE COMMAND "O"	184,755	36,292	371,854	54,512	12,919	160,296	130,243	23,373	211,558
NAVAL SHORE ESTABLISHMENTS	43,159	5,100	236,368	—	—	—	43,159	5,100	236,368
SHIPPING TOTAL	793,388	140,499	1,375,223	436,466	71,857	640,311	356,902	68,642	734,118
AIR ECHELON (FEAF)	22,160*	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
GRAND TOTAL	815,548	140,499	1,375,223	436,466	71,857	640,311	356,902	68,642	734,118

SIXTH ARMY COMBAT UNITS	TOTALS			ASSAULT SHIPPING			FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS		
	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT
<u>Infantry</u>									
1 Hq & Hq Co, ARMY	1,457	145	750	1,150	108	600	307	37	150
3 Hq & Hq Co, Corps (USA)	1,740	69	570	1,500	54	330	240	15	240
9 Inf Divs	126,315	19,260	138,600	108,000	13,600	98,400	18,315	5,660	40,200
1 AB Div	12,997	1,291	11,780				12,997	1,291	11,780
1 Inf RCT	4,357	416	2,900	4,100	330	2,300	257	86	600
1 Ranger Bn	516	17	350	516	17	350			
1 Hq & ServBn, Amphib Corps	1,180	52	933	980	45	750	200	7	183
3 Marine Divs	59,898	6,699	62,871	57,798	6,000	57,000	2,100	699	5,871
SUB TOTAL	208,460	27,949	218,754	174,044	20,154	159,730	34,416	7,795	59,024
<u>Cavalry</u>									
1 Cav Div	12,930	3,046	16,500	12,500	2,400	13,500	430	646	3,000
1 Cav RCT	2,622	480	2,900	2,522	390	2,300	100	90	600
SUB TOTAL	15,552	3,526	19,400	15,022	2,790	15,800	530	736	3,600

SIXTH ARMY COMBAT UNITS (Continued)	TOTALS			ASSAULT SHIPPING			FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS		
	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT
<u>Armored</u>									
1 Hq & Hq Co, Armored Gp	98	26	175	98	26	175			
9 Tank Bns	6,506	2,054	10,037	6,389	2,029	39,073	117	25	964
3 TD Bns	1,926	579	6,270	1,926	579	6,270			
SUB TOTAL	8,530	2,659	16,482	8,413	2,634	45,518	117	25	964
<u>Amphibious</u>									
7 Amphib Tractor Bns	3,664	1,060	18,191	3,664	1,060	18,191			
2 Amphib Tank Bns	1,496	258	4,842	1,178	165	2,929	318	93	1,913
1 Amphib Tractor Bn LVT (A) (Marines)	869	156	2,887	869	156	2,887			
4 Amphib Tractor Bn LVT (Cargo) (Marines)	2,140	604	7,912	2,140	604	7,912			
SUB TOTAL	8,169	2,078	33,832	7,851	1,985	31,919	318	93	1,913
<u>Field Artillery</u>									
4 Hq & Hq Btry FA Gp	428	143	380	321	111	285	107	37	95
3 Hq & Hq Btry FA Corps (USA)	348	111	330	300	84	270	48	27	60
10 FA Bn, 155 How	5,150	1,520	11,960	4,750	1,300	11,000	400	220	960
6 FA Bn, 155 Gun (USA)	3,246	714	6,390	2,600	500	5,000	646	214	1,390

S I X T H A R M Y COMBAT UNITS (Continued)	TOTALS			ASSAULT SHIPPING			FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS		
	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT
4 FA Bn, 8" How	2,272	476	4,260	1,620	300	3,000	652	176	1,260
2 FA Bn, 240 How	974	248	3,340	450	100	1,600	524	148	1,740
1 FA Rocket Bn	684	259	794				684	259	794
4 FA Obsn Bn	1,796	464	1,716	1,600	400	1,600	196	64	116
1 Hq Btry, Corps (Marines)	151	27	132	151	27	132			
4 FA Bn, 155 Gun (Marines)	2,948	592	7,272	2,948	592	7,272			
3 Rocket Det (Marines)	156	30	150	156	30	150			
SUB TOTAL	18,153	4,589	36,724	14,896	3,144	30,309	3,257	1,145	6,415
Anti-Aircraft									
2 Hq & Hq Btry, AAA Brigade	160	36	130	75	13	50	85	23	80
6 Hq & Hq Btry, AAA Group (USA)	428	96	372	254	39	233	174	57	139
8 AAA Gun Bn (SM)	5,096	800	7,760	3,591	474	5,615	1,505	326	2,145
9 AAA AW Bn (SM)	7,092	1,215	7,531	5,263	805	5,611	1,829	410	1,920
1 AAA AW Bn (AT)	760	153	266				760	153	266
2 AAA AW Bn (SP)	1,404	470	2,450	1,300	400	2,100	104	70	350
3 AAA SL Bn	2,426	709	4,173	935	254	1,540	1,491	455	2,633
3 AAA Opns Det	126	33	120	42	11	40	84	22	80

S I X T H A R M Y COMBAT UNITS (Continued)	TOTALS			ASSAULT SHIPPING			FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS		
	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT
1 Hq & Hq Btry, AAA Gp (Marines)	150	15	50	150	15	50			
3 AAA Bn (Marines)	3,780	798	6,237	3,780	798	6,237			
2 AAA Gun Bn (MOL)	1,454	438	3,046				1,454	438	3,046
SUB TOTAL	22,876	4,763	32,135	15,390	2,809	21,476	7,486	1,954	10,659
<u>Chemical</u>									
5 Chem Mort Bn (4.2)	3,360	1,325	5,137	3,193	1,251	4,837	167	74	300
SUB TOTAL	3,360	1,325	5,137	3,193	1,251	4,837	167	74	300
<u>Engineer</u>									
9 Hq & Hq Co, Engr Groups (C)	729	225	873	729	225	873			
20 Engr Combat Bn	12,740	3,300	36,640	12,740	3,300	36,640			
2 Hvy Pon Bn	762	422	3,006	381	211	1,503	381	211	1,503
4 Light Pon Co	844	548	3,216	633	411	2,412	211	137	804
2 Engr Special Brigade	15,090	2,206	32,398	14,050	1,832	19,684	1,040	374	12,714
1 Engr Boat & Shore Regt (Landing Team)	2,255	282	4,746	2,255	282	3,124			1,622
3 Engr Treadway Bridge Co	414	252	2,451	414	252	2,451			
4 Engr Tech Intell Teams (C)	16	2	40	16	2	40			

SIXTH ARMY COMBAT UNITS (Continued)	TOTALS			ASSAULT SHIPPING			FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS		
	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT
1 Engr Bn (Sep) Corps (Marines)	1,007	282	4,300	1,007	282	4,300			
SUB TOTAL	33,857	7,351	86,036	32,225	6,629	69,393	1,632	722	16,643
Miscellaneous									
4 Inf Scout Dog Plat	104	40	80	104	40	80			
1 Sig Opn Bn (Army)	582	192	650	291	96	325	291	96	325
3 Sig Bn, Corps	2,799	627	2,772	2,550	540	2,430	249	87	342
1 Sig Bn, Corps (Marines)	777	121	948	777	121	948			
9 JASCO (USA)	4,878	756	2,898	4,878	756	2,898			
3 JASCO (Marines)	1,505	252	966	1,506	252	966			
3 War Dog Plat (Marines)	186	60	162	186	60	162			
4 WAO (Marines)	148	28	172	148	28	172			
SUB TOTAL	10,900	2,076	8,648	10,440	1,893	7,981	540	183	667
Initial Overstrength and Replacements	53,000			33,000			20,000		
TOTAL SIXTH ARMY - COMBAT	382,937	56,316	487,448	314,474	43,589	386,963	68,463	12,727	100,185

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SIXTH ARMY SERVICE UNITS	TOTALS			ASSAULT SHIPPING			FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS		
	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT
Adjutant General									
3 MRU (Type Y)	144	27	300				144	27	300
1 MRU (Type Z)	68	20	100				68	20	100
7 APU	119	7	42	34	2	12	85	5	30
3 Post Reg Sta	93	6	72	93	6	72			
<u>Chemical</u>									
1 Serv Co	218	26	140	218	26	140			
11 Serv Plat	594	121	583	486	99	477	108	22	106
<u>Engineer</u>									
1 Hq & Hq Co, Const Brig	109	15	61	109	15	61			
1 Cam Bn	386	94	356				386	94	356
1 Topo Bn (Army)	426	96	485	92	15	85	334	81	400
3 Topo Co (Corps)	354	93	477	135	27	120	219	66	357
4 Water Sup Co	544	284	2,100	408	213	1,575	136	71	325
5 Maint Co	955	370	2,925	332	160	1,140	623	210	1,785

S I X T H A R M Y		TOTALS			ASSAULT SHIPPING			FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS		
SERVICE	UNITS (continued)	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT
	10 Dump Trk Co (w/dr teams)	1,310	650	4,550	524	260	1,820	786	390	2,730
	1 Parts Sup Co	174	10	109	174	10	109			
	2 Pet Distr Co	432	60	630	432	60	630			
	2 Base Equip Co	346	186	1,962				346	186	1,962
	2 Depot Co	418	48	304	209	24	152	209	24	152
	6 Lt Equip Co	708	468	3,984	708	468	3,984			
	1 Map Depot Det	12	2	15	2	1	5	10	1	10
	1 Surv Liaison Det	14	2	15	14	2	15			
	1 Model Making Det	19	3	20				19	3	20
	3 Well Drilling Det	42	21	150	42	21	150			
	3 S/It Maint Det	9	3	30	9	3	30			
	1 Tech Intell Rear (P)	9	2	15	9	2	15			
	3 Tech Intell Det (G)	12	6	16	12	6	16			
	1 Refr Maint Team (DH)	18	1	22				18	1	22
	2 Utility Det (HE)	106	22	254	108	22	254			
	4 Naval Const Bn	4,460	920	7,740	2,230	460	3,870	2,230	460	3,870
	3 Tech Intell Det (C)	12	6	16	12	6	16			

SIXTH ARMY		TOTALS			ASSAULT SHIPPING			FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS		
SERVICE	UNITS (Continued)	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT
<u>Medical</u>										
2 Hq & Hq Det Med Co		68	14	44	68	14	44			
2 Hq & Hq Det Med Bn		58	16	56	58	16	56			
14 Coll Co		1,414	252	1,260	1,212	216	1,080	202	36	180
14 Cllg Co		1,568	252	1,176	1,344	216	1,008	224	36	168
4 Amb Co (Intzd)		356	148	480	356	148	480			
1 Depot Co		133	23	113	133	23	113			
3 Med Bn (ESB)		1,218	189	960	1,218	189	960			
14 Evac Hosps (SM)		4,004	630	3,808	3,432	540	3,264	572	90	544
3 Field Hosp (400 bed)		666	66	438	222	22	146	444	44	292
25 Port Surg Hosp		925	100	650	740	80	520	185	20	130
1 Aug Surg Gp		378	18	245	189	9	123	189	9	122
3 Food Insp Det		15	3	21	15	3	21			
5 Mal Surv Det		65	20	75	26	8	30	39	12	45
8 Mal Control Det		96	24	192	24	6	48	72	18	144
3 Opt Rep Det		21	9	45	21	9	45			
1 Gen Disp		38	2	50				38	2	50

SIXTH ARMY SERVICE UNITS (Continued)	TOTALS			ASSAULT SHIPPING			FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS		
	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT
1 Army Lab	53	9	49				53	9	49
1 Med Bn (Marines)	337	73	274	337	73	274			
1 Evac Hosp (Marine)	250	23	90	250	23	90			
<u>Military Police</u>									
1 MP Bn (Army)	543	76	353	543	76	353			
5 MP Co (Corps)	815	110	250	815	110	250			
1 PW Proc Co	116	14	70	116	14	70			
4 Escort Guard Co	540	16	100	540	16	100			
8 Crim Invest Det	88	24	80	88	24	80			
1 MP Bn (Marine)	550	76	350	550	76	350			
<u>Miscellaneous</u>									
1 CIC Det (Army Area)	100	11	30	100	11	30			
3 CIC Det (Area)	51	21	63	51	21	63			
4 CIC Det (Mbl)	56	20	80	56	20	80			
1 PWB Det	25	4	15	25	4	15			

S I X T H A R M Y		TOTALS			ASSAULT SHIPPING			FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS		
SERVICE	UNITS (Continued)	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT
	2 OOB Teams	16	4	20	16	4	20			
	4 Photo Interpreter Team	32	12	40	32	12	40			
	1 Civil Censor Team	10	3	10	10	3	10			
	8 AGF Bn.	207	-	40				207	-	40
	9 Fin Dish Sec	180	9	54				180	9	54
	2 Spec Serv Co	228	30	77				228	30	77
	<u>Ordnance</u>									
	1 Hq & Hq Det Ord Gp	51	6	22	51	6	22			
	9 Hq & Hq Det Ord Bn	315	54	216	210	36	144	105	18	72
	14 Med Maint Co	2,268	630	4,102	2,104	585	3,809	162	45	293
	2 Med Auto Maint Co	232	72	366	232	72	366			
	4 Hvy Maint Co (Ttk)	808	132	1,584	808	132	1,584			
	3 Hvy Maint Co (FA)	570	99	999	190	33	333	380	66	666
	2 Maint Co (Ad.)	314	72	366				314	72	366
	12 Amm Co	2,148	192	1,404	1,969	176	1,287	179	16	117
	5 Depot Co	900	115	970	720	92	776	180	23	194

SIXTH ARMY SERVICE UNITS (Continued)	TOTALS			ASSAULT SHIPPING			FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS		
	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT
2 Evac Co	352	74	366	176	37	183	176	37	183
16 Bomb Disp Sqd	112	48	416	112	48	416			
1 Bomb Disp Co (Marine)	82	15	50	82	15	50			
<u>Quartermaster</u>									
4 Hq & Hq Det QM Bn (Mol)	108	12	80	54	6	40	54	6	40
5 Hq & Hq Det QM Bn	150	20	100	120	16	80	30	4	20
16 Trk Co (w/Dr Teams)	2,160	1,664	5,104	1,485	1,144	3,509	675	520	1,595
4 Gas Sup Co	500	200	684	375	150	513	125	50	171
1 Car Co	129	92	156	129	92	156			
5 Rhd Co	1,145	40	325	687	24	195	458	16	130
2 Salv Coll Co	412	25	306	412	25	306			
16 Serv Co	3,504	64	1,888	2,847	52	1,534	657	12	354
4 Bakery Co	640	16	316				640	16	316
2 Laundry Co	534	60	478				534	60	478
17 Hosp Laundry Det (EA)	493	17	425	348	12	300	145	5	125
4 Graves Regt Co	500	76	396	375	57	297	125	19	99

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FAR EAST AIR FORCES (Incl Marine) COMBAT UNITS	TOTALS			ASSAULT SHIPPING			FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS		
	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT
12 Fiter Gps	8,676	2,436	12,636	2,892	812	4,212	5,784	1,624	8,424
4 Fiter Gps (M)	3,360	804	3,072	2,520	603	2,304	840	201	768
2 Nite Fiter Sq (M)	526	120	560	526	120	560			
2 Nite Fiter Sq	274	120	284	274	120	284			
1 Tac Rec Gp	800	250	1,010	800	250	1,010			
8 L/M Bomb Gps + 1 Sq	10,206	2,727	19,012				10,206	2,727	19,012
1 Med Bomb Gp (M)	1,424	360	1,988				1,424	360	1,988
7 HB Gp	5,950	2,427	17,088				5,950	2,427	17,038
3 HB Sq (LAF)	1,250	200	1,050				1,250	200	1,050
2 Air Sea Res Sq	200	30	260				200	30	260
1 Weather Sq	400	60	300				400	60	300
2 Troop Car Gp	2,000	788	5,342				2,000	788	5,342
5 Photo Sq	666	207	1,536	250	80	600	416	127	936
1 VD Sq (M)	125	45	300				125	45	300
TOTAL AIR COMBAT	35,857	10,574	64,388	7,262	1,985	8,970	28,595	8,589	55,418
Note: Air Echelon	22,160								

FAR EAST AIR FORCES (Incl Marine) SERVICE UNITS	TOTALS			ASSAULT SHIPPING			FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS		
	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT
2 Air Forces	1,926	212	1,670				1,926	212	1,670
2 Air Service Commands	1,094	118	1,132				1,094	118	1,132
1 Air Service Area Command	293	52	506				293	52	506
2 Bomber Commands	1,054	106	852				1,054	106	852
2 Fighter Commands	1,000	140	866				1,000	140	866
1 Photo Wing	251	32	218				251	32	218
3 Bomb Wings	687	159	1,017	687	159	1,017			
3 Fighter Wings	783	81	900	783	81	900			
3 Emergency Rescue Boat Sqs	582	84	741	388	56	494	194	28	247
2 Fighter Control Sqs	780	96	650	780	96	650			
1 Air Combat Control Sq (Amph)									
3 Tactical Air Comm Sqs	657	126	498	438	84	332	219	42	166
Weather Personnel	434	80	273	70	18	126	364	62	147
30 Hqs & Base Service Sqs	8,609	2,430	19,110	1,434	405	3,184	7,175	2,025	15,926
30 Material Sqs	4,260	1,260	12,120	710	210	2,020	3,550	1,050	10,100
30 Engineering Sqs	7,800	2,160	14,953	1,300	360	2,578	6,500	1,800	12,375

FAR EAST AIR FORCES (Incl Marine) SERVICE UNITS Continued	TOTALS			ASSAULT SHIPPING			FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS		
	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT
Det AACs	300	60	500	300	60	500			
10 Mal Surv Dets	130	50	150	52	20	60	78	30	90
10 Mal Cont Dets	240	40	120	48	8	24	192	32	96
4 Portable Surg Hosps	148	32	96	74	16	48	74	16	48
1 Emergency Rescue Gp Hq	46	5	50				46	5	50
1 Photo Gp Hq	100	20	150				100	20	150
1 MEW Control Sq	377	50	300				377	50	300
2 Radio Sqs (Mobile)	1,138	250	1,500				1,138	250	1,500
2 Radar Calibration Dets	70	10	32				70	10	32
2 Radio Security Dets	76	26	216				76	26	216
2 Photo Tech Sqs	312	66	798				312	66	798
2 Photo Tech Units	250	20	216				250	20	216
2 Photo Intel Dets	184	8	126				184	8	126
2 Combat Camera Units	64	8	20				64	8	20
4 Stat Control Units	276	40	512				276	40	512
2 Bands, AAF	52		10				52		10
1 Chemical Maint Co, AVN	82	8	44				82	8	44
2 Engr Topo Cos, Avn	298	36	1,480				298	36	1,480

FAR EAST AIR FORCES (Incl Marine) SERVICE UNITS Continued	TOTALS			ASSAULT SHIPPING			FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS		
	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT
5 Air Liaison Sqds JASCO	260	95	108	104	38	40	156	57	68
16 Airborne Sqds	4,208	1,504	6,856	789	282	1,288	3,419	1,222	5,568
8 Air Cargo Resupply Sqds	1,968	400	2,960	492	100	740	1,476	300	2,220
4 Air Cargo Control Sqds	920	160	1,240	460	80	620	460	80	620
3 Aircraft Repair Units (Floating)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
9 Aircraft Maint Units (Floating)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
13 Chemical Cos (A.O.)	1,690	598	3,718	390	138	858	1,300	460	2,860
16 Eng Avn Utility Cos	1,856	320	2,128	696	120	798	1,160	200	1,330
5 Medical Dispensaries, Avn	140	20	125	84	12	75	56	8	50
30 M.P. Cos	3,030	600	3,300	606	120	660	2,424	480	2,640
22 Q.M. Truck Cos	2,154	1,452	5,852	624	414	1,662	1,530	1,038	4,190
2 Supply Sqds (A.D.G.)	304	80	384	304	80	384	-	-	-
5 Ordnance Ammo Cos	880	330	1,545	352	132	618	528	198	927
9 Signal Cos Wings	801	99	738	534	66	492	267	33	246
4 Sig Hvy Constr Cos (Avn)	772	219	957	772	219	957	-	-	-
1 Sig Air Warning Bn (Mobile)	1,937	428	2,622	1,937	428	2,622	-	-	-
1 Sig Air Warning Bn (L.W.)	1,414	406	2,480	1,414	406	2,480	-	-	-
1 Sig Co A.W.S.	216	13	210	216	13	210	-	-	-

FAR EAST AIR FORCES (Incl Marine) SERVICE UNITS Continued	TOTALS			ASSAULT SHIPPING			FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS		
	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT
2 Central Medical Ests	70	6	40				70	6	40
1 Med Air Evacuation Sq	87	10	80				87	10	80
2 Veterinary Dets, Avn	8	2	2				8	2	2
5 Veterinary Sections, Avn	15	5	3				15	5	3
2 QM Co Depots, Cl III, Avn	64	6	604				64	6	604
2 QM Depots, Subsistence	144	12	110				144	12	110
4 QM Cos (S.G.)	324	64	408	162	32	204	162	32	204
1 QM Serv Co, Avn	212	40	202				212	40	202
1 1/3 Sig Serv Bn, Avn	1,203	102	713				1,203	102	713
1 Sig Serv Co, Avn	253	8	51				253	8	51
3 Sig Serv Cos (Wing)	459	42	246				459	42	246
5 Sig Hvy Const Bns, Avn	2,185	410	3,625				2,185	410	3,625
1 Sig Co, Avn	175	15	112				175	15	112
2 Sig Bns, Tactical Air Command	1,462	488	2,136				1,462	488	2,136
20 Air Support Parties	300	60	300	300	60	300			
7 Hqs Sqs, Serv Gp	1,435	378	1,134	410	108	324	1,025	270	810
14 AEB Photo Teams	42	28	28				42	28	28

FAR EAST AIR FORCES (Incl Marine) SERVICE UNITS Continued	TOTALS			ASSAULT SHIPPING			FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS		
	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT
4 Air Depot Gps(each consisting of)									
1 Hq & Hq Sq	179	55	487				179	55	487
1 Repair Sq	368	137	670				368	127	670
1 Supply Sq	152	40	192				152	40	192
1 Sig Co Dep	159	50	263				159	50	263
1 QM Plat ADG	27	3	33				27	3	33
1 Ord Dep Co	177	20	622				177	20	622
1 QM Trk Co	102	67	322				102	67	322
1 MP Co	125	50	105				125	50	105
1/3 Ord Ammo Co	55	4	83				55	4	83
1 Avn Sq	243	11	50				243	11	50
1 Ord Med Automotive Maint Co	116	36	240				116	36	240
(or Ord Sand M Co)									
1 Air Tech Cnd	50	15	60				50	15	60
5 Ord Maint Co AF	1,075	200	1,050				1,075	200	1,050
2 Ord Depot Co	354	46	1,244				354	46	1,244
3 Air Tech Serv Cnds	150	45	180				150	45	180

[illegible]

[illegible]

ARMY SERVICE COMMAND "O"	TOTALS			ASSAULT SHIPPING			FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS		
	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT
SERVICE UNITS (Continued)									
1 Serv Co	218	26	140				218	26	140
2 Gen Serv Co	260	82	586				260	82	586
1 Maint Co	93	15	129				93	15	129
5 Process Co	700	35	1,050				700	35	1,050
1 Lab Co	58	8	92	58	8	92			
1 Base Depot Co	109	16	108				109	16	108
Engineer									
7 Hq & Hq Co, Const Gp	658	175	742	297	75	318	361	100	424
4 Hq & Hq Co, PR & C Gp	1,088	188	2,328	544	94	1,164	544	94	1,164
2 Hq & Hq Co, Base Depot	144	10	70				144	10	70
1 Hq & Hq Co, Forestry Bn	89	10	100				89	10	100
2 Hq & Hq Co, Const Brig	218	30	122	109	15	61	109	15	61
15 Gen Serv Regts	18,735	2,985	24,750	1,249	199	1,650	17,486	2,786	23,100
10 Const Bns	9,010	2,350	33,490	7,208	1,880	26,792	1,802	470	6,693
33 Avn Bns	25,641	8,415	110,444	10,878	3,570	46,880	14,763	5,300	66,912
6 Naval Const Bns (Marine Airfields)	6,690	1,380	20,952	4,460	920	13,968	2,230	44	6,984

[illegible]

ARMY SERVICE COMMAND "0"	TOTALS			ASSAULT SHIPPING			FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS		
	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT
SERVICE UNITS (Continued)									
2 Port Repair Ships	140	4	116	140	4	116			
2 Power Plant Maint Dets	46	16	124				46	16	124
4 Power Plant Oper Dets	32		20				32		20
6 S/Lt Maint Dets	18	6	60				18	6	60
3 Dredge Crews									
8 Fire Fighting Dets	232	16	92	116	8	46	116	8	46
2 Power Line Maint Dets	8	4	20				8	4	20
2 Rock Crusher Dets	14		100				14		100
1 Floating Power Plant	59								
2 Barge Assby Co (Pontoon Cube)(Prv)	648	74	860				648	74	860
Medical									
2 Hq & Hq Det Med Bn	68	14	44				68	14	44
6 Amb Co (Mtzd)	534	222	720	356	148	480	178	74	240
3 Depot Co	399	69	339				339	69	339
6 San Co	672	24	186				672	24	186

ARMY SERVICE COMMAND "0"	TOTALS			ASSAULT SHIPPING			FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS		
	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT
SERVICE UNITS (Continued)									
2 Base Depot Co	88	10	70				88	10	70
1 Med Bn Gas Treatment	456	92	575				456	92	575
2 Evac Hosps (Fxd)	790	120	1,050				790	120	1,050
12 Field Hosps	2,664	264	1,748	1,332	132	874	1,332	132	874
25 Gen Hosps (1000 Bed)	14,350	525	10,975				14,350	525	10,975
3 Sta Hosps (750 Bed)	1,371	45	1,158				1,371	45	1,158
8 Sta Hosps (500 Bed)	2,640	104	1,872				2,640	104	1,872
2 Sta Hosps (250 Bed)	358	27	459				358	27	459
3 Hosp Centers	96	9	144				96	9	144
1 Prof Serv Plat	317	37	476				317	37	476
2 Dental Pros Teams (Fxd)	18		28				18		28
6 Food Insp Dets	30	6	42				30	6	42
11 Mal Surv Dets	143	44	143				143	44	143
22 Mal Control Dets	264	66	352				264	66	352
1 Museum Med Arts Det	7	1	10				7	1	10
2 Blood Transfusion Dets	62	14	76	62	14	76			
6 Gen Disps	228	12	300				228	12	300
6 Dental Pros Teams (Mbl)	16	4	24				16	4	24

ARMY SERVICE COMMAND "O" SERVICE UNITS (Continued)	TOTALS			ASSAULT SHIPPING			FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS		
	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT
2 Army Labs	106	18	96				106	18	96
<u>Military Police</u>									
2 Hq & Hq Co, MP Bn (Z/I)	78	8	212	78	8	212			
6 MP Bn (Z/I)	3,894	516	2,118	1,947	258	1,059	1,947	38	1,059
4 MP Co (Z/I)	596	68	352	596	68	352			
4 MP PC & S Co	404	52	286				404	52	286
2 MP Gate & Patrol Plat	62	10	50				62	10	50
25 MP Gate & Patrol Sec	75		75				75		75
1 PW Proc Co	116	14	70				116	14	70
1 Escort Guard Co	115	4	25				115	4	25
2 Crim Invest Det	22	6	20				22	6	20
<u>Miscellaneous</u>									
14 Fin Disb Sec	280	14	84				280	14	84
1 Field Serv Regt (Marine)	3,500	765	6,100	3,500	765	6,100			
1 Base Service Command Hq	2,000	66	1,095	100	10	100	1,900	56	995

ARMY SERVICE COMMAND "NO"	TOTALS			ASSAULT SHIPPING			FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS		
	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT
SERVICE UNITS (Continued)									
3 Base Serv Comd	3,000	150	2,619	750	45	750	2,250	105	1,869
1 Spec Serv Co	114	15	77				114	15	77
Ordnance									
1 Hq & Hq Det, Ord Co	51	6	22	51	6	22			
5 Hq & Hq Det, Ord Bn	175	30	120	105	18	72	70	12	48
1 Hq & Hq Det, Base Depot	41	4	107	41	4	107			
1 Base Arm Maint Bn	616	16	260			1	616	16	260
1 Base Auto Maint Bn	773	13	275			1	773	13	275
6 Med Maint Co	972	270	1,758				972	270	1,758
10 Med Auto Maint Co	1,160	360	1,830	464	144	732	696	216	1,098
1 Hvy Maint Co (Ttk)	202	33	396				202	33	396
2 Hvy Maint Co (FA)	380	66	666				380	66	666
4 Hvy Auto Maint Co	808	144	960			1	808	144	960
1 Maint Co (AA)	157	38	193				157	38	193
12 Am Co	2,148	192	1,404				2,148	192	1,404
5 Depot Co	900	115	970	360	46	388	540	69	582

ARMY SERVICE COMMAND "O"

SERVICE UNITS (Continued)

	TOTALS			ASSAULT SHIPPING			FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS		
	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT
3 Base Depot Co	636	12	285	212	4	95	424	8	190
2 Am Renov Co	214	22	200				214	22	200
2 Tire Repair Co	290	8	270				290	8	270
2 Motor Veh Ass Co	358	52	526				358	52	526
2 Motor Veh Dist Co	328	34	274				328	34	274
2 Tire Rep Det (Mbl)	32	8	74	32	8	74			
8 Bomb Disposal Sqd	56	24	208	56	24	208			
Quartermaster									
4 Hq & Hq Det, QM Gp	140	36	84	70	18	42	70	18	42
6 Hq & Hq Det, QM Bn	180	24	108	30	4	18	150	20	90
5 Hq & Hq Det, QM Bn (Mbl)	135	15	100	108	12	80	27	3	20
1 Hq & Hq Det, Base Depot	154	4	107				154	4	107
35 Trk Co (w/Dr Team)	4,725	3,640	11,165	1,620	1,248	3,828	3,105	2,392	7,337
5 Gas Sup Co	625	250	855	250	100	342	375	150	513


ARMY SERVICE COMMAND "O" SERVICE UNITS Continued	TOTALS			ASSAULT SHIPPING			FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS		
	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT
1 Car Co	129	92	156				129	92	156
3 Rhd Co	531	24	195				531	24	195
11 Depot Sup Co	2,046	363	418	744	132	152	1,302	231	266
1 Salv Coll Co	206	25	153				206	25	153
7 Salv Rep Co (SW)	1,407	112	1,015				1,407	112	1,015
1 Salv Rep Co (Fxd)	217	7	112				217	7	112
30 Serv Co	6,570	120	3,540	1,752	32	944	4,818	88	2,596
7 Bakery Co	1,120	28	553				1,120	28	553
6 Laundry Co	1,602	216	1,494				1,602	216	1,494
2 Refrig Co (Fxd)	196	4	548				196	4	548
3 Refrig Co (Mbl)	309	210	1,200				309	210	1,200
1 Graves Regn Co	125	19	99				125	19	99
8 Hvy. Trk Co (w/Dr Team)	1,128	1,224	5,904				1,128	1,224	5,904
1 Fum & Bath Co	86	10	85				86	10	85
2 Base Depot Co	150	2	148				150	2	148
1 Sup & Sales Co	130	2	150				130	2	150
15 Hosp Lndry Det (EJ)	315	30	300				315	30	300
3 Hosp Ldry Det (EA)	39	3	60				39	3	60

ARMY SERVICE COMMAND "O" SERVICE UNITS Continued	TOTALS			ASSAULT SHIPPING			FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS		
	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT,	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT
3 Pet Lab (Mbl)	18	6	48	12	4	32	6	2	16
1 Pet Lab (Base)	24	4	24				24	4	24
24 Refr Det (Mbl)	72	24	96				72	24	96
<u>Signal</u>									
1 Hq & Hq Det, Base Depot	115	10	214				115	10	214
1 Mcl Comm Unit (GHQ)	530	32	500	530	32	500			
2 Opn Bn	1,104	384	1,300	552	192	650	552	192	650
2 Sig Bn (Sep)	1,586	418	1,848	793	209	924	793	209	924
6 Hvy Const Bn	2,622	1,068	3,930	437	178	655	2,185	890	3,275
4 Lt Const Bn	2,276	488	3,196				2,276	488	3,196
2 Serv Bn	1,510	150	1,038	755	75	519	755	75	519
4 Depot Co	596	84	340	298	42	170	298	42	170
3 Repair Co	477	165	750	159	53	250	318	112	500
1 Rad Intell Co	247	34	242				247	34	242
8 Hvy Const Co	1,544	704	2,664	579	264	999	965	440	1,665
1 Opn Co	254	49	291	254	49	291			

[illegible]

[illegible]

NAVAL SHORE ESTABLISHMENTS (CINCPAC Tentative Estimate)	TOTALS			ASSAULT SHIPPING			FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS		
	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	DWT
1-CUB (Augmented)	27,564	3,723	173,928				27,564	3,723	173,928
1-PT BASE (Initially Tender-based)	478	80	10,022				478	80	10,022
1-GROPAC	3,739	453	22,669				3,739	453	22,669
1-GROPAC (Marine Air Base)	2,616	231	9,984				2,616	231	9,984
NAVY AIR BASE									
1-ACORN	640	291	12,500				640	291	12,500
1-WATS (IP)	24	8	281				24	8	281
1-CASU	1,207						1,207		
1-FLT AIR WING HEADQUARTERS	130						130		
5-PB 4Y Sqdns	1,265						1,265		
2 - Naval Const Bns (CB)	5,496	314	6,984				5,496	314	6,984
TOTAL NAVAL SHORE ESTABLISHMENTS	43,159	5,100	236,368				43,159	5,100	236,368



KAGOSHIMA PENINSULA

FTR	2 GP)
FTR/B	1 GP) MARINE
NI FTR	2 SQ)

MIYAZAKI-MIYAKANOJO

FTR	1 GP
NI FTR	1 SQ
PHOTO	1 SQ

FTR	3 GP
NI FTR	1 SQ
TAC RCN	1 GP
PHOTO	1 SQ

TOTAL


AIR GARRISON


"X+15"

(WITH ASSAULT ECHELON)

9 1/2 GP (EQUIV)

KYUSHU





ANNEX 3B(4)
THE OPERATIONS REQUIRED

NORTH

PACIFIC
OPERATION
"OLYMPIC"
OCEAN
XXXX
SIXTH
PRELIM. OPNS.

40 (+158 CT)

RESERVE AFLOAT FOLLOW-UP

XXXX
IX

XX
98

XX
81

XX
77

XX
11 A/B

KYUSHU

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES
IN
THE PACIFIC

Scale 1:1,000,000

AFPAC RESERVE
(DIVISIONS TO BE DESIGNATED)

XX 5 XX 3 XX Y

XX 2 XX 1 XX 4

XX 1 XX 1 XX 4

XX 1 XX 1 XX 4

XX 1 XX 1 XX 4

XX 1 XX 1 XX 4

XX 5 XX 3 XX Y

XX 2 XX 1 XX 4

XX 1 XX 1 XX 4

XX 1 XX 1 XX 4

XX 1 XX 1 XX 4

XX 1 XX 1 XX 4

XX 5 XX 3 XX Y

XX 2 XX 1 XX 4

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XX 5 XX 3 XX Y

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~~SECRET~~

ANNEX 3 b (4)(b)

"OLYMPIC"

NAVAL OPERATIONS

"OLYMPIC"

NOTE: THE FOLLOWING DIGEST OF INFORMATION OF INTEREST TO U.S. ARMY COMMANDERS IS DRAWN FROM TENTATIVE STAFF STUDY "OLYMPIC", CINCPAC AND CINCPAC, 13 MAY 1945.

1. ORGANIZATION.

Tactical command organization of the elements United States Pacific Fleet committed in the "OLYMPIC" operation is shown on Command Diagram, Appendix 1, hereto.

2. GENERAL MISSIONS.

a. CINCPAC AND CINCPAC.

Coordination and over-all control.

(1) Commander, Third Fleet.

Strategic and general support for "OLYMPIC", including carrier-based air and surface operations.

(2) Commander, Fifth Fleet.

Operations immediately connected with seizure and occupation of beachheads in Southern KYUSHU.

(a) Commander, Amphibious Forces Pacific Fleet.

Operations of Naval Attack Forces.

1. Commanders: Third Amphibious Force,
Fifth Amphibious Force,
Seventh Amphibious Force,
Naval Attack Force to be designated.

Establishment of Landing Forces ashore in assigned Corps Sectors. Subsequent amphibious operations as directed.

2. Commander, Battleship Squadron One.

Gunfire support for landing operations.

(b) Commander, First Fast Carrier Task Force.

Close air support and cover in vicinity of objective.

TOP

(c) Commander, Escort Carrier Force.

Direct air support and cover of landing and subsequent operations.

(d) Commander, Battleship Squadron One.

Cover and screening operations against enemy surface attack in vicinity of the objective.

(e) Commander, Mine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Mining and minesweeping operations, underwater naval harbor defenses.

(f) Commander, Fleet Air Wing One.

Over-water search and reconnaissance (initially from RYUKYUS, later from KYUSHU).

3. AVAILABILITY OF NAVAL VESSELS.

a. Naval assault shipping for mounting Landing Forces is assembled in the HAWAIIAN area by X - 60; MARIANAS by X - 37 and the PHILIPPINES during the period X - 40 to X - 30. Follow-up elements are in general transported by turn-around of Naval Assault Shipping.

b. For tentative availability of naval elements for "OLYMPIC" operation see Chart, Appendix 3b. Type allocations are subject to amendment by CINCPAC upon receipt of Army lift requirements.

4. LOGISTICS AND NAVAL SHORE INSTALLATIONS.

a. In the RYUKYUS, CINCPAC provides all installations for ground, naval and air forces. CINCPAC, through Commanding Generals, Middle and Western Pacific, provides supply for Army Air Forces.

b. For KYUSHU, CINCPAC provides for Naval elements, and for Marine elements not under Army control, hospitalization, storage, tankage, proportionate share of unloading facilities including labor, staging, rehabilitation, and housing. He constructs, operates and maintains his own installations for the Naval service, and performs harbor clearance to high-water mark.

c. CINCPAC controls all ports used in common. Each Service controls directly its own shore installations.

[REDACTED]

d. Fifth Marine Amphibious Corps, First Marine Air Wing, and other attached Naval and Marine units, while operating under control of CINCPAC, are provided by the latter with supplies consumed in common with the Army and with services required to render such Marine and Naval units self-supporting at a distance from beachheads.

e. CINCPAC furnishes supplies and construction troops for construction of Marine installations; provides complete logistic support for all Naval forces afloat; establishes Naval fixed harbor defenses; establishes facilities for the support of fleet elements and escort forces, and for the repair of ships damaged in action; establishes advanced emergency anchorages and temporary seaplane bases.

f. The following are some of the more important installations required by CINCPAC in the objective area:

Four airfields to accommodate:

By X / 5 2 Gp VMF
 2 Gp VMFB
 1 Gp VMF(N)

By X / 30 4 Sq PB (HL)
 1 Sq VD

By X / 90 1 Gp VMB

Bulk petroleum storage for 200,000 barrels fuel oil and 3,000 barrels diesel oil.

An advanced supply depot with 1,000,000 sq ft of covered storage, 10,000 tons of ammunition storage, and requiring 4,000 acres, to be operational by X / 150.

6,800 hospital beds.

PT operating bases for three squadrons.

Harbor craft operating bases in the various anchorages.


Storage for motor and avgas and diesel fuel to supply local requirements of Navy and Marine Corps Forces ashore for thirty days.

Visual radio and wire communications facilities for harbor control and for administration and tactical control of Naval Forces.

[REDACTED]

g. COMSERVPAC, COMAIRPAC and COMGENFMPAC are responsible to CINCPAC for initial supply of Naval and Marine elements proceeding to the objective, and for re-supply of such elements as are in the objective area and not under Army control. They also are responsible for provision to CINCAFPAC in the objective area of supplies peculiar to Naval and Marine elements operating under Army control, including service troops and a proportionate share of unloading facilities and labor required in such supply.

APPENDIX I
TO
ANNEX 3 b(4)(b)
"OLYMPIC"
TACTICAL
COMMAND ORGANIZATION



100

APPENDIX 3, b
TO
ANNEX 3b (4) (b)
"OLYMPIC"
TENTATIVE COMPOSITION
OF
U.S. NAVAL FORCES


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
1. Subject to amendment upon determination of Army Lift Requirements.
2. British Pacific Fleet adds to foregoing approximately

4 BB
6 CV
4 CVL
9 CVE
16 CA/CL
26 DD

Minecraft and Train

~~TOP SECRET~~





STAFF STUDY

"OLYMPIC"

ANNEX 3B(5)(B)4

GENERAL COORDINATION
OF
AIR FORCES

NOTE:

COORDINATION WITH THE
ELEMENTS ASSIGNED
PRIMARY INTEREST IN AN
ATTACK-AREA, IS REQUIRED,
PRIOR TO EXECUTION OF
MISSIONS INTO THAT AREA
BY ANY OTHER ELEMENT.

CHOSSEN - HONSHU

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA

PRIMARY ATTACK AREAS
20th AIR FORCE

THE
OBJECTIVE
AREA

0 50 100 150 MILES

~~SECRET~~

ANNEX 4

STAFF STUDY

"OLYMPIC"

OPERATION - "OLYMPIC"

ANNEX 4

BASIC LOGISTIC PLAN

APPENDIX A

KYUSHU BASE DEVELOPMENT

B AMPHIBIOUS AND HEAVY CARGO SHIPPING REQUIREMENTS

C AIRFIELD DEVELOPMENT

D BULK PETROLEUM FACILITIES

E CONSTRUCTION MATERIAL, TABLE

F NAVAL BASE DEVELOPMENT

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BASIC LOGISTIC PLAN

I. SUPPLY.

1. The Commanding Generals, Army Forces in WESTERN PACIFIC and MIDDLE PACIFIC maintain, in appropriate bases, sufficient stocks to issue accompanying supplies (as required by the Commanding General, Sixth Army) to all Army forces employed in the operation. Supplies for Marine Units are located as directed by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. Issues are made within the following quantities:

Classes I, II, and IV (Less construction materials) - 30 D/S

Class III - For units arriving in objective area prior to X / 30 (all items). - 15 D/S

After X / 30 (Lubricants, greases, range fuel, and kerosene only). - 15 D/S

Class III A

For units arriving in objective area prior to X / 15 - 15 D/S

For units arriving after X / 15 (Lubricants only) - 30 D/S

Class V (Combat Troops) - 5 U/F

Class V (Service Troops) - 3 U/F

Class V A - 30 D/S

Sufficient Class IV construction materials, including necessary equipment for initiation of construction of airdromes, bulk petroleum installations, signal communication facilities, and port facilities, accompany assault echelons in naval amphibious shipping, or where necessary in special loaded heavy shipping direct from the UNITED STATES. Subsequently, construction materials are supplied in heavy shipping direct from the UNITED STATES, or bases in the PACIFIC as required.

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2. Floating reserves in predetermined loads to meet emergencies are held under the control of Commander-in-Chief, Army Forces in the Pacific, at Regulating Stations available for immediate sailing as follows:

Aviation and motor gasoline, and lubricants, packaged;
Ground and Air Force ammunition;
Balanced-loaded maintenance ships.

By phasing with the necessary lead time an overlapping supply of balanced-loaded maintenance ships in sufficient number to provide a rotational floating reserve of these ships is provided as indicated in par 9 below.

3. Resupply is direct from the UNITED STATES, augmented as necessary from bases under control of Commander-in-Chief, Army Forces in the Pacific, and Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. Resupply is accomplished by "AUTOMATIC SUPPLY" made possible by the employment of preloaded resupply ships as follows:

a. Maintenance for the first 30 days is provided by standard balanced Classes I, II, III, and IV ships, each based on approximately 30 days of supply for 25,000 troops. Thereafter maintenance is moved in standard ships of the following types. (1) Class I, (2) Class III, and (3) Classes II and IV exclusive of construction materials.

b. Additional Classes II and IV supplies, based on estimated combat losses, are provided in special-loaded ships.

c. Ammunition (Ground) is supplied in preloaded ammunition ships as follows:

(1) Within the first 90 days of the operation, the first five shiploads for each prescribed landing area consist of sufficient balanced loads of all calibers to gain an initial on-the-ground stockage of five units of fire which with the quantities brought in by troops initially, and as

replenished by (2) below provide a maximum of 10 U/F in each area.

- (2) Additional ships are loaded for selective discharge with calibers based on estimated rates of expenditure giving consideration to experience in all theaters in order to maintain an adequate ammunition supply for sustained operations.

d. Ammunition (Aircraft) is supplied in balanced-loaded ships in sufficient number to meet estimated expenditures at theater experience rates as revised to reflect world-wide experience.

e. Class IV supplies (Construction Materials) are provided as follows:

Sufficient ships to provide minimum basic facilities in each principal landing area are loaded for selective discharge. Thereafter ships are bulk-loaded (ordinary stow).

4. Determination of the loading of all ships indicated in the foregoing paragraph will be under the general supervision of the Commander-in-Chief, Army Forces in the PACIFIC. Requisitions for additional classes II and IV supplies may be submitted by the Commanding General, Sixth Army, to provide those items which he feels are not provided in adequate quantities in preloaded resupply ships. These supplies are delivered in special-loaded ships.

5. Resupply vessels are scheduled to arrive in objective area ports or at beaches, based upon the capacity of the port or beach organizations to discharge, and in sufficient number to meet the daily requirement for supplies of all classes. Partial discharge of ships to meet operational demands is permitted during the first 45 days of the operation.

6. All resupply shipping moves to Regulating Stations to be

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designated and controlled by Commander-in-Chief, Army Forces in the PACIFIC. Movements forward of this Regulating Station are controlled by the Commanding General, Sixth Army, from X Day to X / 15, thereafter by the Commanding General, Army Forces in WESTERN PACIFIC, insofar as determining the number and type of resupply ships to be moved into each objective area to meet operational demands.

7. The Commanding General, Army Forces in WESTERN PACIFIC, is responsible for the procurement of all supplies, except Air Force technical supplies and supplies peculiar to the Marine Corps, and the movement of all supplies except supplies peculiar to the Marine Corps, in ships to the Regulating Stations in accordance with schedules to be prescribed by this headquarters. The Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, is responsible for the procurement and supply of all material peculiar to the Air Forces, which will be moved to the objective area in shipping under the control of the Commanding General, Army Forces in WESTERN PACIFIC. Supplies peculiar to the Marine Corps will be procured through Marine Corps supply channels and moved to the objective area in shipping as arranged by agreement between Commander-in-Chief, Army Forces in the PACIFIC and Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Area.

8. The Commanding General, Army Forces in WESTERN PACIFIC, is responsible for coordinating the loading of cargo ships with the appropriate commanders responsible for loading support shipping to insure that these ships are loaded in accordance with the general procedure outlined above and with detailed plans to be later perfected and furnished to appropriate U. S. port commanders.

9. To meet a possible requirement for emergency resupply, the Commanding General, Army Forces in WESTERN PACIFIC, will:

a. So phase loading and sailings of balanced loaded maintenance ships with sufficient lead time to insure 15 days supplies for the entire force to be available on call at Regulating Stations.

b. Similarly, 5 U/F on balanced-loaded ships for 5 divisions to be available on call at the Regulating Stations.

c. Similarly, 15 days of supply of Air Forces ammunition on balanced-loaded ships for the operation of the Air Forces employed to be available on call at the Regulating Stations.

d. After X / 60 the foregoing a, b and c will be released to the Commanding General, Army Forces in WESTERN PACIFIC for appropriate distribution.

10. In the objective area the Commanding General, Army Forces in WESTERN PACIFIC, establishes by X / 120 the following stockages:

a. 30 days reserve with 30 days operating level of Classes I (Including Post Exchange Supplies), II, III (lubricants and greases only), IV and V-A.

b. Class III (except lubricants and greases) to be maintained at 15 days (maximum) packaged products plus bulk storage of not to exceed 15 days.

c. Class III-A - 15 days operating level.

d. Class V - 5 U/F reserve and 5 U/F operating level for ground forces employed in the operation.

e. Accumulation of reserves is at a uniform rate.

11. The Commanding General, Army Forces in WESTERN PACIFIC, is responsible for the procurement of and delivery to the Army Commander in the objective area food, medical supplies, and other items for the relief of the civilian population, liberated nationals, and allied prisoners of war, as required.

II. EVACUATION.

1. Evacuation from the objective areas initially is by naval assault craft, followed at the earliest practicable date by the employment of hospital ships and air evacuation. Evacuation is to ports and bases where bed credits have been established.

After X / 90, insofar as practicable, all hospitalization is effected in the objective areas. Direct evacuation to the UNITED STATES will be later determined and directed by this headquarters.

2. Responsibility for evacuation is as follows:

Overwater - Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet

By air - Commanding General, Far East Air Forces.

To beaches, air strips, and hospitals operated in objective areas - by Commanding General, Sixth Army until X / 15. After X / 15 the Commanding General, Army Forces in WESTERN PACIFIC will evacuate from Army installations to Base Command hospitals and to beaches and air strips as required.

3. The Commanding General, Army Forces in WESTERN PACIFIC, is responsible for the early establishment of fixed hospitals and the hospitalization of casualties evacuated thereto from mobile hospitals of the combat forces.

4. Geneva-protected hospital ships operating under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, are available for augmenting evacuation from the objective area.

5. The Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, employs two groups of Troop Carriers to evacuate casualties from the several objective areas to hospitals at OKINAWA. Three squadrons of L-5 evacuation planes are available for use in evacuating patients from forward medical units.

6. The Commanding General, Pacific Division, ATC, evacuates patients by air to hospitals at more distant bases in the CENTRAL PACIFIC Area, and to the UNITED STATES, as requested by the commander responsible for evacuation and as arranged by the Commander-in-Chief, Army Forces in the PACIFIC.

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7. In emergency, casualties are evacuated on heavy cargo shipping but only to ports and bases equipped with adequate hospital facilities at minimum distances from the objective areas. When this is done the ships complement is augmented by the necessary medical personnel appropriately equipped with supplies to care for the patients enroute.

8. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet (As provided for in paragraph 2 above), and the Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, are responsible that water (except cargo ships) and air transportation respectively, evacuating casualties from the objective area have adequate medical equipment, personnel, and supplies to care for patients while enroute. The Commanding General, Army Forces in WESTERN PACIFIC, is responsible for medical care and attendance of casualties evacuated by cargo shipping in emergency.

9. Prisoners of war are confined in the objective area.

10. Civilian casualties are not evacuated from the objective area.

III. HOSPITALIZATION.

1. During the early phases of the operation prior to the establishment of fixed hospitals in the objective area, minor casualties are hospitalized in mobile-type hospitals assigned to the Sixth Army. Casualties requiring prolonged treatment (in excess of 30 days) within the period X to X / 90 are hospitalized in fixed hospitals in rear areas and in similar hospitals as they become established in the objective area. After X / 90 this type of hospitalization is effected in the objective area to the extent possible within the theater evacuation policy. Necessary evacuation after X / 90 is direct to the UNITED STATES as far as practicable.

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2. Bed credits are available for air and ground forces employed in this operation, to X / 90 at bases under the control of:

Commanding General, Army Forces in MIDDLE PACIFIC

X Day - 5,000 X / 7 - 7,000 additional

Commanding General, Army Forces in WESTERN PACIFIC

X Day - 5,000 X / 10 - 6,000 additional X / 20 -
7,000 additional.

3. The Commanding General, Army Forces in WESTERN PACIFIC is responsible for establishing 36,750 fixed hospital beds in the objective area.

4. The maximum use, consistent with the minimum needs of the civilian population, is made of existing civil hospitals and other suitable buildings for hospitalization of casualties.

IV. TRANSPORTATION.

1. Assault naval craft is used for transportation of assault and reinforcing elements forward from mounting areas and for movement of other troop organizations with heavy equipment and stores.

2. Estimate of troops, equipment, and cargo, including maintenance, construction materials, and supplies for the Military Government to be moved into the SOUTHERN KYUSHU Area, are included in Appendix B.

3. Concentration of troops in mounting areas requiring water transportation is effected in theater shipping, augmented by available naval troop carrying craft.

4. In order to regulate flow of shipping into the objective port areas, regulating stations are established at locations designated by this headquarters.

5. The movement of shipping forward from the regulating station is controlled by the Army Commander up to X / 15,

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thereafter by the Commanding General, Army Forces in WESTERN PACIFIC.

6. To assist in port clearance and to minimize motor traffic on roads to the greatest extent possible, the maximum use is made of railways and rolling stock captured within the operational area that can be rapidly rehabilitated and without the introduction of major railway equipment tonnages.

V. CONSTRUCTION.

1. For general information of facilities to be provided in the SOUTHERN KYUSHU Area, see Appendix 4 A.

2. Construction is limited to the provision of minimum essential operational facilities.

3. The Army Commander, employing construction forces made available to him, initiates construction of port, base, air and signal communication facilities. The Commanding General, Army Forces in WESTERN PACIFIC, upon assuming logistic responsibility (X / 15), continues the construction of approved projects.

4. Bulk petroleum shore tankage and distribution systems are constructed as shown in Appendix "D".

VI. MAIL.

The Commanding General, Army Forces in WESTERN PACIFIC, is responsible for picking up mail from staging areas immediately after troops mount, transporting mail to the objective areas, and for the establishment and operation of a principal APO in each principal landing area.

VII. SHIPPING DESIGNATORS. (will be announced later).

VIII. MISCELLANEOUS.

1. Maximum use is made of available local resources, and civilian labor.

ANNEX 4

OPERATION - "OLYMPIC"

AFROU EAST DEVELOPMENT (Cont'd)

TYPE FACILITY	KARACHI	SHINGAR	AFHANGI	REMARKS
(10) Air Warning Net	SOUTHERN KYUSHU Net	SOUTHERN KYUSHU Net	SOUTHERN KYUSHU Net	
(11) Water Supply for Strength of:	320,000	215,000	135,000	
(b) <u>Ground Forces</u>				
(1) Supply Points	400,000 trps for 30 days plus 30 day operating level	185,000 trps for 30 days plus 30 day operating level	Temporary facilities for 135,000	
(2) Covered Storage	1,730,000 sq ft	750,000 sq ft	115,000 sq ft	
(3) Open Storage	5,000,000 sq ft	2,500,000 sq ft	As Required	
(4) Motor Vehicle Assembly Shop Incl in b (2)	NONE	NONE	NONE	
(5) Salvage Segregation Depots Incl in b (2)	One Dupot	As Required	NONE	
(6) Rehabilitation Camp	50,000 to be located in TANIYAMA Area	NONE	NONE	
(7) Semi-permanent Cantonments for	Not to exceed 175,000 1 Marine Corps (less one Div) 60,000.	Not to exceed 140,000	NONE	Includes unit camps. All Army construction of temporary type. Marine Corps camps to be constructed by Navy.
(8) Hospital Beds	13,250 fixed beds Marine - 4,750 fixed beds	15,500 fixed beds	4,500 fixed beds	Marine Corps hospitalization constructed by Navy.
(9) Headquarters	GHQ Forward Echelon Base Command Combat Forces RMP Liaison Group	Sub Base Combat Forces	Combat Forces	

Annex 4

OPERATION - "CLIMAX"

KYUSHU BASE DEVELOPMENT (Cont'd)

TYPE FACILITY	ACCOMMODATION	SHIFTS	REMARKS	REMARKS
(c) <u>Air Forces</u>				
(1) Air Depots	NONE	5 ADC	NONE	
(2) Covered Storage Sq. ft	Included under (b) (2)	Included under (b) (2)	Included under (b) (2)	
(3) Open Storage Sq. ft	Included under (b) (3)	Included under (b) (3)	Included under (b) (3)	
(4) Headquarters	PEAR Fwd Echelon	PEAR Fwd Echelon	NONE	
(5) A.T.C.	NONE	Freight & passenger terminal. Airfield facilities to be provided at KANOKA air center	NONE	
(6) Airfields	* 2 - 5,000 ft * 2 - 6,000 ft * 100 Standard Hardstands	* 4 - 6,000 ft * 5 - 7,000 ft * 97 Standard Hardstands	2 - 7,000 ft 1 - 6,000 ft 342 Standard Hardstands	
(7) Communications	Radio, wire, cable and teletype to support operations	Radio, wire, cable and teletype to support operations	Radio, wire, cable and teletype to support operations	
(8) Air Warning Net	SOUTHERN KYUSHU Net	SOUTHERN KYUSHU Net	SOUTHERN KYUSHU Net	
(9) Camp Areas Strength	Incl under (b) (7)	Incl under (b) (7)	Incl under (b) (7)	
(10) AACs	NONE	As Required	NONE	
(d) <u>Marine Corps</u>	All facilities included under ground and air forces.	All facilities included under ground and air forces.	All facilities included under ground and air forces.	
* Marine Airfields at ITAKU constructed by Navy. Tentatively estimated by AFMAC for planning purposes.				

OPERATION - "OLYMPIC"

AMPHIBIOUS AND HEAVY CARGO SHIPPING REQUIREMENTS

	X to X / 15	X / 30	X / 45	X / 60	X / 75	X / 90	X / 120	X / 150
<u>PERSONNEL</u> (Exclusive of Naval Service except 4 NCB)								
Assault Craft	394358	140000	70000	61939	25349			
Replacements (Assault Craft)	33000		20000					
Airborne	4840	4995	6865	4680	960			
Total	432198	144995	96865	66619	26309			
Cumulative Total	432198	571193	674058	740677	766986	766986	766986	766986
<u>TONNAGES (DWT)</u> (Exclusive of construction performed by Naval Forces)								
<u>Amph Lift</u>								
Org Eqpt (Incl 30 days maint) a b	622966	250000	130000	110000	92732			
Construction Materials	18075							
Civilian Relief	2700							
Sub-total	643741	250000	130000	110000	92732			
<u>Cargo Lift</u>								
Maintenance (less ammunition)		117000 (18)	149500 (23)	162500 (25)	175500 (27)	182000 (28)	370500 (57)	286000 (44)
Ammunition								
Ground Forces	39000 (6)	58500 (9)	58500 (9)	58500 (9)	58500 (9)	65000 (10)	123500 (19)	84500 (13)
Air Forces	18000 (3)	20000 (3)	37000 (6)	34000 (6)	54000 (8)	45000 (7)	91000 (14)	91000 (14)
Construction Materials	32125 (5)	54000 (8)	54000 (8)	57000 (9)	36000 (6)	18000 (3)	13000 (2)	
Civilian Relief		2700 #	2700 #	2700 #	2700 #	2700 #	5400 (1)	
Sub-total	89125 (14)	252200 (38)	301700 (46)	314700 (49)	326700 (50)	312700 (48)	603400 (93)	461500 (71)
<u>AGGREGATES</u>								
Amph	643741	250000	130000	110000	92732			
Cargo	89125 (14)	252200 (18)	301700 (46)	314700 (49)	326700 (50)	312700 (48)	603400 (93)	461500 (71)
Total	732866	502200	431700	424700	419432	312700	603400	461500
<u>CUMULATIVE</u>								
Amph	643741	893741	1023741	1133741	1226473	1226473	1226473	1226473
Cargo	89125 (14)	341325 (52)	643025 (98)	957725 (147)	1284425 (197)	1597125 (245)	2200525 (338)	2662025 (409)
Total	732866	1235066	1666766	2091466	2510898	2823598	3426998	3888498

NOTES: a. Includes Military Government Organizations.

b. Assumes 100% personnel, vehicles, and DWT lifted. Some adjustment will be required if a deficiency in vehicle lift occurs.

Represents tonnage to be lifted but to be loaded on vessels carrying maintenance or other supplies.

() Represents number of Liberty ship equivalents of 6500 DWT.

CONVERSION FACTORS DWT TO MT

Organizational Equipment - 3.0
Maintenance Supplies - 1.8
Construction Materials - 1.4

OPERATION - "OLYMPIC"

* MATSUSHIMA AREA

E. D. C.

FACILITIES

RUNWAYS

REMARKS

X / 15

Undispersed parking with 40 Standard
Hardstands for 4 F1 Gps, 2 M1 F1 Sqs,

2 - 5,000 ft

- (1) Rehabilitation of existing field at
TOJIMBARA to 5,000 ft.
- (2) Rehabilitation of existing field at
CHIRAN to 5,000 ft.

X / 30

Undispersed parking with 60 Standard
Hardstands for 4 F1 Gps, 2 M1 F1 Sqs,
1 Photo Sq VD

1 - 5,000 ft

1 - 6,000 ft

- (1) TOJIMBARA at 5,000 ft
- (2) CHIRAN extended to 6,000 ft.

X / 45

Parking with 120 Standard Hardstands
for 4 F1 Gps, 1 MB Gp, 2 M1 F1 Sqs,
1 Photo Sq VD

1 - 5,000 ft

1 - 6,000 ft

- (1) TOJIMBARA at 5,000 ft.
- (2) CHIRAN at 6,000 ft.
- (3) Additional 5,000 ft at CHIRAN.
- (4) Additional 5,000 ft at MATSUNAGA.

X / 60

Parking with 180 Standard Hardstands
for 4 F1 Gps, 1 MB Gp, 2 M1 F1 Sqs,
1 Photo Sq VD

2 - 5,000 ft

2 - 6,000 ft

- (1) TOJIMBARA at 5,000 ft.
- (2) CHIRAN at 6,000 ft.
- (3) CHIRAN extended to 6,000 ft.
- (4) MATSUNAGA at 5,000 ft.

* Tentatively phased for Planning Purposes by AFAC. Construction
by Navy.

OPERATION - "OLYMPIC"

MIYAZAKI AREA (Cont'd)

<u>E. D. C.</u>	<u>FACILITIES</u>	<u>RUNWAYS</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
X / 15	Undispersed parking with 33 Standard Hardstands for 1 FI Cps, 1 NI FI Sq, 1 Photo Sq	1 - 5,000 ft	(1) Existing Jap field at MIYAZAKI rehabilitated to 5,000 ft all-weather.
X / 30	Parking with 78 Standard Hardstands for 2 FI Cps, 2 NI FI Sq, 1 1/4 MB Cps, 1 Photo Ren Sq.	1 - 5,000 ft 1 - 6,000 ft	(1) MIYAZAKI extended to 6,000 ft. (2) Additional 5,000 ft all-weather at MIYAZAKI.
X / 45	Parking with 163 Standard Hardstands for 4 FI Cps, 2 NI FI Sq, 2 1/4 MB Cps, 1 Photo Ren Sq, 1 ASR Sq	1 - 5,000 ft 2 - 6,000 ft	(1) MIYAZAKI at 6,000 ft. (2) MIYAKANOJO additional 5,000 ft all-weather. (3) MIYAZAKI #2 extended to 6,000 ft.
X / 60	Parking with 257 Standard Hardstands for 4 FI Cps, 2 NI FI Sq, 3 1/4 MB Cps, 1 HB Cps, 2 Photo Ren Sq, 1 ASR Sq	1 - 6,000 ft 2 - 7,000 ft	(1) Two at MIYAZAKI extended to 7,000 ft. (2) MIYAKANOJO extended to 6,000 ft.
X / 75	Accommodations with 331 Standard Hardstands for 4 FI Cps, 2 NI FI Sq, 3 1/4 MB Cps, 2 HB Cps, 2 Photo Ren Sq, 1 ASR Sq.	1 - 6,000 ft 2 - 7,000 ft	(1) Two at MIYAZAKI at 7,000 ft. (2) MIYAKANOJO at 6,000 ft.
X / 90	Accommodations with 342 Standard Hardstands for 4 FI Cps, 2 NI FI Sq, 3 1/4 MB Cps, 2 HB Cps, 2 Photo Ren Sq, 1 ASR Sq.	1 - 6,000 ft 2 - 7,000 ft	(1) Two at MIYAZAKI at 7,000 ft. (2) MIYAKANOJO at 6,000 ft.

OPERATION - "OLYMPIC" (Cont'd)

KAGOSHIMA AREA (Cont'd)

Completion Dates	Bbls. Avgas	Bbls. M.T.	Bbls. Diesel Fuel	Bbls. Range Fuel and Kerosene	Other Facilities and Remarks
4th Objective (X / 60)	10,000	21,000	10,000	10,000 1,000 *	Four (4) 10,000 bbl tanks; one (1) each for Avgas and Diesel fuel and two (2) for MT gas located at main installation at KAGOSHIMA. Two (2) 5,000 bbl tanks for range fuel and kerosene located at main installation at KAGOSHIMA, complete with drum filling facilities. One (1) 1,000 bbl tank for MT gas to be located at KAJIKI and to be complete with connection and fittings to permit distribution to drums and/or tank trucks. One (1) 4-inch pipeline for MT gas from main terminal at KAGOSHIMA to small tank at KAJIKI. One (1) 4-inch dual-purpose pipeline to connect main terminal at KAGOSHIMA with KUSHIKINO terminal.
5th Objective (X / 90)	10,000	45,000	20,000	10,000	Seven (7) 10,000 bbl tanks; one (1) for Avgas, four (4) for MT gas and two (2) for Diesel Fuel - to be located at main installation at KAGOSHIMA. Three (3) 5,000 bbl tanks; two (2) for range fuel and kerosene to be located at main installation at KAGOSHIMA and one (1) for MT gas to be located at KAJIKI. Drum cleaning and filling facilities to accommodate daily 2,000 drums Avgas, MT gas, Diesel fuel, and range fuel/kerosene.
TOTAL SHORE TANKAGE:	56,000	93,000	36,000	21,000	

* One (1) 1,000 bbl tank erected to MT gas to be transferred to range fuel-kerosene on X / 60.

Note: During assault phase until adequate tankage is established ashore, 5,000 bbl barges or small tankers, moored at landing points at YAMAKITA and KUSHIKINO, will be used for storage.

OPERATION - "OLYMPIC"

SHIBUSHI AREA

BULK PETROLEUM STORAGE

Co location Dates	Bbls. Avgas	Bbls. H.T.	Bbls. Diesel Fuel	Bbls. Range Fuel and Kerosene	Other Facilities and Remarks
1st Objective (X 4 10)	2,000	1,000			<p>One (1) small fueling bitty, located in sheltered water in vicinity of SHIBUSHI, complete with 6-inch unloading lines to permit discharge of Avgas and HT gas to tanks ashore.</p> <p>Two (2) 1,000 bbl tanks, one each for Avgas and HT gas at SHIBUSHI terminal, complete with connections and fittings to permit distribution to drums and/or tank trucks.</p> <p>One (1) 1,000 bbl tank for Avgas at airfield with connections and fittings to permit distribution to tank trucks; to be connected to SHIBUSHI terminal by 4-inch victualic invasion pipe with necessary pumps.</p>
2nd Objective (X 4 25)	2,000	6,000	2,000	*	<p>Two (2) 5,000 bbl tanks, one each for Avgas and HT gas, to be located at SHIBUSHI terminal.</p> <p>One (1) 2,000 bbl tank for diesel fuel located at SHIBUSHI terminal.</p> <p>One (1) 1,000 bbl tank for HT gas to be located at SHIBUSHI terminal.</p> <p>Two (2) 1,000 bbl tanks for Avgas; one additional at two airfields with necessary connections and fittings to permit distribution to tank trucks.</p> <p>One (1) 4-inch unloading line for discharge of diesel fuel from tankers to shore tankage.</p> <p>One (1) 4-inch victualic invasion pipeline, together with small tankage to permit distribution of HT gas to drums and/or tank trucks to follow immediately in rear of troops advancing northward.</p>

'OLYMPIC'

BULK PETROLEUM STORAGE

OPERATION - "OLYMPIC"

MIYAZAKI AREA

COMPLETION DATES	BELS AVGAS	BELS M.T.	BELS DIESEL FUEL	OTHER FACILITIES AND REMARKS
1st Objective (X / 10)	1,000	(1,000) *	*	One (1) small barge for TY tanker landing with one (1) 6-inch sea unloading line each for Avgas and MT gas, one (1) 4-inch line for ADF. Two (2) 1,000 bbl tanks; one (1) each for MT gas and Avgas located at airfield. Each complete with connections and fittings to permit distribution to drums or tank trucks.
2nd Objective (X / 30)	10,000	10,000	5,000	Two (2) 10,000 bbl tanks located at airfield; one (1) each for Avgas and MT gas. One (1) 5,000 bbl tank for diesel fuel in vicinity of main terminal complete with connections and fittings to permit distribution to drums.
3rd Objective (X / 45)	5,000	5,000	1,000 *	Two (2) 5,000 bbl tanks at main terminal; one (1) each for Avgas and MT gas.
4th Objective (X / 60)	30,000	13,000	4,000	One (1) 10,000 bbl tank and three (3) 1,000 bbl tanks at main terminal for MT gas. Four (4) 1,000 bbl tanks at main terminal for ADF. Three (3) 10,000 bbl tanks to be located in airfield areas.
TOTAL SHORE TANKAGE:	46,000	28,000	10,000	

* 1,000 bbl tank erected for use to be transferred to Diesel Fuel on X / 60.

Note: During assault phase until shore tankage is established ashore, 5,000 bbl barges or small tankers, moored at the landing point at MIYAZAKI, will be used for storage.

OPERATION - "OLYMPIC"

SUMMARY OF
CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS REQUIREMENTS

		(DWT)	
	<u>ENGINEER</u>	<u>SIGNAL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
KAGOSHIMA	113517	20060	133577
SHIBUSHI	120700	9557	130257
MIYAZAKI	24420	2207	26627
TOTAL	258637	31824	290461

PHASED REQUIREMENTS

<u>PERIOD</u>	<u>DWT</u>
X - X / 15	32125
X / 15 - X / 30	60400
X / 30 - X / 45	61265
X / 45 - X / 60	63000
X / 60 - X / 75	39871
X / 75 - X / 90	20800
X / 90 - X / 120	13000
TOTAL	290461

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ANNEX 5 a

STAFF STUDY

OLYMPIC

Communications Plan

1. DIRECTIVE

This plan covers the signal communications for operations of Pacific Forces in the assault upon, and the establishment of the beachheads in, the southern portion of KYUSHU; and further operations to destroy hostile forces therein, and establish conditions favorable for the launching of a major offensive against the heart of JAPAN, on the Island of HONSHU.

2. ASSUMPTIONS

a. That normal command, administrative, and liaison communications will be functioning within the communications zones of CINCAFPAC and CINC U.S. Pacific Fleet, and to headquarters of theaters and major supporting forces not directly participating in Operation OLYMPIC.

b. That at the initiation of the operation the following headquarters will be established and operating as follows:

CINCAFPAC - MANILA

CINC U.S. PACIFIC FLEET - GUAM

20TH AIR FORCE - GUAM

14TH AIR FORCE - KUNMING

SIXTH U.S. ARMY - LUZON

FAR EAST AIR FORCES - MANILA

ARMY FORCES IN MIDDLE PACIFIC - HONOLULU

CINCPOA ADVANCE - GUAM

ARMY FORCES IN WESTERN PACIFIC - MANILA

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- c. (1) That Naval Forces will install, operate, and maintain all naval communication facilities unless otherwise directed.
- (2) CINC U.S. Pacific Fleet will install, operate, and maintain at ADVANCE CINCAFPAC in the objective area, the signal communication facilities required for the reception and transmission of orders, information, and intelligence between the Advance Headquarters of CINCAFPAC in the objective area, and the appropriate headquarters and elements of CINC U.S. Pacific Fleet.
- (3) That CINC U.S. Pacific Fleet will provide such signal communication facilities and personnel at Advance Headquarters of CINCAFPAC in the objective area, as may be required to keep CINCAFPAC promptly informed of all matters affecting the progress of the naval phases of the operations.

d. The Japanese military and civil communications will be completely destroyed prior to or during the landing and subsequent operations.

e. That plans will be completed whereby adequate communications for cooperative action between all forces will be assured.

f. That the 68th Army Airways Communications System will establish such Army Airways Communication facilities and radio and radar navigational aids in the OLYMPIC area as may be required.

[REDACTED]

3. OPERATIONS (See Chart, Appendix 5 a, Principal Channels of Signal Communication)

a. General

- (1) In general, signal communication facilities for Operation OLYMPIC will provide channels of communication between Headquarters, CINCAFPAC, Sixth U. S. Army, CINC U. S. Pacific Fleet, Far East Air Forces, USAF WESTPAC, 20th Air Force, 14th Air Force, USAF MIDPAC, CINCPAC, and the designated elements of the attack, landing and supporting forces.
- (2) Liaison channels are provided between all tactical units as required.
- (3) Temporary safehand air courier service will be provided to areas to be designated.

b. Sixth U.S. Army, Far East Air Forces, and USAF WESTPAC will install, operate, and maintain the communication facilities required for the reception and transmission of orders, information, and intelligence between their respective headquarters and Headquarters, CINCAFPAC and Advance Echelons thereof, wherever located.

c. Tasks

- (1) Sixth U. S. Army
 - (a) Insures the provision of signal communications required to accomplish the tasks assigned by the plan to which this is an Annex.
 - (b) Insures the provision of an integrated inter-communication system between air,

[REDACTED]

ground, and naval forces in the objective areas for defense, aircraft warning, intelligence, navigation, supply point, liaison, and line of communication purposes.

- (c) In cooperation with Far East Air Forces insures the availability of the facilities and devices mentioned in paragraph 3 c (2)(c) below.
- (d) Assist the Commanding Officer, 68th Army Airways Communications System Group in the establishment, in the OLYMPIC area, of such Army Airways Communication facilities and radio and radar navigational aids as may be required by Far East Air Forces.
- (e) Provides communications required for the operation of so much of the enemy railway systems as may be required for operational and supply purposes.
- (f) Will be prepared to render the Naval Forces in the objective area all necessary assistance in the initial establishment of naval communications therein.
- (g) Will insure the provision of such signal communications services as may be required for Military Government purposes.

[REDACTED]

(2) Far East Air Forces

(a) Provides the signal communications, aircraft warning services and air navigational facilities required for:

1. Accomplishment of the tasks assigned in the plan to which this is an Annex.
2. Air operational intelligence, air command, and liaison purposes with 14th and 20th Air Forces, and air units of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.
3. Air Forces purposes in the cooperative action between land-based and carrier-based aircraft, and between other elements of the Air Forces of CINCPAC and the Air and Naval Forces of CINC U.S. Pacific Fleet.

(b) Provide maximum possible assistance to the Sixth U.S. Army in the construction of initial minimum airdrome communication facilities to insure the rapid accomplishment of missions assigned in the plan to which this is an Annex.

(c) In cooperation with the Sixth U.S. Army insures that electronic devices, such as radar and radar beacons, are provided as may be required for use in indicating the location of the friendly

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front lines and friendly forward elements, and for electronically indicating the location of the enemy targets for direct air and naval support.

(3) U.S. Army Forces in Western Pacific

Provide the signal communication facilities required for the tasks assigned in the plan to which this is an Annex, and in addition those required:

- (a) For a mobile communication system to serve the Advance Headquarters, CINCAFPAC.
- (b) By the Regulating System, Headquarters CINCAFPAC, for the movement of shipping from United States, Pacific Ocean Areas, Philippines, and Australasian bases.
- (c) For the furnishing, in cooperation with the Sixth U.S. Army, of such communication services as may be required for Military Government purposes.
- (d) For the operation of so much of the enemy railway systems in the occupied areas as may be passed to its control by CINCAFPAC for supply, administrative, and operational purposes.

4. LOGISTICS

a. Signal supply, in general, will be from the United States and supply establishments in the objective area, augmented as practicable from the CENTPAC and SWPA.

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b. USAF WESPAC provides the signal supplies, equipment, and construction material in accordance with existing directives.

c. Far East Air Forces provides the signal supply and equipment for Air Force technical purposes in accordance with existing directives.


5. PLANS

a. Sixth U.S. Army, Far East Air Forces, and USAF WESPAC will prepare and submit to this headquarters communications plans and requests for signal supplies, equipment, and personnel to accomplish the tasks enumerated in paragraph 3 c above, on or prior to dates specified in relevant instructions from this headquarters.

b. Central Bureau and Section 22 will submit their respective plans for radio intelligence, and radio and radar countermeasures to this headquarters by dates to be specified by the Chief Signal Officer.

c. Plans and directives for coordination of radio frequencies and call signs among forces concerned will be issued by this headquarters at an appropriate time.

PRINCIPAL CHANNELS OF SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS



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ANNEX 5 b

STAFF STUDY

"OLYMPIC"

MILITARY GOVERNMENT

Details regarding Military Government matters
to be issued at a later date.

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METEOROLOGICAL STUDY
SOUTHERN KYUSHU, JAPAN

(One Week Before and After 1 November 1945)

1. General

KYUSHU during this season is dominated by the Asiatic anticyclone, resulting in a generally cold dry northerly airflow over the archipelago. Poor weather in the southern and eastern areas occurs principally during a cold front passage, but a short time afterward when the high pressure cell overlies the islands, the islands are attended by generally fair weather and light winds.

Mean daily temperatures vary between 49° - 66° F. with extreme maximum and minimum of 81° and 29° F. Humidity will average 70% varying between 40% and 85%.

2. Precipitation

Precipitation of at least .004 inches may occur 5-6 days of the two-week period. The monthly precipitation averages 4 inches for the area which is about the lowest of the year, November, December and January being the three driest months of the year. This 4-inch minimum of November may be compared to the maximum of 17 inches in June.

Greatest precipitation with resulting inclement weather occurs as the result of wave activity on the semi-permanent front lying NE and SW in the FORMOSA-LUZON area.

Precipitation in the form of snow should not occur at this time.

3. Winds

Prevailing winds are N and NW 7 miles per hour. Southerly winds of greater velocity may occur in November when KYUSHU is under the influence of wave activity to the south.

4. Cloudiness

This is the period of minimum cloudiness in Southern KYUSHU

During the two-week period an average of 4 clear days (0-.2), 7 partly cloudy (.2-.8) and 4 overcast (.8-1.0) may be expected.

Icing in the clouds when present, will be a hazard to flying. Moderate to severe icing being frequent in the clouds over 8,000 feet and especially after cold frontal passages.

5. Visibility

Greatest obstructions to visibility on the coast will be precipitation. Fog is rare on the coast but inland where air drainage is poor and on the slopes of mountains, fog will occur more frequently.

6. Typhoons & Gales

This is the end of the typhoon season and the possibility of typhoons affecting the area is negligible. Winds of gale force or better may occur one time during the month due to the proximity of wave activity along the semi-permanent FORMOSA-LUZON front.

7. Sea and Swell

Defining favorable conditions as waves 6 feet or less and unfavorable conditions as waves greater than 6 feet. The percent of observations during which such conditions occur are shown below.

The month of November has been compared with the month of July during which beach conditions are the most favorable.

	<u>EAST COAST</u>		<u>WEST COAST</u>	
	<u>November</u>	<u>July</u>	<u>November</u>	<u>July</u>
Favorable	79%*	90%*	87%	95%
Unfavorable	21%	10%	13%	5%

* July has maximum occurrence of fog 5-10% compared with less than 5% for November.

This is not the most favorable period of the year for sea conditions, especially in the open seas. While average swell conditions in June and July as compared with November are similar, the frequencies of moderate and high seas are 5-10% higher than the most favorable month of July.

8. Military Implications of Climatic Conditions

a. Air Operations

<u>Military Factor</u>	<u>Weather</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
High Level Bombing	Good	Except during wave and frontal activity.
Incendiary Bombing	Good	Dry
Observation & Photography	Good	Less than .4 cloud.
Air-Ground Support	Good	Good visibility and flying.
Parachute Operations	Good	Good flying.

b. Ground Operations

Artillery Fire Control	Good	Good visibility.
Chemical Warfare	Good	Stable-dry.
Mechanized Operations	Good	Dry terrain.
Infantry	Good	Dry & cool.
Engineer Construction	Good	Cool - dry.
Supplies & Storage	Good	Semi-tropical climate.
Amphibious Operations	Fair	Occasional high seas.

9. Astronomical Data

Moon Phases

New Moon	6 October 1945
First Quarter	14 October 1945
Full Moon	21 October 1945
Last Quarter	27 October 1945
New Moon	4 November 1945
First Quarter	12 November 1945
Full Moon	19 November 1945
Last Quarter	26 November 1945
New Moon	4 December 1945
First Quarter	12 December 1945
Full Moon	19 December 1945
Last Quarter	26 December 1945

TIDAL RANGES

FUKUSHIMA
INAMACHI
ARIAKE WAN

Latitude : 31°27' N

Longitude: 131°12' E

15 October - 15 December

1945

OCTOBER

Day	HIGH		LOW	
	Time	Ht.	Time	Ht.
15	-----	---	0645	2.4
M	1336	5.2	1956	4.2
16	0037	5.3	0815	2.2
Tu	1502	5.5	2104	3.6
17	0216	5.5	0917	1.8
W	1553	6.0	2151	2.9
18	0335	6.0	1007	1.4
Th	1635	6.4	2233	2.1
19	0435	6.5	1050	1.2
F	1708	6.8	2310	1.4
20	0525	7.0	1130	1.1
Sa	1743	7.0	2348	0.8
21	0610	7.3	1208	1.2
Su	1818	7.2	-----	---
22	0653	7.3	0026	0.4
M	1852	7.3	1246	1.5
23	0738	7.2	0106	0.2
Tu	1926	7.1	1323	1.8
24	0825	6.9	0146	0.2
W	2004	6.9	1400	2.3
25	0913	6.4	0229	0.5
Th	2042	6.5	1438	2.9
26	1006	5.9	0318	0.9
F	2126	6.1	1522	3.4
27	1110	5.4	0413	1.4
Sa	2218	5.5	1629	3.9
28	1232	5.1	0537	1.9
Su	2333	5.1	1852	4.1
29	-----	---	0716	2.1
M	1417	5.2	2030	3.8
30	0112	4.9	0831	2.1
Tu	1525	5.4	2126	3.2
31	0255	5.0	0925	2.0
W	1609	5.7	2208	2.7

NOVEMBER

Day	HIGH		LOW	
	Time	Ht.	Time	Ht.
1	0405	5.3	1008	2.0
Th	1639	5.9	2242	2.2
2	0450	5.6	1044	1.9
F	1705	6.1	2312	1.7
3	0528	5.9	1115	1.9
Sa	1729	6.3	2341	1.3
4	0602	6.0	1145	2.0
Su	1753	6.4	-----	---
5	0634	6.1	0010	1.0
M	1818	6.5	1211	2.1
6	0706	6.1	0034	0.8
Tu	1841	6.5	1238	2.3
7	0738	6.0	0103	0.7
W	1907	6.4	1305	2.5
8	0814	5.9	0133	0.6
Th	1933	6.3	1335	2.7
9	0858	5.7	0206	0.7
F	2005	6.1	1405	3.0
10	0942	5.5	0243	0.9
Sa	2044	5.8	1442	3.3
11	1032	5.3	0328	1.2
Su	2138	5.5	1530	3.6
12	1137	5.1	0427	1.6
M	2245	5.1	1701	3.8
13	-----	---	0555	1.8
Tu	1252	5.1	1916	3.6
14	0020	5.0	0730	1.9
W	1402	5.3	2030	3.0
15	0147	5.1	0838	1.7
Th	1457	5.7	2122	2.2
16	0306	5.5	0932	1.6
F	1545	6.1	2206	1.4
17	0415	6.0	1019	1.4
Sa	1627	6.4	2250	0.7
18	0508	6.4	1103	1.4
Su	1706	6.7	2329	0.1
19	0558	6.6	1143	1.5
M	1745	6.9	-----	---
20	0643	6.7	0010	-0.3
Tu	1823	7.0	1223	1.7
21	0730	6.6	0051	-0.4
W	1902	6.9	1303	2.0
22	0818	6.4	0133	-0.4
Th	1942	6.7	1342	2.4
23	0907	6.1	0216	-0.1
F	2025	6.3	1424	2.8
24	0957	5.7	0303	0.4
Sa	2112	5.8	1515	3.2
25	1053	5.3	0357	0.9
Su	2206	5.3	1624	3.5
26	1158	5.1	0504	1.5
M	2312	4.8	1818	3.6
27	-----	---	0627	1.9
Tu	1310	5.0	1952	3.3
28	0037	4.5	0744	2.1
W	1418	5.1	2053	2.8
29	0215	4.4	0845	2.2
Th	1510	5.3	2138	2.3
30	0335	4.6	0930	2.3
F	1547	5.5	2215	1.8

DECEMBER

Day	HIGH		LOW	
	Time	Ht.	Time	Ht.
1	0431	4.9	1008	2.3
Sa	1620	5.7	2247	1.4
2	0513	5.2	1042	2.3
Su	1648	5.9	2317	1.0
3	0547	5.4	1114	2.3
M	1715	6.0	2346	0.6
4	0622	5.5	1145	2.4
Tu	1743	6.1	-----	---
5	0656	5.6	0016	0.4
W	1811	6.2	1215	2.5
6	0729	5.7	0047	0.2
Th	1841	6.2	1250	2.6
7	0806	5.7	0118	0.1
F	1913	6.1	1319	2.7
8	0846	5.6	0153	0.2
Sa	1952	6.0	1355	2.8
9	0930	5.5	0231	0.4
Su	2035	5.7	1436	3.0
10	1016	5.3	0315	0.7
M	2130	5.4	1529	3.2
11	1107	5.2	0407	1.1
Tu	2232	5.1	1640	3.2
12	1203	5.2	0515	1.5
W	2349	4.9	1820	3.0
13	-----	---	0639	1.8
Th	1302	5.3	1947	2.5
14	0115	4.9	0755	1.9
F	1400	5.5	2047	1.8
15	0239	5.1	0857	1.9
Sa	1455	5.8	2140	1.0

"OLYMPIC"TERRAIN ESTIMATEOFSOUTHERN KYUSHU1. GENERAL

Southern KYUSHU is that area lying south and southeast of the central mountain mass below the general line SENDAI-NOBOEKA.

Southern KYUSHU includes three more or less large lowland areas facing the sea which will hereinafter be referred to as the KANOYA, KAGOSHIMA, and MIYAZAKI areas. These lowlands are separated by jumbles of low, rugged mountains and upland plateaus, and connected by a series of fairly level but winding valleys, 3 to 10 miles wide and 20 to 50 miles long, which cut through the upland masses.

2. KANOYA AREA (ARIAKE WAN - KANOYA - MIYAKANOJO)a. Topography

This area contains two terrain compartments: The ARIAKE Plain, 10 x 10 miles, extending west from the head of ARIAKE WAN, and the MIYAKANOJO Plain, 6 x 10 miles, extending south from MIYAKANOJO to the head of ARIAKE WAN.

The floors of both compartments are a series of flat terraces, divided into 1 and 2 mile blocks by stream valleys 20 to 100 feet deep. Terraces in the MIYAKANOJO Plain are planted in wet field rice, in the ARIAKE Plain in dry field rice. Patches of woodland are scattered through the lowlands; the surrounding foothills are densely forested. The surface is a deep layer of loose, medium-textured volcanic ash except for a few spots of clay-sand soil.

The ARIAKE Plain is separated from the KAGOSHIMA WAN by a narrow, 1 to 4 mile belt of hills 200 to 500 feet high, coridored only by low narrow valleys. The MIYAKANOJO Plain is connected to the south end of the MIYAZAKI Plain by the national highway (Route 1) which has to cross a 10 to 12 mile belt of low, moderately steep, heavily forested, ash covered hills rising 600 to 700 feet above the valleys. Cross-country movement is difficult across this route. The western route between KANOYA and MIYAKANOJO lies along a 12 mile, flat-topped,

ash covered ridge of which only the central four miles presents difficult obstructions in the form of rugged hills 500 to 1000 feet high.

b. Critical Terrain Features.

The critical terrain features of this area are:

- (1) The small hill belt separating KANOYA Plain from the KAGOSHIMA WAN.
- (2) The ridge mass east of the line MIYAKANOJO-KANOYA.
- (3) The southwestern end of the corridor route between MIYAKANOJO and MIYAZAKI.
- (4) The SAKURA JIMA peninsula extending into KAGOSHIMA WAN and overlooking the port of KAGOSHIMA from the east.

c. Beaches.

(1) ARIAKE WAN Beach Area.

- (a) Location and Extent: A broad sandy beach 10.5 miles long extending along the head of ARIAKE WAN between $31^{\circ}21' N$, $131^{\circ}01' E$ and $31^{\circ}29' N$, $131^{\circ}06' E$. The south end is marked by a rocky steep to coast flanking the beach and the north end is marked by the town of SHIBUSHI.
- (b) Character: Smooth and fine sand, varying in width from 100 to 300 feet. Inland it grades into wind-blown sand and low dunes. Slope of foreshore averages 1 on 25 and is steepest at northern end. Beach is firm, although inland dune areas are soft. Three stream mouths interrupt the beach and several small lagoons lie parallel to its line. Moderately heavy surf is nearly always present and shore drift predominately southward. No structures along beach except breakwater at SHIBUSHI.
- (c) Nearshore: Approach is clear except for small island (BIROSHIMA) lying 3 miles offshore opposite SHIBUSHI. Bottom slopes are mild with the 30 ft depth lying 3000 ft offshore and 15 ft depth lying 1500 to 1800 ft offshore. Bottom materials are sand grading to mud in deep water. Winds will be from northwest at time of landing. The mean tide range is 3.5 ft with high water interval about 6 hours

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after meridional passage of the moon.

- (d) Terrain and Exits: The beach is backed by low wind-blown sand dunes which grade inland to a belt of scattered trees and grass, followed by cultivated fields. Communications are well developed in the area. An improved road roughly parallels the beach about 3,000 feet inland. The road has lead out roads running inland to KANOYA (about 10 miles west) and MIYAKANOJO (about 20 miles north). A railroad connecting MIYAKANOJO-SHIBUSHI-KANOYA runs close behind the northern half of the beach. In general, the exit from the beach to the main road appears to be straightforward along most of the beach extent.

d. Roads and Railroads

- (1) Roads: The road from SHIBUSHI to MIYAKANOJO is an improved road about 18 feet wide, probably gravel surfaced. Road rises to height of about 800 feet 8 miles north of SHIBUSHI and then maintains level run into MIYAKANOJO. Critical areas along the route are two steep-curved areas 3 and 7 miles north of SHIBUSHI and river crossings just north of SHIBUSHI and just south of MIYAKANOJO. There are three villages between these points. Road capacity is estimated at 900 MT per day with development potential of 1800 MT per day.

The road from SHIBUSHI to KANOYA is a second class road, probably gravel, having an estimated capacity of 750 MT per day with development potential of 1000 MT per day. The most direct road leads to KANOYA following north of the railroad. Another converging road extends south of the railroad but is connected to the SHIBUSHI road only by an unimproved dirt road.

Another secondary road leads from SHIBUSHI eastward along the northern coast of ARIAKE WAN.

(2) Railroads.

A railroad runs from MAEJOJO to SHIBUSHI, at which point it branches east to a terminal on the east coast at ODOTSU, and west, passing through KANOYA, to a terminal on the KAGOSHIMA WAN at FURUE. This is a 3 ft 6 in gauge, single track all the way.

e. Ports.

SHIBUSHI.

This is an artificial harbor at the head of ARIAKE WAN. The harbor is east of MAE-KAWA, with the town north of the harbor. Its basin has dredged depths from 4 to 15 feet and is protected by breakwaters on the western and southern sides. Harbor works completed in 1943 include some quayage; lengths and depths alongside are not known. A railway and highway serve the port and town. Present capacity estimated at 2400 MT per day, with potential development to 5400 MT per day.

ABURATSU.

Located in latitude 31°34' N, on the east coast. This port has protected anchorage except from south and southeasterly blows. Inner harbor has a depth of 21 feet with outer anchorage in 42 to 48 feet of water over sand and mud. All cargo must be lightered to shallow water wharves. The port is headquarters for a fishing fleet and has also been used for timber export. Along the northern shore eastward of the wharf is a 1300 foot quay equipped with landing stages. Two small piers are near the center of the harbor on the eastern side. Reasonable amounts of water available to vessels here.

YAMAKAWA.

Located at 31°12' N, 131°38' E. Has channel entrance of 1800 feet with 19 feet depth. Harbor depth is 120 feet. Quays and piers reported here with 8 to 13 feet depths alongside. Used as a base for a fishing fleet.

f. Airfield Sites.

(See Inclosure 1).

3. KAGOSHIMA AREA (KAGOSHIMA - KUSHIKINO - MAKURAZAKI)

a. Topography

This area consists of two small coastal plains. The (southern) MAKURAZAKI Plain extends eastward 11 miles along the south coast of SATSUMA Peninsula. It is 2 to 6 miles wide with a gently rolling surface. The (western) KUSHIKINO Plain extends southward from KUSHIKINO 24 miles along the west coast. It is very narrow and has sand dunes along the coast; in its northern section hill spurs run down to the sea.

Both plains are in crops, chiefly wetfield rice on the western plain and dryfield rice on the southern plain. Surface materials on the plains are chiefly volcano ash and clay loam; on the hills, clay and loose rock. The plains and valleys have patches of woodland among the cultivated fields and on the sand dunes. Cross country movement is easy across the plains (in dry season), but difficult in the dune areas and hills back of the plains because of steep slopes and loose sand-ash soils.

The two plain areas are connected by two narrow valleys, each about 6 miles long and running in a general north-south direction in the southwest section of the peninsula. Both areas are separated from KAGOSHIMA WAN by rugged inland hills 300-800 feet high. Secondary roads cross the hill mass from the south and east to KAGOSHIMA.

b. Critical Terrain Features

The critical terrain features in this area are:

- (1) The central upland hill belt between IZAKU and KAGOSHIMA.
- (2) The valley corridors connecting the southern and western plains.
- (3) The heights south of KUSHIKINO.
- (4) The southeast tip of the SATSUMA peninsula around KAIMONDAKE.

c. Beaches

(1) KUSHIKINO-IZAKU Beach Area

- (a) Location and Extent: An uninterrupted sand beach 22 miles long, along the west coast of KYUSHU south of KUSHIKINO. Limits are $31^{\circ}42' N$, $130^{\circ}17' E$, and $31^{\circ}24' N$, $130^{\circ}15' E$.

(b) Character.

Beach material is moderately fine sand varying in width up to 300 feet. Inland there is a belt of wind-blown dunes which locally attain a width of 0.5 mile. These dunes are most prominent in the southern half of the beach. Foreshore is generally firm and back shore soft. There are several obstacles along the beach; the mouth of a lagoon one mile south of northern limit; the rocky peninsula of TOZAKI-MAMA 2 miles further south; and small river mouths and southern part of beach. There are no structures along the beach. Surf is heavy, especially when swell approaches from the northwest, and surf belt is widest along southern half of the area. Short drift is predominantly south.

(c) Nearshore.

Offshore approach is clear to 30 feet depth except for small islet about 5.5 miles west of central portion, and a shoal 3 miles southwest of this islet. The 30-foot line lies about 2500 feet offshore in the north and 4000 feet offshore in the south. The 18 foot line averages 2500 feet offshore. The beach is fronted by a sand flat at low tide. Bottom material along shore is sand, becoming fine in deep water. Winds will be from the northwest at time of landing. The mean range of tide is about 7 feet with a 7 hour high water interval.

(d) Terrain and Exits.

Beach area is backed by a coastal plain extending inland along several stream valleys. Immediately behind beach the dunes are without vegetation, but further inland they are covered with pines. An improved highway runs fairly close behind the beach in the northern area but recedes to 3 miles inland in the south. As far as known, the road is accessible from the beach by way of numerous tracks and

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unimproved roads. A railroad runs generally parallel to the highway south from KUSHIKINO.

(2) WAKI BEACH AREA (KAIMONDAKE)

(a) Location and Extent:

A sandy beach 5 miles long from $31^{\circ} 15' N$, $130^{\circ} 27' E$, southeastward to $31^{\circ} 11' N$, $130^{\circ} 31' E$. The volcano KAIMONDAKE (extinct) marks the southeast extremity of the beach.

(b) Character:

Mainly a sand beach about 100 feet wide at high water. Beach is generally firm and backed along greatest part by pine trees and scrub growth. Slope on foreshore averages about 1 on 20 and back shore is considerably flatter. Surf is heaviest during summer months and generally breaks in a broad belt close to shore. No structures are known.

(c) Nearshore:

Offshore approach to the 30 foot depth is clear and this depth lies 1500 to 2000 feet offshore so that bottom slope is mild to gentle. The 18 foot depth lies about 800 to 1000 feet offshore. Within 18 foot depth at northern and center part of beach are several scattered rocks and shoals. Bottom materials are sand. Winds at time of landing will be from the northwest. Mean tide range is 6 feet and occurs about 7 hours after meridional passage of the moon.

(d) Adjacent Terrain & Exits:

The beach area is backed by a narrow coastal plain. Inland from the plain and to the southeastward the slopes rise steeply along the volcanic cone, KAIMONDAKE, behind the central part of the plain the slopes are more gradual to the mountainous interior. A highway runs close behind the beach except for a short central portion where it curves inland for about 0.5 mile. Connecting highways

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run generally northeastward to the western shore of KAGOSHIMA WAN. Immediately behind the beach is a belt of pines which is succeeded farther inland by cultivated fields, mainly rice.

d. Roads and Railroads.

(1) Roads.

The road from KUSHIKINO to KAGOSHIMA represents a 25 mile stretch of the national highway. This is a 24 foot hard-surfaced road (probably gravel) and is paved for short distances into and out of the main cities. The road slopes gently up to a height of 400 feet about 2/3 of the way to KAGOSHIMA and thence down to sea level at KUSHIKINO. A terrain bottleneck exists about 5 miles outside KAGOSHIMA where the road passes through narrow defiles and there are sharp road curves in the vicinity of KUSHIKINO. There are three river crossings and two villages between KUSHIKINO and KAGOSHIMA. This road has an estimated capacity of 1800 MT per day and should not require additional construction.

The road from KUSHIKINO to MAKURAZAKI is a 35 mile section running generally parallel to the west coast. It is an improved road about 18 feet wide (probably gravel) and is paved for the first few miles after it leaves KUSHIKINO. The road profile never rises above 200 feet and runs level along the greater part of its route. Sharp curves offering potential terrain blocks exist at points 6, 23, and 31 miles south of KUSHIKINO. There are 8 river crossings and 7 villages between KUSHIKINO and MAKURAZAKI. Estimated road capacity is 1000 MT per day.

A secondary road circles the peninsula from KAGOSHIMA to MAKURAZAKI where it links with the main road. Three secondary roads cut inland from the southern coast and two secondary roads cross the peninsula from west to east. The estimated capacities of these roads are from 500 to 900 MT per day.

(2) Railroads:

A 3' 6" gauge single track railroad connects SENDAI-KUSHIKINO-KAGOSHIMA. Branches of this track parallel the east and west coasts of the SATSUMA peninsula to the southern extremities, but there is no connecting branch between the southern terminals. A trunk line extends 10 miles inland from KASEDA in the south.

e. Ports

(1) KAGOSHIMA

This is the major port in southern KYUSHU and lies on the northwest coast of KAGOSHIMA WAN. A rather small harbor is enclosed by breakwaters with an inner harbor average depth of 21 feet. There is anchorage for 4 vessels close to the two entrances to the harbor and 4 more could be anchored outside the first. Off the port, anchorage is 60 to 90 feet over mud and sand. There is approximately a mile of quay space available, a considerable portion of which has shallow water alongside. Estimated tonnage using lighters or amphibians is 4800 MT per 20-hour day. Clearance would be by rail or road with estimated combined capacity of 4500 MT per day.

(2) MAKURAZAKI

A small secondary port on the southwestern tip of the SATSUMA peninsula. The channel width is 1800 feet and has a depth of 19 feet. The harbor depth runs from 120 to 138 feet. Small quays and piers are present with 8 to 13 feet depths alongside. This is a base for a small fishing fleet. No tonnage estimate is given.

f. Airfields

(See Inclosure #1)

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4. MIYAZAKI AREA (MIYAZAKI Coastal Plain).

a. Topography.

Two triangular plains form a broken coastal shelf along the eastern KYUSHU coast, from NOBEOKA 52 miles south to MIYAZAKI.

The (Northern) NOBEOKA triangle is 3 miles deep and 7 miles wide; it is formed by the deltas of the GOKASE and KITA rivers and is composed of flat, wedge-shaped areas $\frac{1}{2}$ to 1 mile wide covered with wet rice fields. Small areas on the delta and the surrounding hills are covered by dense woods. The NOBEOKA triangle is separated from the (southern) MIYAZAKI triangle by a 12 mile long belt of low hills. Soils are chiefly clay, and sticky when wet.

The larger southern plain is 33 miles long and varies from $\frac{1}{2}$ to 1 mile wide in the north to 8 to 10 miles wide in the south. The area consists principally of a series of flat terraces, cut into 1 to 2 mile blocks by streams flowing out of the highlands. Most terraces and wider stream valleys are covered with rice paddies. Edges of terraces and projecting spurs are covered with grass and woodland. Inland from the plain, the foothills rise to 1000-1500 feet and are covered with dense forest. Soils are clay and loam on the flats; sandy and rocky in the surrounding low hills and spurs.

b. Critical Terrain Features.

- (1) The 12-mile hill belt south of NOBEOKA separating the northern and southern plains.
- (2) Road pass west of SADOWARA 12 miles north of MIYAZAKI.
- (3) High ground southwest of MIYAZAKI dominating coastal road leading to MIYAKANOJO.

c. Beaches.

TAKANABE BEACH AREA.

(1) Location and Extent.

A broad sand and pebble beach 38 miles long between the headland TOZAKI-HANA and the town of MIMIZU; limits are 31°48' N, 131°28' E, and 32°20' N, 131°37' E.

(2) Character of the Beach.

The beach is composed mainly of sand but the composition varies, becoming coarser and even pebbly at river mouths. Width of the beach varies from 50 to 300 feet. The broadest portions along the main central part and the narrowest portion lying between.

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KATANAMI and MIMIZU. Along most of the beach the sand grades inland into a belt of wind-blown sand dunes which are most prominent along the southern half of the area. The foreshore slopes of the beach is generally moderate and averages 1 on 25. The beach is firm over its entire extent except for local soft sand areas near some of the river mouths. The back shore is soft along the wind-blown portions. Surf is almost always present along this beach and for the greater part consists of several lines of breakers. Shore drift is southward along this beach. There are no structures along the beach. The villages are almost all inland but a few small settlements and houses may be found in the back shore area. The beach is interrupted along its total 38 miles extent by some half dozen river mouths.

- (3) Nearshore: The approach to the beach area is clear along most of its extent but shoal areas occur at both ends and locally along the beach. Shifting bars may be encountered in the nearshore region opposite the mouths of several rivers which flow into the sea along this area. In general, the bottom slopes within the 30 foot depth are mild but close to shore the bottom rises more steeply. Bottom material is sand near shore grading out to fine sand and moderate with mixed. Winds will be from the northwest at the time of the landing. The entire beach area is exposed and surf is moderate during the entire year. Swells will approach generally from the northeast at the time of landing. The mean range of tide is approximate 5 feet, and the mean offshore ocean drift is generally north.
- (4) Adjacent Terrain & Exits: The terrain behind this beach area consists of a roughly triangular plain with its broadest portion near its south end, where it extends inland along

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the flood plain of the OYODO-GAWA. This plain has a maximum width of about 10 miles. It is locally hilly but the most hilly portion approaches close to the sea northward of TAKANABE. The terrain immediately behind the beach consists mainly of a belt of wind-blown sand along the southern half of the beach. Inland of the beach from TAKANABE northward an irregular, hilly terrain approaches closer to the shore, and this country presents an alternation of cultivated fields and wooded areas.

Communications are well-developed along this area with a network of highways running parallel to the coast and inland along the several valleys which lead southwest, west, and northwest. The main coastal road approaches the beach at MIYAZAKI and runs northward, nearing the shore just south of TAKANABE and again between TSUNO and MIMIZU. An improved road enters the area from the south at the settlement of ORYUZAKO, runs northward along the beach, crosses the KIYOTAKE-GAWA about 1000 yards from its mouth, and runs northward at an average distance of 1.2 miles inland to the town of MIYAZAKI where it joins the main coastal highway. A standard-gauge railroad parallels this improved road and joins the main line at MIYAZAKI. From that town the railroad runs northward, generally parallel to the main coastal highway, and from a point about 4 miles south of TAKANABE the tracks run close inland behind the beach, forming its inner limit practically all the way to MIMIZU.

Exits from the southern half of the beach are generally convenient to the improved road between ORYUZAKO and MIYAZAKI; between the latter town and SHIOJI, about 6 miles farther north, another improved road parallels the beach at a distance of about 0.6 mile. This road is accessible along trails or tracks which lead shoreward from the beach. Difficulties of

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exit may be encountered along the southern half of the beach owing to the presence of lagoons behind the river mouths and occasional ditches which run parallel to the beach among the cultivated areas. Northward of TANANABE exit is passable to the railroad embankment, and inland of it are numerous unimproved roads forming a network over the area. A radio station is located at MIYAZAKI, and an airfield at TOMITAKA, about 6 miles north of MIMITSU along the main coastal road.

d. Roads and Railroads

(1) Roads

The road from MIYAZAKI to NOBOEKA is a 55 mile stretch of the national highway and is all-weather, hard surfaced and 24 feet wide. The road's profile is generally level during its entire course, never exceeding a height of over 200 feet above sea level. There is a steep curve area about 27 miles north of MIYAZAKI capable of providing serious road block. There are 21 river mouths and 12 villages along the route between MIYAZAKI and NOBOEKA. The estimated capacity of the road is 1800 MT per day.

A secondary road branches off the main highway about half way between NOBOEKA and MIYAZAKI and generally parallels the foothills running along the western side of the coastal triangle. Three crossroads connect the main highway and this secondary road. The estimated capacity of all these roads is from 500 to 900 MT per day, with potential development to 1200 MT per day.

From MIYAZAKI the national highway follows a hill mass to the west and then southwest into MIYAKANOJO. A secondary road leads directly out of MIYAZAKI to the southwest to MIYAKANOJO, following the southern base of the above mentioned hill mass.

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An overland route across the central mountain mass leads northwest out of SADOWARA to the west coast of KYUSHU. However, this is a secondary improved road and may be easily blocked about 10 to 15 miles west of SADOWARA where it rises in steep wind curves to a height of about 1000 feet.

(2) Railroads

A 3-foot, 6 inch gauge railroad parallels the coast from NOBOEKA to MIYAZAKI staying close into the coast along the northern half of the area but never exceeding 3 miles inland on the southern portion.

e. Port Facilities

There are no major ports along this portion of the east coast of KYUSHU. However, there are secondary landing areas at HOSOSHIMA at the extreme northern tip of the plain area and ORYUZAKO at the extreme southern end of the area. Estimates are not available on the capacity of these landing places.

f. Airfield Sites

(See Inclosure #1)